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Abstract
This thesis studies three questions in development economics.
Chapter 1, co-authored with Shilpa Aggarwal and Rebecca Dizon-Ross, explores
how the design of incentives should vary with the time preferences of agents. We
formulate predictions for two incentive contract variations that should increase effi-
cacy for myopic agents relative to patient ones: increasing the frequency of incentive
payments, and making the contract "dynamically non-separable" by only rewarding
compliance in a given period if the agent complies in a minimum number of other
periods. We test the efficacy of these variations, and their interactions with time pref-
erences, using a randomized evaluation of an incentives program for exercise among
3,200 diabetics in India. On average, providing incentives increases daily walking
by 1,300 steps or roughly 13 minutes of brisk walking, and decreases the health risk
factors for diabetes. Increasing the frequency of payment does not increase effective-
ness, suggesting limited impatience over payments. However, making the payment
function dynamically non-separable increases cost-effectiveness. Consistent with our
theoretical predictions, agent impatience over walking appears to play a role in non-
separability's efficacy: both heterogeneity analysis based on measured impatience
and a calibrated model suggest that the non-separable contract works better for the
impatient.
Chapter 2 presents evidence that the standard electricity billing process con-
tributes to inelastic demand. The paper assesses the elasticity of demand for elec-
tricity for customers using two metering and billing technologies. The first technol-
ogy, postpaid metering, allows customers to use energy and subsequently bills them
for the amount utilized. Many features of this system may reduce attentiveness
to the marginal price of energy-consuming activities: electricity prices are buried in
3
monthly bills; charges are aggregated over a lengthy billing period, making it difficult
to match energy-consuming behaviors to kilowatt-hours used; and bills are delivered
after consumption, potentially making cost less salient at the time of consumption.
The second technology, prepaid metering, requires customers to purchase electric-
ity prior to its use (similar to a prepaid phone plan). I find that customers who
are charged under the second technology are approximately twice as price-elastic as
those who are billed later.
Chapter 3, co-authored with Nick Hagerty, presents an experimental protocol
for a project that pays smallholder farmers in India to reduce their consumption
of groundwater. This project will test the effectiveness of payments for voluntary
conservation - a policy instrument that may be able to sidestep regulatory constraints
common in developing countries. It will also measure the price response of demand for
groundwater in irrigated agriculture, a key input to many possible reforms. Evidence
from a pilot suggests that the program may have reduced groundwater pumping by
a large amount, though confidence intervals are wide.
Thesis Supervisor: Abhijit Banerjee
Title: Ford Foundation International Professor of Economics
Thesis Supervisor: Esther Duflo
Title: Abdul Latif Jameel Professor of Poverty Alleviation and Development Eco-
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Chapter 1
Incentivizing Behavioral Change:
The Role of Time Preferences
1.1 Introduction
Incentive design is of core economic interest. While most classic contracting models
assume that agents are relatively patient, there is growing evidence that many people
are myopic. This raises an important question: What are the implications of agent
myopia for the design of incentives? In this paper, we develop and test insights for
how to tailor incentive design for impatient agents. We first formulate predictions
for incentive contract variations that should be more effective for myopic agents,
working within a contracting environment where principals pay agents to repeatedly
engage in tasks over time. We then conduct a randomized controlled trial (RCT) to
test the average efficacy of the contract variations, and to test our prediction that
the variations are more effective for the impatient.
Our experiment focuses on incentives for behavioral change, which are becoming
increasingly prevalent in areas such as health (Morris et al., 2004; Thornton, 2008;
Martins et al., 2009; Duflo et al., 2010), education (Fryer, 2011) and the environ-
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ment (Davis et al., 2014; Jayachandran et al., 2017). Tailoring incentives to account
for agent impatience may be particularly important in the behavioral-change do-
main, because the express purpose of many behavioral-change incentive programs
is to address present bias.1 Present-biased agents may fail to undertake behav-
iors that have short-run costs but only long-run benefits (e.g., getting immunized,
studying for tests), even if those behaviors are in their own long-run self-interest.
Behavioral-change incentive programs thus deliver small, short-run, positive incen-
tives in an attempt to better align agents' short-run behavior with their long-run
interests. However, even in this context where impatience is a key rationale for the
use of incentives, there is very little evidence on how to adjust incentive design for
impatient agents.
We begin by developing predictions about how incentive contract design depends
on time preferences. To do so, we distinguish between discount rates over consump-
tion and over financial rewards. The recent time-preference literature emphasizes
that time preferences over the receipt of financial rewards should reflect agents' bor-
rowing and lending opportunities, which are distinct from their (true) time prefer-
ences over time-dated consumption (Augenblick et al., 2015). As a result, we model
agents as having separate time preferences in the domains of consumption and fi-
nancial rewards. We then identify two contract variations, one per domain, with
increasing efficacy in agents' impatience in that domain.
In particular, we first test the often-posited but previously-untested prediction
that for agents who are impatient over payments, providing more frequent payment
can increase efficacy. Second, we test a novel prediction of our model: that making
the contract "dynamically non-separable," can improve the relative efficacy of incen-
'In contrast, other types of incentives (e.g., incentives for workers) often aim primarily to solve
moral hazard issues instead of an "internality" like present bias.
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tives for those with high discount rates over consumption (effort). By dynamically
non-separable, we mean that the incentive paid for action in a given period depends
on the actions in other periods. For example, the contract might pay people for
walking at least 10,000 steps on a day if and only if they reach that step target on
at least 5 days in the week. Notably, both of these contract variations are predicted
to improve the relative effectiveness of incentives for agents with a variety of types
of myopia, including those who are time-inconsistent and "sophisticated" (aware of
their own time inconsistency), those who are time-inconsistent and "naive" (unaware
of their time inconsistency), and those who are impatient but not time-inconsistent.
We test these two predictions through an RCT with roughly 3000 participants in
an important setting: the exploding policy problem of diabetes in India. There are
an estimated 60 million diabetics in India, with the number expected to surpass 100
million by 2025, approximately 7% of the population (Whiting et al., 2011; Anjana
et al., 2011). Diagnosed diabetics often fail to follow the primary health recom-
mendations for diabetes: exercising, eating right, and taking prescribed medicines.
Since following these recommendations entails short-run costs and long-run benefits,
providing incentives is a promising approach to improve compliance and promote
behavioral change. Our experiment delivers incentives to diabetics and prediabetics
for daily walking, a key recommendation for diabetes management (Qiu et al., 2014;
Zanuso et al., 2009).
The incentive program monitors participants' walking using pedometers, and, if
they achieve a daily step target of 10,000 steps, provides them with small financial
incentives in the form of mobile recharges (i.e. cell-phone credits). Within the incen-
tives program, we randomly vary (i) the frequency with which incentives are paid,
and (ii) whether payment is a linear function of the number of days the agent meets
the step target, or is "dynamically non-separable" - i.e., only rewarding step-target
21
compliance on a given day if the agent meets the step target on a minimum number
of other days that week. Our experiment also randomly assigns some participants
to a pure control group, and some to a "monitoring group" which receives pedome-
ters but no incentives, allowing us to test for the overall effects of our incentives on
exercise and health.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. We begin by establishing that small incentives
are highly effective at inducing exercise in this context. Providing incentives worth
just 20 INR (0.33 USD) per day increases compliance with a daily step target by 21
percentage points, off of a base of 30 percent. This translates to an additional 1300
steps per day on average, or roughly 13 minutes of brisk walking.
We then use our experiment to explore the implications of time preferences for
incentive design, presenting three main results. We begin by examining payment fre-
quency. If agents are impatient over payment receipt, then more immediate payment
should produce larger effects on behavior. This is the most intuitive prediction of im-
patience for incentive design, and, to our knowledge, the main prediction discussed
in the literature (besides pre-commitment) for tailoring incentives to impatience, 2
with, for example, Cutler and Everett (2010) proclaiming "the more frequent the
reward, the better." However, there is no empirical evidence on whether payment
frequency matters, and theoretical reasons to question both whether and what types
of increases in payment frequency would matter. In particular, discount rates over
money - and thus the overall responsiveness to payment frequency - could be small
or large: if credit markets are perfect, discount rates over payment should only re-
flect the interest rate, but if not (as may be true in developing countries) they could
be closer to discount rates over consumption. Furthermore, the types of increases
2 0'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) examine how to optimally penalize time-inconsistent procrasti-
nators for delays in a setting where delay is costly to the principal but task costs vary over time.
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in frequency that matter depend on which time-preference model holds in practice:
in some models used in the literature (e.g., the "beta-delta" model), the gains to
increasing frequency are limited unless payments can be made very frequently (e.g.,
every day), whereas in other models there could be large gains between, say, every
month and every week, which is important if very-frequent payments are infeasible.
We test the efficacy of three payment frequencies - monthly, weekly, and daily -
in order to assess whether, and what type of, increases in payment frequency improve
compliance. The three frequencies also allow us to explore which model of discounting
best fits the data; the overall magnitude of frequency effects is informative about the
overall level of discounting, and the relative effects of moving from monthly to the
weekly frequency, and from the weekly to daily frequency, help identify the shape of
time-preferences.
Our first main result is that increasing the frequency of incentive delivery has
limited impact. Incentives delivered at daily, weekly, and monthly frequencies all have
equally large impacts on walking, indicating that the discounting model that best fits
our sample is one of patience over rewards. We find additional evidence in support
of this conclusion: step-target compliance does not increase as the date of reward
delivery approaches. Survey-based measured impatience over rewards is limited, and
we find no evidence of heterogeneity in the effects of frequency by baseline measures
of impatience over rewards. This null finding suggests that, in contrast with the
conventional wisdom, increasing incentive frequency is not an effective way to adjust
incentives for impatience. This result is consistent with Augenblick et al. (2015), who
find limited time inconsistency in monetary choices, but is perhaps still surprising
given the limited access to borrowing in our setting.
We turn next to the second feature of the contracts we varied - whether they
are dynamically non-separable - and explore the average efficacy of non-separability,
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and whether it is more effective for those who are impatient over consumption. Our
base incentive contract is separable - and, in particular, linear - in behavior across
days, which means that the agent is paid separately for his behavior on each day
(normally, 20 INR for each day of exercise). We examine the impact of making the
contract dynamically non-separable by adding a "dynamic threshold" that requires a
minimum compliance level before a reward is paid; we use two threshold levels, one
that only pays agents if they meet their step targets on at least 4 days in a week,
and one that only pays them if they meet it on at least 5 days. (Note that the daily
behavior incentivized in all contracts is to walk at least 10,000 steps in a given day;
what we vary is whether there is a cross-day, or dynamic, threshold dictating the
minimum number of days on which the 10,000 step target must be met in the week.) 3
Dynamic non-separability has several advantages and disadvantages that have been
discussed before.
Our new theoretical insight is that dynamic non-separability interacts with time
preferences. In particular, relative to linear contracts, certain dynamically non-
separable contracts, including dynamic thresholds, should increase compliance for
people who are impatient over future effort compared to for those who are patient.4
This is because payments in dynamically non-separable contracts are a function of
behavior on multiple days, thus linking the agent's decision about exercise over time.
In the linear contract, the agent always compares the cost of walking today (which is
not discounted) to a reward, and so discount rates over walking/consumption do not
3While dynamic thresholds interact with time preferences, this is not true of all thresholds. For
example, any step target, such as 10,000 steps, involves a minimum "static threshold" required for
payment. However, since all the steps have to be completed in a single period, the performance
of these static thresholds does not depend on the time preferences of the agents in the incentive
program, although the demand for static thresholds may vary with time preferences (Kaur et al.,
2015).
4See Section 1.4.3 for further discussion of which types of non-separable contracts our predictions
apply to.
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matter. 5 In contrast, for threshold (and certain other dynamically non-separable)
contracts, when the agent decides to walk, his decision bundles the costs incurred
in different periods, comparing the present discounted cost of walking in multiple
periods with the expected payments. For those who discount future consumption and
effort more heavily, the present discounted cost of walking will be lower; compliance
in the dynamically non-separable contract should thus increase in agents' discount
rate over consumption. Intuitively, this type of contract takes advantage of the fact
that impatient people discount their future effort spent walking.'
Our second main finding is that, on average, the "dynamically non-separable"
threshold contract is more cost-effective than the linear contract. Introducing 4-day
and 5-day dynamic thresholds does not change the percent of days on which people
hit their step target. However, with the dynamic threshold, if agents do not meet
the threshold number of days, they do not receive incentives for every day the daily
target is reached as they do with the linear contract. As a result, the 4-day and 5-day
threshold contracts cost roughly 10 and 15% less, respectively, while generating the
same amount of exercise. However, the thresholds do have a potential downside:
they generate more extreme outcomes, working better for some people but worse
for others, making it important from a policy perspective to determine for whom it
works well.
Our third finding is that, consistent with our theoretical predictions, the dynam-
ically non-separable contract is more efficacious for the impatient. We first perform
5Note that this statement is conditional on discount rates over payment.
6 This logic holds both for sophisticates and naives (as well as impatient time-consistents), al-
though the logic plays out somewhat differently by type. For sophisticates, non-separability creates
a commitment motive: agents exercise today to induce their future selves to exercise. For time-
inconsistent naives, who are overoptimistic about their future desire to exercise, it creates an "option
value" motive: they exercise today to give their future selves the opportunity to follow-through.
25
heterogeneity analysis based on a baseline measure of discount rates over exercise 7 to
test our prediction that, relative to the linear contract, the dynamically non-separable
will increase efficacy more for the impatient. The prediction holds: relative to lin-
ear contracts, non-separable contracts increase compliance 4 (10) percentage points
(pp) more for those whose impatience is above-median (above the 75th percentile)
relative to those who are below. These magnitudes are large relative to the sample-
average effect of either contract (roughly 20 pp), especially given that there is no
sample-average difference between the contracts. We also calibrate a model using
experimental estimates of the distribution of daily walking costs; the results there
also suggest that threshold contracts work considerably better for the impatient.
We conclude the paper with a program evaluation of our incentives program. We
show that the large increases in walking induced by incentives cause moderate im-
provements in physical health and emotional wellbeing. Participants in our sample
have high rates of diabetes and hypertension; regular exercise can help prevent com-
plications from both these diseases. We find that incentives for walking improve an
index of overall health risk, including two measures of blood sugar,8 by a modest but
statistically significant amount. In addition, the incentives program improves mental
health outcomes, suggesting a causal link between exercise and mental health.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, it contributes
to the literature on motivating time-inconsistent or impatient agents, and on con-
tract design with non-standard time preferences. To date, the primary way that
researchers have attempted to motivate time-inconsistent agents is to provide com-
7 Specifically, we use the convex time budget method of Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) and ask
people to allocate steps over time.
8The index includes glycated hemoglobin or Hbalc, a three-month weighted average of blood
sugar levels; random blood sugar (RBS), a measure of instantaneous blood sugar levels; a body
mass index (BMI); waist circumference; and mean arterial blood pressure (MAP)
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mitment devices or contracts that restrict the possible actions of their future selves
(e.g., Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002); Kaur et al. (2015); Ashaf et al. (2006); Gina
et al. (2010); Duflo et al. (2011); Schilbach (2017)). Although pre-commitment can
be a very useful tool, it is not a panacea: take-up of commitment contracts is gen-
erally modest, as discussed in Laibson (2015). Indeed, commitment contracts are
only effective for sophisticated time-inconsistents, but evidence suggests that a large
share of the population is at least partially naive, and that commitment can in fact
be harmful for partially naive agents (Augenblick and Rabin, 2017; Bai et al., 2017).
In contrast, the predictions we test do not require sophistication: they work for mul-
tiple types of myopia, including naive time-inconsistency. Beyond the literature on
pre-commitment, there is limited work, theoretical or empirical, on how to optimize
incentive design for impatience.' O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) is a notable excep-
tion, examining the theoretical implications of time-inconsistent procrastination for
the design of "temporal incentive schemes," which reward agents based on when they
complete tasks. In their setting, the focus is on how to avoid delay, which is costly
to the principal. In contrast, in our setting, the period in which the agent com-
pletes the task is less important; rather the goal is to maximize the average level of
compliance over time. Another exception is the literature showing that worker per-
formance tends to improve toward the end of pay cycles, and attributing this effect to
impatience. In particular, Clark (1994) finds extensive anecdotal evidence that 19th
century factory workers often shirked at the beginning of pay cycles, Oyer (1998)
finds dramatic spikes in sales among US salespeople near the end of the year when
bonuses are calculated and paid, and Kaur et al. (2015) show that individuals paid
9Dellavigna and Malmendier (2004) study how the firm's profit-maximizing contract varies with
consumer time preferences. Opp and Zhu (2015) study the implications of agent impatience for
dynamically self-sustaining agreements when agents can renege on agreements, e.g., settings with
upfront payment to workers.
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at a piece-rate increase output as a randomly-assigned weekly pay-day approaches.
While these papers suggest a potential role for high-frequency payment to improve
performance, 10 ours is the first to directly test this suggestion.
Second, we build on the literature examining dynamic contracting (see for exam-
ple Lazear (1979) and Prendergast (1999)). Many theoretical dynamic contracting
papers yield the prediction that it is optimal to defer some component of current
pay until the future, with ultimate receipt of the payment contingent on future ef-
fort. Since time only moves in one direction, this practice, sometimes called "deferred
compensation," can improve the effective power of the incentive contract. We make
two main contributions to this literature. First, since our dynamically non-separable
contract entails deferred compensation, our paper is the first to theoretically demon-
strate that impatience over consumption can improve the performance of deferred
compensation. Second, to our knowledge, our experiment represents the first em-
pirical evaluation comparing a contracts with and without deferred compensation,
albeit outside the workplace compensation setting where the deferred compensation
literature generally focuses.
We build on a third body of literature that measures the shape of time prefer-
ences. The majority of the recent literature in this area has focused on distinguish-
ing whether time preferences are time-consistent or time-inconsistent (Andreoni and
Sprenger, 2012a; Andreoni et al., 2016; Augenblick et al., 2015). However, within
those classes, there is large variation in the feasible shape and size of discount rates
with important policy implications; to our knowledge, our paper is the first to test
the policy implications of that variation." Finally, we contribute to the growing
1OKaur et al. (2015) suggest this explicitly.
"Two previous papers have explored the shape of discounting within the time-consistent or time-
inconsistent subclasses, both using lab-experimental preference measures in the monetary domain.
Benhabib et al. (2008) test between hyperbolic, quasi-hyperbolic, and exponential models, but do
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literature on incentives for health, including incentives for weight loss (Volpp et al.,
2008; Kullgren et al., 2013), disease monitoring (Labhardt et al., 2011), and physical
activity (Charness and Gneezy, 2009; Finkelstein et al., 2008). Although there are
several financial incentives trials for exercise for non-diabetics (Charness and Gneezy,
2009; Finkelstein et al., 2008), as well as one trial incentivizing 3-month blood sugar
control (as measured by Hbalc), there is a lack of interventions that test low-cost
methods of incentivizing important daily habits among diabetics. Ours represents
the first evaluation of financial incentives to diabetics for daily disease management,
as well as the first trial evaluating a scalable incentives program for exercise in a
developing country.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.3 discusses the study setting
and research design. Section 3.4 discusses the data and presents summary statis-
tics. Section 1.4 presents the results on incentive design and its relationship with
time preferences. Section 1.5 presents the impacts on health outcomes. Section 3.7
concludes.
1.2 Study Setting and Experimental Design
India is facing a diabetes epidemic. In addition to 60 million diabetics, there are
also 77 million pre-diabetics in the country (Whiting et al., 2011; Anjana et al.,
2011). This has large economic and social implications: in 2010, diabetes imposed
an estimated cost of $38 billion - 2 percent of India's GDP - on the healthcare
system, and led to the death of approximately 1 million individuals (Tharkar et al.,
2010).
not have the power to distinguish between them. Tanaka et al. (2010) reject that preferences are
purely hyperbolic, quasi-hyperbolic, or exponential.
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There is widespread agreement that lifestyle changes are essential for managing
the burden of diabetes, but existing strategies to promote change have had lim-
ited success. In particular, increased physical activity can prevent diabetes, and
help the diagnosed avert serious (and expensive) long-term complications such as
amputations, heart disease, kidney disease, and stroke. Recognizing this, the In-
dian government is piloting a National Programme on Prevention and Control of
Diabetes, Cardiovascular diseases and Stroke (NPCDS), with a key objective of gen-
erating awareness of appropriate lifestyle changes. However, anecdotal evidence from
physicians suggests that adoption of the lifestyle changes recommended by NPCDS
is low, and new strategies are needed to encourage change.
1.2.1 Sample Selection and Pre-Intervention Period
Our project is a collaboration with the government of the state of Tamil Nadu to
encourage lifestyle changes, specifically exercise, among those with or at risk of Type
2 diabetes. We selected our sample through a series of public screening camps in the
city of Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu. In order to recruit diverse socioeconomic groups,
the camps were held in locations ranging from the government hospital to markets,
mosques, temples, and parks. During the camps, trained surveyors took health mea-
surements; discussed each individual's risk for diabetes, hypertension, and obesity;
and conducted a brief eligibility survey. In order to be included in the study, in-
dividuals were required to have elevated blood sugar or have been diagnosed with
diabetes, have low risk of injury or complications from regular walking, be capable
with a mobile-phone, and be able to receive personal rewards in the form of mobile
recharges.1 2 Within a week of attending a screening camp, eligible individuals were
12The full list of eligibility criteria was that the respondent must: either be diabetic or have
elevated Random Blood Sugar, or RBS, (> 130 if haven't eaten, > 150 if have eaten in previous
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contacted by phone and invited to participate in a program to encourage walking.
Surveyors visited the potential participants at their homes or workplaces in order
to conduct an initial baseline health survey and enroll participants in a one-week
phase-in period. During the baseline health survey, surveyors collected detailed
health, fitness, and lifestyle information. Surveyors then prepared respondents for
the phase-in period, which was designed to collect baseline walking data and to
familiarize participants with pedometer-wearing and step-reporting. Surveyors first
demonstrated how to properly wear and read a pedometer. Next, they demonstrated
how to report steps to our database by either responding to an automated call or
directly calling into the system, and how to check text messages sent by the reporting
system (as explained in Section 1.2.3, we created this automated calling system for
respondents, who typically lack internet access, to self-report their daily steps). After
the demonstration, respondents were asked to consistently wear a pedometer, and
to report their steps each day through the automated call system for the weeklong
phase-in period.13
Following the phase-in period, surveyors again visited respondents to sync the
data from the pedometers, and conducted a baseline time-preference survey.1 4 In the
time-preference survey, surveyors elicited time preferences with a series of choices in
the two domains relevant for our intervention: walking and mobile recharges (the
2 hours); be 30-65 years of age; have a prepaid mobile number which is used solely by them and
without an unlimited calling pack; be literate in Tamil; be physically capable of walking half an
hour; be currently living in Coimbatore city; not be pregnant; not be currently receiving insulin
injections for diabetes; not be suffering from blindness, kidney disease or foot ulcers; not have
had medical conditions such as stroke or heart attack; and not have been diagnosed with Type 1
diabetes.
13 Respondents received a small cash reward of 50 INR at the end of the phase-in period for
consistently wearing their pedometers and reporting their steps.
14 Surveyors first used the Fitbit web application to automatically sync the actual walking data
from the phase-in week to an online step database. They compared actual steps to reported steps,
and reviewed the step-reporting processes as needed, before administering the time-preference sur-
vey.
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financial reward we used to incentivize walking). The choices follow the Convex
Time Budget (CTB) methodology pioneered by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) and
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b), and adapted in many studies, including Augenblick
et al. (2015); Carvalho et al. (2016); Andreoni et al. (2016); Augenblick and Rabin
(2017); Gin6 et al. (2017).
Finally, the participants were randomly assigned to participate in one of two
comparison groups (a monitoring group that received pedometers during the inter-
vention period and a control group that did not), or to one of six incentive contracts
for walking. All participants who withdrew or were found ineligible for the study
prior to randomization were excluded from the sample, leaving a final experimental
sample of 3192 individuals.
1.2.2 Experimental Design
The Daily Step Target
Our interventions center around encouraging participants to walk at least 10,000
steps a day. We chose this daily step target to match exercise recommendations for
diabetics. The choice of a daily target reflects the fact that research organizations like
the Center for Disease Control (CDC) and American Diabetes Association (ADA)
recommend daily exercise sessions with no more than two consecutive days of rest.
The target choice of 10,000 steps approximates the number of steps that our average
participant would take if he added the exercise routine recommended by the CDC
and ADA to his existing behavior." In addition, 10,000 steps per day is a widely
5 1n particular, daily exercise recommendations for diabetics translate into approximately 3,000
steps of brisk walking per day (Marshall et al., 2009). In our sample, the average participant does
not walk for exercise, but completes 7,000 steps per day. Our daily target is the sum of average
daily pre-intervention steps plus the steps needed for daily recommended exercise.
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quoted target among health advocates and a common benchmark in health studies,
making our choice consistent with existing literature and standard advice.
Treatment Groups
Participants were randomized into the incentives group or one of two comparison
(non-incentive) groups:
1. Incentives: Receive a pedometer and incentives to reach a daily step target of
10,000 steps.
2. Monitoring (often plays the role of control): Receive a pedometer but no in-
centive contract.
3. Control: Receive neither a pedometer nor an incentive contract.
Within the incentives group, we randomized participants into one of six incentive
contracts for walking. All treatments are summarized in Figure 1-1 and further
elaborated below. The randomization was stratified by baseline Hbalc (a measure
of blood sugar control) and a simple survey-based measure of impatience, using a
randomization list generated in Stata.16 Treatment groups were not of equal size:
the size of each treatment group was chosen to ensure power to detect health im-
pacts of the pooled incentives treatments relative to the comparison treatment, and
the interactions between particular baseline characteristics and incentive contract
features.
16 Specifically, participants were stratified into four cells according to whether their baseline Hbalc
was greater than 8 mmol/mol, and whether the average of their answer to the question "On a scale
of 1 to 10, how patient are you?" at screening and baseline is greater than 6.5.
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All incentives groups were rewarded for accurately reporting steps above the daily
10,000 step target through the automated step-reporting system. As in the phase-
in period, this step-reporting system called participants every evening (participants
could choose a call time at the beginning of the intervention period), and prompted
them to enter their daily steps as shown on the pedometer. Participants also had the
option to call in their steps to a dedicated phone line at any time. The step-reporting
system sent immediate text-message confirmations of each step report, and weekly
text messages summarizing walking behavior.
During the explanation of the incentive contract, surveyors explained the step
target to participants in the context of health recommendations, saying: "Remember
that doctors recommend that you walk at least 10,000 steps a day, and more is always
better! We recommend that you try to walk at least 10,000 steps a day and build
up."
The threshold treatments implicitly gave participants a goal of how many days
to walk per week. To control for these goal effects, surveyors verbally encouraged
participants in all treatment groups to walk at least 4 or 5 days per week at contract
launch.
The Base Case Incentives Group We vary three dimensions of the payment:
frequency, amount, and minimum days before an incentive is paid. The base case
incentives group serves as our "base contract" or comparison group for all other incen-
tives groups. To assess the responses to variation on each dimension, we compare the
base case incentives group to a treatment group differing only along that dimension.
The base case incentives group was offered an incentive contract awarding them
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mobile recharges worth 20 INR for each day they reported complying with the daily
10,000 step target. (Note that this means that that incentive payments are a linear
function of compliance across days.) Recharges were delivered at a weekly frequency
for each day the participant complied with the step target in the previous week.
Our next treatment groups differ from the base case incentive group in one of the
following two dimensions that we predict will interact with time preference: payment
frequency and whether the contract has a dynamic threshold.
Payment Frequency Two other treatment groups, the daily and monthly groups,
differed from the base case incentives group only by the frequency of incentive deliv-
ery. In the daily group, recharges were delivered at lam the same night participants
reported their steps. In the monthly group, recharges were delivered every four weeks
for all days of compliance in the previous four weeks. Comparing walking behavior
in these two groups with the base case incentives group allows us to assess the role
of payment frequency - and time preferences over mobile recharges - in incentive
effectiveness. See Figure 1-1.
Threshold Two other treatment groups, the 4-day threshold and the 5-day thresh-
old groups, differed from the base case incentives group only by the minimum thresh-
old of weekly step-target compliance required before an incentive was paid. The base
case incentives group's contract was separable across days: participants received 20
INR for each day of compliance. The threshold contracts were dynamically non-
separable (i.e., non-separable across days). The 4-day threshold group received mo-
bile recharges worth 20 INR for each day of compliance if they exceeded the target
at least 4 days in the weeklong payment period. So, a 4-day threshold participant
who exceeded the step target on only three days in a payment period would receive
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no reward, but a participant who exceeded the step target on four days would re-
ceive mobile recharges worth 80 INR at the end of the week. Similarly, the 5-day
threshold group received mobile recharges worth 20 INR for each day of compliance
if they exceeded the target at least 5 days in the week.
Recall that, to control for goal effects, surveyors verbally encouraged participants
in all treatment groups to walk at least 4 or 5 days per week. For those in the
threshold groups, the target days-per-week was the same as their assigned threshold
levels; for those in the other groups, the target days-per-week was randomly assigned
in the same proportion as the threshold participants are divided between the 4- and
5-day threshold groups.
Finally, we also included a small-payment treatment group that differed from the
base case incentive group only by the amount of incentive paid. The 10-INR group
was offered an incentive contract awarding them mobile recharges worth 10 INR,
instead of the base-case 20INR, for each day they reported exceeding the daily step
target. This treatment was included to help us learn about the distribution of the
cost of walking, -and to b~enchmark the magnitude of our other treatments effects
(following for example Bertrand et al. (2005) and Kaur et al. (2015)).
Control Groups
We include two control groups in our experiment, a monitoring group and a pure
control group, allowing us to separately identify the effect of incentives and the
increased monitoring that is bundled within the incentives treatment. In order to
measure the overall health effects of the incentives program, we compare outcomes
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in the pooled incentives treatments to outcomes in the pure control treatments.1 7
Monitoring The monitoring group allows us to isolate the effects of incentives
alone. The monitoring group was treated identically to the incentives groups, but
for the fact that monitoring participants did not receive incentives. In particular,
they received pedometers and were encouraged to wear the pedometers and report
their steps every day through the step reporting system.18 To control for the pos-
sibility that incentives may increase the salience of walking behavior, monitoring
participants received daily confirmations of their step reports, and weekly text mes-
sages summarizing their walking behavior. In order to control for the effect of step
goal-setting that an incentive for 10,000 daily steps may bring, monitoring and in-
centive treatment participants are given the same verbal step target of 10,000 daily
steps at contract launch, and the same encouragement to walk at least 4 or 5 days
per week.
Pure Control The pure control group allows us to measure the impact of all
those aspects of the Incentive treatments that were necessary for operating a walking
incentives program in our setting, excluding the incentives themselves. Participants
in the pure control group returned their pedometers at randomization (after the one-
week phase-in period), but, because we wanted to net out any effects due to survey
visits related only to research needs, still received regular visits from the survey team
at the same frequency of the pedometer sync visits. Thus, the difference between the
1 7Our experiment was not powered to detect differences in health outcomes between the control
and monitoring groups, but we report these comparisons nonetheless.
18Participants in all incentives groups and the monitoring group received a cash bonus of 200 INR
for regularly wearing the pedometer and reporting their steps at the endline survey. In addition,
if participants did not report steps for a number of days, the system would send them messages
asking them to please report their steps regularly.
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pure control and incentives groups includes the effect of incentives bundled with the
effect of receiving a pedometer, but excludes the effect of the regular survey visits.
Because any feasible incentive program would bundle the "monitoring" effect of a
pedometer with the effect of incentives, the pure control group is a useful benchmark
from a policy perspective: the difference between the pure control group and the
incentives groups measures the total effect of a walking incentives program, including
the effects that come simply from participants utilizing a step monitoring technology.
The control groups enable us to identify the overall effect of incentives on health.
To benchmark the size of the incentive effect on health, as well as to accommodate a
request from our government partners, we also cross-randomized one additional in-
tervention for 10% of the sample. In particular, 10% of the sample, cross-randomized
across all other treatments, received the SMS treatment, which consisted of weekly
text-message-based reminders to engage in healthy behaviors for diabetes such as eat-
ing right and exercising, adapted from another SMS program that had been shown
to be successful in the Tamil Nadu region (Ramachandran, 2013).
1.2.3 The Intervention Period and After
After randomization, all participants in the experiment were given a contract that
detailed the specifics of the treatment group they had been assigned to, and also
outlined the evaluation activities entailed for the rest of the study. A trained surveyor
walked them through the contract and answered any of their questions to make sure
it was clear.
In order to determine the number of steps taken, we gave those assigned to the
"monitoring" and incentive groups Fitbit Zip pedometers for the duration of the
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intervention.19 Although these pedometers could be synced to a central database
with an internet connection, most participants did not have regular internet access
and so these data were not available in real time. Instead, we asked participants to
report their daily step count to an automated calling system every evening. Incentive
deliveries, i.e., mobile credits, were based on these reports. To verify the reports, we
visited participants every two to three weeks to manually sync their pedometers and
discuss any discrepancies with them. Anyone found to be chronically over-reporting
was suspended from the program. All empirical analysis is based on the synced data
from the Fitbits, not the reported data.
We visited all participants three times during the twelve-week intervention pe-
riod. The primary purpose was to sync pedometers, but we also conducted short
surveys to collect biometric and mobile phone usage data (we conducted these vis-
its even with those participants who did not have a pedometer). We conducted a
slightly longer midline survey at the second sync visit. Following the twelve-week
intervention period, we conducted an endline survey. At endline, surveyors again
collected detailed health, fitness, and lifestyle information. The timeline of the full
intervention is outlined in Figure 1-2.
1.3 Data and Summary Statistics
1.3.1 Baseline Data: Health, Walking, and Time Preference
In the paper, we use three datasets of baseline characteristics: a baseline health
survey, a week of baseline walking data, and a time-preference survey. The baseline
health survey, conducted at the first household visit, contains information on re-
19We chose Fitbit Zip pedometers due to their wearability, long memory, and relatively simple
process for syncing data to a central database.
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Day 1 Screening
Interest Assessment Phone Survey
Baseline Health Survey
Phase-in Period with Pedometers
Pedometer Sync ,Time Preference Survey
Day 30 Pedometer Sync, Health Check
ay 51 Pedometer Sync, Health Check and Midline
Day 72 Pedometer Sync, Health Check
Day 100 Endline Survey
-Randomization
0
0
CL
Figure 1-2: Experimental Timeline for a Sample Participant
Notes: This figure shows a representative experimental timeline for a participant in the experiment.
Screening camps occurred throughout Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu from January 2016 to October 2017.
In practice, visits were scheduled according to the availability of the respondent, leading to variation
in the exact number of days between each visit. In addition, we intentionally introduced random
variation into the timing of incentive delivery by randomly delaying the start of the intervention
period by one day for selected participants. However, the intervention period was 12 weeks for all
participants.
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spondent demographics, as well as health, fitness, and lifestyle information. Health
measures include Hbalc, a measure of blood sugar control over the previous three
months and the most commonly used measure of diabetes risk; random blood sugar,
a measure of more immediate blood sugar control; BMI and waist circumference, two
measures of obesity; blood pressure, a measure of hypertension; and a short mental
health assessment. The baseline also includes two fitness measures (time to complete
5 stands from a seated position, and time to walk 4 meters), and lifestyle information
including information on dietary, exercise, and substance use habits. Then, during
the phase-in period between the baseline health survey and randomization, we col-
lected one week of pedometer data, consisting of daily step counts. We use this to
construct two measures of baseline walking: the average daily step count during the
phase-in period, and the average compliance with the daily 10,000-step target during
the phase-in period.
Following the phase-in period, we conducted a baseline time-preference survey.
The survey adapts the convex time budget (CTB) methodology of Andreoni and
Sprenger (2012a) to measure time preferences in two domains: walking and mobile
recharges. We asked participants to make a series of decisions allocating either
recharges to be disbursed, or steps to be taken, on two dates: a "sooner" and "later"
date. Each decision satisfies a budget set of the form
1
Ct + -Ct+k = m
r
where (Ct, Ct+k) are the chosen recharge amounts to be disbursed or steps to be taken
on the sooner and later dates, respectively. The sooner date t, the time lag between
the sooner and later date k, and the interest rate r vary across decisions. Within a
domain for a given respondent, the total budget m is fixed across allocations.
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In order to avoid potential biases in baseline time-preference measures, our CTB
environment builds on a number of features from previous studies. First, the choices
are made after the one-week phase-in period in which all participants have pedome-
ters and report their daily steps, ensuring that participants are familiar with the
costs of walking. This allows for meaningful allocations of steps between sooner and
later dates. Second, to reduce bias from inattention, the responses are designed to
be incentive compatible; all respondents were informed that we would implement
their choice from a randomly selected survey question. We set the probabilities such
that for most respondents, the randomly selected survey question was a multiple
price list of lotteries over money (which measures risk preferences), but for a few,
a CTB allocation was selected. Because the allocations might have interfered with
any walking program offered, we excluded these respondents from the experimental
sample. To ensure that participants complete the allocated steps, we offer a large
cash completion bonus of 500 INR in the step domain if the allocation is selected to
be implemented, and the steps are completed as allocated.
We take a number of precautions to avoid various potential confounds, including
confounds reflecting fixed costs or benefits of taking an action, or confounds due to
the time of day of measurement.2 o However, we were not able to fully address one
20In particular, to avoid confounds related to fixed costs or benefits, such as the effort of wearing a
pedometer or the psychological benefit of receiving a free recharge, we include minimum allocations
on both sooner and later days in each domain. The minimum allocations were chosen to be high
enough that any fixed costs would be included (e.g. one could not easily achieve the minimums by
simply shaking the pedometer), but low enough to avoid corner solutions. In the step domain, this
required a novel modification of the CTB methodology: individual-specific minimum allocations.
Our step allocations also featured individual-specific total step budgets m, which were chosen to be
large enough that achieving them would require some effort beyond simply wearing the pedometer,
but small enough that participants would certainly achieve them in exchange for the completion
bonus. Specifically, minimum steps on each day are calculated as w, and the total step budget m
is X + 2-, respectively, where X C {3000, 4000, 5000} is the element closest to the participant's
average daily walking during the phase-in period. That is, minimum steps are one of 300, 400, or
500 on each day, and the total step budget is one of 3,600, 4,800, or 6,000. To avoid confounding
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potential confound to our estimates of time-preferences across individuals: variation
across people in the cost of walking over time, or in the benefit of receiving a recharge
over time. For example, an individual with a particularly busy week after the time-
preference survey, and therefore relatively high costs to steps in the near-term relative
to the distant future, will appear to be particularly impatient over steps in our data
(he will wish to put off walking). An individual with a relatively free week just after
the time-preference survey will instead appear particularly forward-looking (he will
not wish to put off walking). The same concerns can also arise with recharges, but
because recharges are storable and thus may be consumed on a different day than
when they are received, we expect less variation (and heterogeneity) in the utility of
recharge receipt over time.
We used a participant's decisions to construct two individual-specific structural
parameter estimates of time-preference: one in the walking domain and one in the
mobile recharge domain. In each domain we construct an estimate of the Daily dis-
count rate,. - 1. This is a one-parameter estimate of the daily discount rate that is
increasing both in time-consistent impatience and in present bias. Following Augen-
blick et al. (2015), our estimate is from a two-limit Tobit specification of the standard
intertemporal Euler equation for an agent with an exponential daily discount factor
6, and concavity over recharges (or convexity over steps) oz. Further details of the
impatience with the time of day that the baseline time-preference survey was administered (which
could influence the desirability of walking and/or recharges delivered in the next 24 hours), as
well as to capture heterogeneity in time preferences including any present-bias for very short beta-
windows, we required that all walking on any date be conducted within a 2 hour period, which
was chosen to start at the time immediately after the time-preference survey would end (e.g., if the
survey ended at 4pm, the time period for any day's walking would be 5-7pm). The short window
could potentially bias our overall measures of impatience downwards, as uncertainty about future
schedules in a short time window could lead participants to want to get their walking done early
when they had more certainty over their schedule. However, our primary purpose was to capture
heterogeneity in time-preferences, and we considered the potential loss in validity of aggregate time
preference estimates to be worth the ability to capture heterogeneity in time preferences in the time
frames near to the present.
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estimation methodology are described in Appendix l.A. 2, However, because the
discount rate can only be estimated for individuals making interior choices, we can-
not estimate our structural parameter for all individuals in our sample. As a result,
we supplement the estimation with several survey-based measures of impatience and
time preference taken from the psychology literature in order to demonstrate whether
the effects we see in the structural parameter sample extend beyond it; note that
these are not specific to the domain of walking but are meant to proxy for discount
rates over consumption.2 3
1.3.2 Summary Statistics
The baseline characteristics of the full experimental sample are reported in the first
column of Table 1.1. Our sample is on average 49.42 years old, and has slightly
more males than females. Their average annual household income is approximately
16,000 INR (about 200 USD) per month; for comparison, in 2015 the median urban
household in India earned between 10,000 and 20,000 INR per month (Labor Bureau
2 10ur predictions are generally about overall impatience, not about whether an individual is
time-consistent, and so we want one summary measure capturing impatience over the time horizon.
Estimating just one parameter has the advantage of avoiding overfitting, which is relevant in our
setting because we use fewer CTB allocations than some of the US-based methodological papers on
CTB.
22 Other papers have also used the CTB data to estimate reduced-form measures (e.g., Gine
et al. (2017) use the number of present-biased reversals). The structural measures have several
advantages and so we choose to focus on them. First, the structural measure of impatience is
increasing both in present-bias and in overall myopia, both of which are theoretically relevant to
the performance of the contracts we offer. Second, whereas the standard reduced-form measures
treat all preference reversals as equal regardless of magnitude, the structural measure takes into
account the magnitude of impatience indicated by each decision. Third, by estimating the concavity
(convexity) of preferences over recharges (steps), the structural measure avoids bias in the estimated
discount rate from assuming linear utility (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012a).
2 3Note that we only began measuring these latter measures partway through the data collection
(at the point when we realized it was common for participants to choose non-interior solutions) and
so the measures are available for only part of the sample.
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of India). Panel B shows that our sample is at high risk for diabetes and its compli-
cations: 67 % of the sample has been diagnosed with diabetes by a doctor, and 82 %
have Hbalc levels which are strongly indicative of diabetes. The random blood sugar
concentrations are also indicative of high diabetes risk. Note that Hbalc above 6.5
is considered diabetic, and RBS above 180 (even just after eating) is unlikely except
among diabetic individuals; average Hbalc and RBS in our sample surpass both of
these cut-offs. The sample also has high rates of common diabetes comorbidities: 41
% have hypertension (defined as systolic blood pressure above 140 or diastolic blood
pressure above 90), and 61 % are overweight (defined as BMI above 25) at baseline.
Panel C shows that although baseline walking levels are below international daily
walking recommendations of 10,000 steps per day, they are comparable to the average
steps taken in many developed countries. On average, participants walked just under
7000 steps per day in the phase-in period. For comparison, Japanese adults also
take approximately 7,000 steps per day, whereas adults in the United States take
approximately 5,000 steps per day, and adults in western Australia take about 9,000
steps per day (Bassett et al., 2010).
Panel D of Table 1.1 reports measures of impatience measured using the CTB
survey questions. First, we do not see evidence of impatience over recharges on
aggregate. In particular, the average estimated daily discount rate over recharges
is only 0.01, which is similar to monetary discount rates estimated using the CTB
methodology in other settings (e.g. Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) and Augenblick
et al. (2015)). Second, individuals are quite impatient over steps: present-biased
preference reversals are more common than future-biased reversals, and the aver-
age estimated daily discount rate over steps is 0.37. Our estimate of the average
discount rate over steps is somewhat larger than effort discount rates estimated by
Augenblick et al. (2015) using a similar CTB methodology. However, because the
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present time period in our CTB questions was only two hours whereas our future
time periods were entire days, inflating the costs of present relative to future steps,
it is likely that our measures of daily discount rates over steps are biased away from
zero. In addition, the discount rates over steps show wide variation across individ-
uals compared to Augenblick et al. (2015), suggesting that these estimates may be
confounded heterogeneous differences in walking costs in the CTB allocation dates.
Such a confound would add noise to our discount rate estimates over walking and
attenuate the observed relationship between time preferences and incentive contract
design.
Baseline health and time preferences are similar across treatment groups. Columns
1 and 2 of Table 1.1 show means for the pure control and monitoring groups, and
Columns 5-10 show means separately for each incentive group, with standard devi-
ations in parentheses. To explore whether randomization provided balance in these
characteristics across the different groups, we test that all characteristics are jointly
orthogonal to treatment assignment relative to the pure control group (Hansen and
Bowers, 2008). We fail to reject that the coefficients on all characteristics are 0 in
regressions of treatment assignment on characteristics, suggesting that balance was
achieved.
1.3.3 Outcomes
Our outcomes are gathered from two datasets. The first is a time-series dataset of
daily steps walked for each participant with a pedometer during the twelve-week
intervention period. Because surveyors collect pedometers back from pure control
participants after the phase-in period, we do not have daily steps for this group.
Surveyors collect pedometer data at three separate "pedometer sync" visits during
47
Table 1.1: Baseline summary statistics in full sample and by treatment group.
Averages of Baseline Characteristics by Treatment Group
Full Sample Control Monitoring Incentives Daily Base Monthly 4-Day TH 5-Day TH 10 INR
Pooled Case
A. Demographics
Age (from BL)
Female (=1)
Labor force participation
Daily mobile usage
(INR)
Mobile balance
(INR)
Per capita income
(INR/month)
Private water source
Household Size
B. Health
Diagnosed diabetic
Hbalc (mmol/mol)
RBS (mmol/L)
Systolic BP (mmHg)
Diastolic BP (mmHg)
BL BMI
HbAlc: Diabetic (=1)
BP: Hypertensive (=1)
Overweight
C. Walking
Pr(exceeded step)
target (phase-in)
Avgerage daily steps
(phase-in)
D. Time Preferences
i. Mobile Recharges
Discount rate
ii. Steps
Discount rate
F-test for Joint Orthogonality
F-statistic
Sample size
Number of individuals
Percent of sample
49.54
(8.52)
0.42
(0.49)
0.75
(0.44)
6.61
(8.79)
29.26
(49.42)
4463
(3638)
0.67
(0.47)
3.91
(1.62)
0.67
(0.47)
8.68
(2.33)
192.42
(89.39)
133.35
(19.15)
88.47
(11.11)
26.42
(4.35)
0.82
(0.38)
0.41
(0.49)
0.61
(0.49)
49.78
(8.19)
0.46
(0.50)
0.73
(0.45)
7.22
(10.14)
30.80
(48.79)
4488
(4483)
0.65
(0.48)
3.94
(1.54)
0.67
(0.47)
8.67
(2.36)
191.32
(88.73)
133.33
(20.34)
88.54
(11.50)
26.52
(4.34)
0.82
(0.38)
0.36
(0.48)
0.62
(0.48)
50.28
(8.95)
0.43
(0.50)
0.72
(0.45)
6.47
(8.95)
29.48
(48.68)
4620
(3160)
0.68
(0.47)
3.82
(1.51)
0.68
(0.47)
8.76
(2.40)
196.07
(86.67)
134.06
(17.68)
88.53
(10.10)
26.47
(3.67)
0.81
(0.39)
0.42
(0.50)
0.66
(0.47)
49.44
(8.55)
0.41
(0.49)
0.75
(0.43)
6.44
(8.36)
28.98
(49.88)
4447
(3447)
0.67
(0.47)
3.91
(1.64)
0.66
(0.47)
8.68
(2.32)
192.51
(89.87)
133.34
(18.99)
88.46
(11.09)
26.40
(4.39)
0.82
(0.38)
0.42
(0.49)
0.60
(0.49)
49.57
(8.60)
0.44
(0.50)
0.75
(0.43)
5.86
(6.25)
28.61
(38.54)
4068
(2765)
0.66
(0.48)
3.92
(1.45)
0.62
(0.49)
8.58
(2.36)
195.58
(91.54)
135.25
(21.55)
89.30
(12.79)
26.41
(5.35)
0.77
(0.42)
0.45
(0.50)
0.57
(0.50)
49.60
(8.33)
0.41
(0.49)
0.74
(0.44)
6.58
(8.77)
29.69
(52.08)
4477
(3496)
0.69
(0.46)
3.89
(1.70)
0.68
(0.47)
8.72
(2.29)
193.26
(88.25)
133.27
(19.07)
88.19
(10.75)
26.47
(4.53)
0.84
(0.36)
0.41
(0.49)
0.60
(0.49)
48.80
(8.94)
0.38
(0.49)
0.81
(0.39)
7.67
(9.19)
28.55
(63.65)
4599
(3235)
0.63
(0.48)
3.74
(1.59)
0.62
(0.49)
8.66
(2.44)
193.30
(98.14)
134.18
( 19.13)
88.60
( 10.10)
26.39
(4.81)
0.79
(0.41)
0.44
(0.50)
0.58
(0.50)
49.31
(8.68)
0.42
(0.49)
0.74
(0.44)
6.43
(8.05)
28.57
(49.10)
4454
(3590)
0.65
(0.48)
3.96
(1.64)
0.67
(0.47)
8.68
(2.32)
192.12
(89.96)
132.49
(18.00)
88.23
(10.73)
26.34
(4.21)
0.81
(0.39)
0.42
(0.49)
0.61
(0.49)
49.67
(8.77)
0.38
(0.49)
0.77
(0.42)
6.01
(8.87)
28.14
(44.98)
4480
(3525)
0.70
(0.46)
3.96
(1.68)
0.68
(0.47)
8.69
(2.38)
192.50
( 91.75)
133.71
( 19.20)
89.01
(11.96)
26.19
(3.70)
0.82
(0.38)
0.43
(0.50)
0.59
(0.49)
49.11
7.84)
0.48
0.50)
0.70
0.46)
4.94
(5.77)
30.05
(36.59)
4341
(2615)
0.67
(0.48)
3.58
(1.29)
0.59
(0.50)
8.35
(2.14)
177.38
(77.00)
135.62
(21.42)
90.00
13.19)
26.99
(4.10)
0.77
(0.42)
0.29
(0.46)
0.67
(0.48)
0.25 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.27
(0.32) (0.31) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.31) (0.33) (0.32) (0.34) (0.34)
6960 7015 6868 6960 6961 6795 7403 7069 6916 7018
(4004) ( 3972) ( 3729) (4038) (4240) (3984) ( 3889) (4047) ( 4111) ( 4195)
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.06)
0.36 0.21 0.28 0.41 0.18 0.47 0.27 0.49 0.29 0.11
(3.76) (0.71) (1.03) (4.34) (0.56) (4.96) (1.02) ( 5.29) (1.66) ( 0.47)
0.87 1.17 1.19 1.05 1.16 1.13 1.16 0.88
3,192 585 203 2404 166 902 164 794 312 66
100.0 18.3 6.4 75.3 5.2 28.3 5.1 24.9 9.8 2.1
Notes: Hbalc (glycated haemoglobin) and RBS (random blood sugar) respectively measure medium- and short-term
blood sugar concentration; Systolic and Diastolic BP measure blood pressure. Hbalc, RBS, and weight are risk
factors for diabetes and its complications; high blood pressure and weight are cardiovascular risk factors. In each
domain (mobile recharges and steps), the discount rate 4-- 1 is an individual-level measure of impatience estimated
from a two-limit Tobit regression with the restrictions /i = 1 and ai = a. The F-statistic tests the joint orthogonality
of all characteristics to treatment assignment. 48
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the intervention period and at the endline survey.2
A potential issue with the daily step data is that we only observe steps taken
while participants wear the pedometer. Because participants in the incentives groups
are rewarded for taking 10,000 steps in a day with the pedometer, 2 1 they have an
additional incentive to wear the pedometer on days that they expect to walk more.
This could lead to a potential selection issue: if the incentives group selectively
makes an effort to wear the pedometer when they think they will walk more but the
monitoring group does not, then we will see a spurious positive relationship between
incentives and observed daily steps.
In order to minimize selective pedometer-wearing, we incentivize all monitoring
and incentives participants to wear their pedometers even on days with few steps.
We do this by offering a cash bonus of 200 INR (About 3 USD) if participants wear
their pedometer (i.e., have non-zero recorded steps) on at least 70% of days in the in-
tervention period. This approach largely addressed the issue: Figure 1-3 shows that
the rates of pedometer-wearing are high and similar between treatment groups. How-
ever, despite this similarity, incentives group participants do wear their pedometers
on a statistically significant 2% more days than monitoring group participants. To
address this potential selection issue, we report Lee (2009) bounds when comparing
pedometer data between the incentives and monitoring groups. 2 6
241n order to collect pedometer data, surveyors ask to see the pedometer, open the Fitbit web
application on a wifi-enabled tablet computer, sign into a respondent-specific account, and upload
the previous 30 days of daily pedometer step data to the Fitbit database. We later pull these data
through the Fitbit application program interface (API) using a web application we designed for
this study.
25Although incentives are delivered for steps reported, we cross-check step reports with actual
pedometer data after every pedometer sync visit. Anyone found to be over-reporting is initially
warned, and is eventually suspended from the program if the behavior continues.
26Lee bounds assume that selection is monotonic, i.e. that being in the incentives group makes
every participant weakly more likely to wear their pedometer on any given day or weakly less likely
to do so. This assumption is likely justified in our setting, as being in the incentives group weakly
increases the payoff to pedometer wearing by increasing the probability of reward.
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Figure 1-3: Fraction of days participants wore Fitbits
The second outcomes dataset - the endline survey - gathered health, fitness,
and lifestyle information similar to the baseline health survey, as well as information
about dietary and exercise behavior changes made during the intervention period.
These data are available for participants in all treatment groups, including the pure
control group. The primary purpose of these data is to allow us to study the impacts
of the programs on health and healthy behaviors. Many of the measures (such
as biometric health measures) have little margin for manipulation. There is no
differential incentive for attending the endline survey across treatments, and although
some respondents did withdraw from the study prior to the endline survey, Table
1.C.1 shows that endline attrition rates are not statistically distinguishable between
the pure control, monitoring, and incentives groups.
1.4 Results: Incentive Design
This section examines the effects of our incentive contract variations on exercise,
and explores the implications of our results for incentive design in the presence of
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impatience. We begin by establishing that providing incentives increases exercise
in this context; if it did not, then this would not be a good laboratory to explore
the effects of varying the contract. We then explore the implications of time prefer-
ences for incentive design, first exploring the role of frequency and then of dynamic
thresholds.
1.4.1 Incentives and exercise
We begin by establishing that our incentives program impacts exercise. This finding
not only suggests that we can use the experiment to explore the design of incentives,
but is also of independent policy interest: exercise has been shown to benefit health
for diabetics (Hill, 2005; Praet and van Loon, 2009; Thomas et al., 2009; Zanuso
et al., 2009; Shenoy et al., 2010; Manders et al., 2010; Qiu et al., 2014)and ours is
the first randomized trial of exercise incentives in a developing country.
We use intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates to assess the impact of incentives for
daily walking on exercise. In particular, we compare average exercise outcomes in
the pooled incentives treatment groups to those in the monitoring treatment group.
We focus here on the Fitbit exercise data as it is both less noisy than self-reported
exercise and less prone to bias; as a result, we only evaluate the effect of incentives
relative to monitoring, not control. Because monitoring may have an independent
impact, this likely understates the policy impact of incentives overall, and these
estimates should be interpreted as lower bounds on the effects of incentives relative
to control. We return to exploring the effects of the monitoring group relative to the
control group in Section 1.5.2.
For pedometer outcomes, which are measured at a daily frequency during the
intervention period, we compare averages on the person-day level across treatment
51
groups using regressions of the following form:
yit = a + 3 x incentivesi + X'ry + Eit, (1.1)
where yit is either daily steps or an indicator for whether the individual surpassed
the 10,000-step target, for individual i on day t during the intervention period;
incentivesi is an indicator for being in the incentives group; Xi is a vector of
individual-specific controls;2 7 and the standard errors Eit are clustered at the in-
dividual level. The coefficient of interest, #, is the ITT effect of incentives relative to
the monitoring group. The results are shown in Panel A of Table 1.2, and without
individual-specific controls in Table 1.C.2. The results are also shown graphically
in Figure 1-4, where the confidence interval shown on the incentives bar is the 95%
confidence interval for the gap between the incentives and monitoring groups (as is
the case for all other graphs in this section).
We find that incentives have large and sustained impacts on walking during the
intervention period. Incentives increase the number of days that participants reach
their 10,000 step target, and the size of the effect is large: Column 1 of Table 1.2
shows that incentivized participants exceed their step target on 20 % more days
than those in the monitoring group (the Lee bounds are 19.1% to 23.8%). These
effects are not simply a result of participants shifting steps from one day to another:
Column 2 shows that incentives increase walking by 1291 steps per day (the Lee
bounds are 934 to 1509 steps). This effect is equivalent to approximately 13 minutes
of additional brisk walking daily, averaged across the intervention period.
To examine the impacts of incentives on walking routines, Figure 1-5a shows
histograms of the number of days the step target was met per week (i.e., each data
" Individual-level controls are age, gender, weight, and phase-in walking.
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Figure 1-4: Incentives increase average walking
Note: Figure displays the impact of the pooled incentives treatments on steps during the inter-
vention period, and the confidence interval for the test of equality between the incentives and
monitoring groups. The dependent variable for the first panel is whether the participant met the
daily step target of 10,000 steps on that day. The dependent variable in the second panel is the
average steps walked.
point is a respondent x week) in the monitoring and incentives groups. Relative to
the monitoring group, the incentives group has a striking reduction in the number
of weeks where the step target is never met and an equally striking increase in the
number of weeks where the target is met on every day.
Figure 1-5b shows the impact of incentives on the distribution of daily steps.
One can see that there is bunching at the 10,000 step level in both groups, but that
the bunching in the incentive group is much more severe. Encouragingly, providing
incentives also appear to shift the entire distribution of daily steps, rather than
simply pushing marginal participants who would otherwise walk nearly 10,000 steps
in a day over the 10,000-step target. There is less mass everywhere below the 10,000
step target, and more mass everywhere above the target.
The effect of incentives on walking also does not attenuate over time. Figure
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Figure 1-5: Incentives shift the distributions of days walked per week and steps
walked per day
Note: Figure displays the impact of the pooled incentives treatments relative to the monitoring
group during the intervention period, with the confidence intervals representing the confidence
interval for the test of equality between the incentives and monitoring groups.
1-6 shows that, if anything, total walking in the incentives groups increases over the
course of the twelve-week program, a rare finding in the literature. 28
Having established that providing incentives affects behavior in this setting, we
next use our experiment to explore the effectiveness of incentive contract variations
designed to improve performance in the face of impatience over rewards and impa-
tience over consumption, respectively.
28 Patel et al. (2016) find that physical activity drops steeply 5-7 weeks into a 12-week walking-
incentive program. Regarding persistence after the intervention period ends, the literature finds
mixed results: Although Charness and Gneezy (2009) find that the effects of a roughly 4-week
incentive program incentivizing gym visits persists even 7 weeks after incentives are paid, Acland and
Levy (2015) and Royer et al. (2015) find that the effects of similar interventions are indistinguishable
from zero by 8 weeks after incentives are removed. Although we can only speculate, potential reasons
why our program led to more sustained engagement include that we use pedometers which are hard
to ignore; that participants needed to engage nightly with a reporting system that may have kept
them engaged; and that our subjects may face fewer competing demands for their attention than
participants in other studies.
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Figure 1-6: The effects of incentives remain stable throughout the 12-week program
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Notes: Panel A shows the average weekly probagigty of exceeding the step target over time for the
monitoring and pooled incentives groups, and Panel B shows the steps walked per day averaged
over each weekly period. Week 0 is the phase-in period, before randomization. The intervention
period runs from Week 1 - Week 12.
Table 1.2: Impacts of incentives on exercise
Pedometer Data (Intervention Period)
Proportion of Daily Steps
Days Achieved Daily Steps (conditional on
10K Steps being > 0)
A. Pooled Incentives
Incentives 0.197*** 1291.3*** 1159.8***
10.01821 1207.81 1186.21
B. Unpooled Incentives
Base Case 0.207*** 1413.3*** 1208.0***
10.0198] [220.81 1197.4]
Daily 0.201*** 1149.7*** 1190.3***
[0.0305] 1324.51 [272.5]
Monthly 0.180*** 1284.3*** 1210.6***
[0.02841 [304.61 [264.31
4-Day Threshold 0.189*** 1214.1*** 1113.0***
[0.0204] [228.2] [202.5]
5-Day Threshold 0.210*** 1312.8*** 1226.7***
[0.02501 [261.6] [230.01
10 INR 0.129*** 798.3** 528.5
[0.03791 [371.5] [326.3]
Monitoring mean 0.302 6822.783 7986.135
Controls Yes Yes Yes
P-value for Base Case vs
Daily .83 .34 .94
Monthly .28 .61 .99
4-Day Threshold .23 .18 .45
5-Day Threshold .89 .61 .91
10 INR .03 .06 .02
# Individuals 2,563 2,563 2,559
Observations 203,235 204,561 180,408
Notes: We report pooled incentive effects in Panel A, and separately by incentive treat-
ment group in Panel B. The columns show coefficient estimates from regressions based on
Equations 1.1 (Panel A) and 1.3 (Panel B), 5king daily panel data from pedometers dur-
ing the intervention period. The sample includes the incentives and monitoring groups.
Controls include age, gender, weight, and the average of the dependent variable during
the phase-in period (before randomization). The omitted category in all columns is the
monitoring group. Standard errors, in brackets, are clustered at the individual level.
1.4.2 Payment Frequency
We begin by outlining predictions for the impact of payment frequency and its in-
teraction with time preferences, and then test these empirical predictions.
Predictions from a simple model of walking
We consider a model with daylong periods. In each period, individuals receive utility
over walking 10,000 steps (which might be negative) and over the mobile recharges
they consume in that period:
00
U Zdc(t) (ct - e(wt=)
t=o
The term et is the utility from walking 10,000 steps, i.e, the cost of complying with the
program exercise target; wt is an indicator for compliance, ct are the mobile recharges
consumed on day t, and individuals discount the cost of walking and consumption k
days in advance by dc(k). Because the amounts are small, we model utility as linear
in payments for simplicity, but the model's qualitative predictions are the same if
we relax this assumption. We assume that walking costs et are independently
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with cumulative distribution function F(.), are
separable from other consumption, and are known in advance.
Individuals earn recharges by walking. A linear incentive contract specifies that
walking on each day t will be rewarded with an incentive of size m in kt days.
Denote the total value of recharges received in period t as mt. The form of the
budget constraint depends on the availability of borrowing/savings technology. We
consider two main cases:
1. No savings, borrowing, or storage. In this case, consumption in a given
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period is equal to the total amount of recharges received in the period: Ct = mt
in all periods. That would imply that in any given period t, an individual would
choose to walk as long as the walking costs are less than the discounted value
of consuming the mobile recharge reward kt days in the future: et < dc(kt)m.
2. Can borrow and save at an interest rate r. The lifetime budget con-
straint becomes (b) ct = E O ( ) mt. Thus, on day t, the value of
receiving m in rewards kt days in the future is (4)kt m, and so the individual
chooses to walk as long as et (.)t m
More broadly, one can accommodate both of these (and other) 29 cases in a reduced
form way by defining a discount factor representing the amount by which individuals
discount rewards received k periods in the future, which encompasses both their
"primitive" discount rate and any financial frictions. We denote this discount factor
as dm(k); in case 1, dm(k) = dc(k), whereas in case 2, dm(k) = (1)k. In either
case, dm(k) should be what was measured by our baseline CTB measurement in the
recharge domain. Using this new notation, individuals thus choose to walk on day
t as long as walking costs are less than the discounted value of the mobile recharges
received for the walk: et < dm(kt)m. The probability of compliance with the step
target on day t for a reward in kt days is thus:
Pr (wt = 1) = F (dm(kt)m) . (1.2)
Based on this, we can make three predictions, all of them quite intuitive.
Prediction 1. For an agent who is "impatient" over the receipt of financial rewards
(i.e., dm(k) < 1 and is decreasing in k), the likelihood of walking is increasing in
29For example, this approach also nests the case where there is no storage of recharges and time
preferences over consumption are domain-specific, so U = I' dm(t)mt - dc(t)et '4-
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the payment frequency. For an agent who is patient (d,(k) ~ 1), payment frequency
does not affect the likelihood of walking.3 0
This follows because equation (1.2) reveals that the likelihood of walking is in-
creasing in the discount factor over rewards dm(k), and increasing payment frequency
weakly decreases the delay to payment kt on each day t. For example, payment is
immediate in the daily contract, so kt = 0 for all t. In contrast, in the base case
incentive contract, payment is immediate only on the last day of the week (k7 = 0),
but delayed by 1 day on the 6th day of the week (k6 = 1), by 2 days on the 5th day
of the week (k5 = 2), and so on.
Prediction 2. The quantitative effect of increasing the payment frequency depends
not just on average discount rates but on the shape of the agent's discount factor over
time.
Figure 1-7 shows how discount factors might change over time for four different
models of discounting used in the literature: Quasi-hyperbolic ("beta-delta"), hyper-
bolic, exponential impatient, and exponential patient (with the former two time-
inconsistent and the latter two time-consistent). One can see that under the models
where discount factors decay more gradually over time (hyperbolic or time-consistent
impatient), there could be large gains to switching from low-frequency (e.g., monthly)
to medium-frequency (e.g., weekly) payments, whereas in a quasi-hyperbolic model,
where the biggest difference is between "the present" and "the future," there would
only be big gains to increasing frequency if payment could be made within the "beta
window" (often modeled as 1 day, which would require daily payments.) Given that
30 This relies on the linearity assumption: if utility were concave and there were no storage, then
more frequent payments could still increase the likelihood of walking through a concavity channel,
as higher frequency would mean the rewards were broken up into smaller tranches.
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paying within the "beta window" could be costly or infeasible in some settings, it is
important to distinguish between these scenarios.
0i -
a
0 10 20 3b 40 50
Lag (days)
Quasi-hyperbolic - Hyperbolic
- Exponential impatient - Exponential patient
Figure 1-7: Hypothetical discount factors
Note: Figure displays hypothetical discount factors as a function of lag length under different
models of discounting.
As a result, our experimental design tests the efficacy of three payment frequencies
- monthly, weekly, and daily - in order to answer the question of whether and what
type of increases in payment frequency improve compliance. Motivated by these
predictions, our three frequencies also allow us to explore which discount factor
model for payments best fits the data, with the overall magnitude of frequency effects
informing our understanding of the overall level of discounting, and the relative effects
of moving from monthly to weekly frequency, and from weekly to daily frequency
informing our understanding of the shape of time-preferences. A final prediction
allows us to use our experiment to shed further light on the model of discounting.
Prediction 3. If the discount factor over payments is decreasing in k and agents
are paid every X days with X > 1, then compliance will increase as the 'payday"
(e.g., the end of the week if agents are paid weekly) approaches.
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This follows from equation (1.2) since the time to payment decreases as the
payment date approaches.
Empirical Results: Payment Frequency
Motivated by the previous framework, we conduct two primary tests:
1. Between-treatment: We compare average compliance between the daily, weekly
(base case), and monthly payment groups. This allows us to both answer the
policy question of how changing payment frequency changes compliance, and
shed light on the shape of discount factors via Predictions 1 and 2 above.
2. Within-treatment: For each individual within the base case incentive group
and monthly groups, we examine whether compliance increases as the payday
approaches. Similar variation in worker effort as the payment date approaches
has been used in previous studies, both in observational (Oyer, 1998) and exper-
imental (Kaur et al., 2015) settings, to shed light on discount rates. (Prediction
3)
The approaches are complementary, each with its own advantages. The between-
treatment approach allows us to directly answer the policy question of whether pay-
ment frequency matters, while the within-treatment approach exhibits higher statis-
tical power and can shed light on discount rates at a more detailed level. Note that
since the shape of discount factors may vary across individuals, we test for hetero-
geneous effects both between- and within-treatment based on baseline measures of
time preferences over recharges.
We begin with the between-treatment analysis in the full sample. Panel B of
Table 1.2 evaluates the ITT effects of our incentive contract variations, estimating
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regressions of the following form:
yit = a + /3 x (incentivesJ). + X'7 + Eit, (1.3)
where yit are daily walking outcomes and (incentivesi)i is an indicator for whether
individual i is enrolled in incentive treatment group j E (daily, base case, monthly, 4-
day threshold, 5-day threshold, 10 INR). Recall that all treatments besides the base
case incentive vary from the base case contract on exactly 1 dimension (linearity,
payment frequency, or payment amount); the bottom rows of the table thus show
the p-values for testing for the significance of the difference between each treatment
group and the base case incentive group.
We now compare average compliance between the daily, weekly (base case), and
monthly groups. In addition to Panel B of Table 1.2, Figure 1-8 shows the compliance
in the frequency treatments visually, with the confidence intervals showing the 95%
confidence interval for a test of equality between the base case incentive group and
each other treatment group. The monitoring group's compliance is also shown as a
reference.
The impacts of the three frequency treatments on both the likelihood of exceeding
the step target and on average steps walked are statistically indistinguishable, and
the differences between the point estimates are relatively small. The treatment effects
do not increase monotonically with frequency. Interpreting the magnitudes of the
point estimates: participants receiving base case incentive delivery in fact walk the
most, but the participants receiving daily incentive delivery walk nearly the same
amount. The likelihood of achieving the step target is 2% lower in the monthly
incentive delivery group than the daily group, but average steps are slightly higher.
We thus do not find any meaningful positive evidence that increasing payment
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Figure 1-8: Payment frequency does not significantly impact walking.
Notes: Panel A shows the average probability of exceeding the daily 10,000-step target during the
intervention period for the 3 different frequency treatments (note that the "base case" treatment
pays with weekly frequency); Panel B shows average daily steps walked during the intervention
period. Confidence interval bars show tests for equality between each group and the base case
incentive group, and come from regressions that control for the phase-in value of the dependent
variable, gender, age, and weight.
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frequency in the range from daily to monthly affects compliance, implying that the
discount factor over financial rewards, dm(k), may be relatively stable over this range.
However, there are two key caveats. First, our confidence intervals are relatively wide:
we cannot rule out that daily has an effect 5 percentage points higher than the base
case, or that monthly has one 8 percentage points lower. Second, although the point
estimates for daily and base case are nearly identical, even the point estimate for the
difference between monthly and the base case, 3 percentage points, is not trivial; for
example, the effect of decreasing the payment level by 50% (which one can see by
comparing the base case and 10 INR treatments in Table 1.2) is only 8 percentage
points. We thus turn next to the within-treatment test, which has somewhat higher
statistical power, to confirm the suggestive evidence from this analysis that payment
frequency does not meaningfully improve compliance.
We next perform the within-treatment analysis. Figure 1-9 shows how compli-
ance within the weekly (Panel A) and monthly (Panel B) treatments changes as the
payment day approaches. The prediction of impatience over payments would be that
compliance increases as the payday approaches. Instead, walking behavior is remark-
ably steady across the payment cycle, indicating that individuals do not differently
discount rewards paid immediately and paid one month in advance. Regression esti-
mates of the slopes of each line are actually negative, although small in magnitude;
for each day closer to the payday,base case participants are 0.2 percentage points
less likely to comply, and monthly participants are 0.1 percentage points less likely.
The 95% confidence intervals for those slopes rule out any positive discount rates,
suggesting that aggregate discounting over payments is limited. Notably, given
the between-treatment results, this means that monthly compliance is actually lower
in the "payweek" (i.e., the last week leading up to the payday) than it is in the
other weeks; this provides further evidence that the small negative point estimate of
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Figure 1-9: The probability of exceeding the step target is stable over the payment
cycle
Notes: Figures show the probability of exceeding the daily 10,000-step target among individuals
receiving the base case, i.e., weekly, incentive (Panel A) and a monthly incentive (Panel B) relative
to the monitoring group, according to days remaining until payday. Effects control for payday day-
of-week fixed effects, gender, age, weight, and the phase-in value of the dependent variable. There
is no evidence of a spike in walking on the day of incentive delivery for incentivized participants;
in contrast, the slope of walking as the payday approaches is negative for participants in both the
base case and monthly treatment groups.
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monthly relative to the base case seen earlier simply reflects noise, not meaningfully
higher discounting for lags beyond 1 week.
Thus, consistent with the between-treatment evidence, the within-treatment ev-
idence suggests that, on aggregate, the discounting model that best describes our
participants is one of patience over mobile recharges within a 1-month time horizon;
as a result, increasing frequency between daily and monthly does not have mean-
ingful effects on average compliance. However, these are all average effects; it is
possible that they mask heterogeneity across individuals. Appendix 1.B tests for
heterogeneity by discount rates over recharges in the between-treatment effects of
payment frequency, as well as the within-treatment pattern as payday approaches.
We do not find significant heterogeneity in either: even for those with high mea-
sured impatience over recharges, increasing payment frequency does not appear to
be effective.
1.4.3 Dynamic Thresholds
Predictions
We now expand the framework presented in Section 1.4.2 to explore the interaction
between "dynamic non-separability" and time preferences. The contracts presented
and analyzed in Section 1.4.2 were all separable, linear contracts: the incentive re-
ceived was a linear function of compliance in different periods. We now explore the
effect of making the contract dynamically non-separable. In this section, we focus on
a specific form of non-separability: a "dynamic threshold" wherein payment is a func-
tion of the number of periods of compliance in a given time range (in our setting: total
days of compliance within a week). The payment function has a minimum threshold
for total compliance below which no incentive is received (in our setting: only paid
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20 INR per day of walking if they walk at least 4 or 5 days in the week). Within
the realm of dynamic non-separability, we focus on dynamic thresholds because they
are a simple, implementable form of dynamic-non-separability. However, the pre-
diction we demonstrate about the interaction between dynamic non-separability and
time preferences holds for a broader set of contracts that display a "dynamic com-
plementarity" (i.e., a period in which the payment for effort is increasing in future
effort).31
Dynamic thresholds make an individual's decision to walk considerably more
complicated. While the decision to walk in linear contracts is separable across days,
in contracts with thresholds, the reward for compliance - and hence the decision
to walk - depends on compliance on others of the 6 days in the payment period.
Rather than fully model this complex decision process, we illustrate how thresholds
interact with compliance and time preferences using a simplified representation of
our threshold contract.
In particular, we consider a hypothetical two-day threshold contract using the
same notation as in Section 1.4.2. If the individual complies with the step target on
both days, she receives 2m on the second day. However, if she complies on only one
day, she receives nothing. As above, we assume that she knows her walking costs on
both days, (ci, c2 ), on day 1. We restrict treatment here for presentational simplicity
to the case where all costs are positive (i.e., there is no inframarginal walking), an
assumption which does not affect the results, but simplifies the notation. 32
31We conjecture that having a dynamic complementarity is a necessary condition for the pre-
diction to hold. The prediction would thus not hold for contracts that only contain "dynamic
substitutabilities" (e.g., paid for at most one day of walking in a week.) Note that dynamic com-
plementarity might not be a sufficient condition.
32 With negative costs, the addition to the decision problem below is that if her cost of compliance
et is negative for either day, she will walk on that day for her own intrinsic enjoyment, and equa-
tion 1.4 becomes E [ _t=i(wt)J2-Day Threshold] = 2f-, F(dm(1)2m - de(1)c)f(c)dc + f_41 -
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Intuitively, the key difference between the threshold and linear contracts is that
in linear contracts, in each period the individual compares the reward only with
her (undiscounted) cost of effort today. Thus, conditional on discount factors over
money, discount factors over consumption do not affect the decisions to comply;
she complies if ci < dm(1)m in period 1 and c 2 < m in period 2. In the threshold
contract, in contrast, the individual in period 1 makes a joint decision about whether
it is worth it to walk in both periods in order to get paid on the second day, and
thus compares the present discounted value of effort across both periods with the
rewards. On the first day, she complies if the present discounted cost of walking on
both days, c1 + d,(1)c 2 , is less than the discounted value of the reward dm(1)2m and
she knows she will follow through on the second day. She thus complies if both (i)
(c + dc(1)c 2 < dm(1)2m), and (ii) c2 < 2m). Importantly, condition (i) is more likely
to be satisfied if agents discount future effort more.33 On the second day, the agent
complies with the step target if she has already walked on the first day, and the cost
of compliance c 2 is less than the present value of the reward, 2m (i.e., if condition
(ii) above holds).
Since we assumed costs are i.i.d., the agent's expected total compliance in the
2-Day threshold contract (with a 2-day payment period) is thus
2
E (wt)12-Day Threshold = P(ci + dc(1)c 2 < dm(1)2m AND c2 < 2m)
= 2 F(dm(1)2m - dc(1)c)f (c)dc (1.4)
For comparison, the linear (i.e., a "Non-threshold") contract with the same 2-day
F(dm(1)2m - dc(1)c)]f (c)dc + F(O)[1 - 2m]
33
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payment period and per-day reward amount m would yield expected total compliance
. 2
E [ (wt)INon-threshold =F(dm(I)m) + F (m) (1.5)
.t=1
Whether total compliance with a 2-day threshold (Equation 1.4) is larger than the
compliance without a threshold (Equation 1.5) depends on the distribution of walking
costs; thus, the effect of adding a threshold to a linear contract on overall compliance
with the step target is theoretically ambiguous. 34
However, we can show the following prediction:
Prediction 4. Compliance in the dynamic threshold contract is decreasing with the
discount factor over walking, de(k), and thus is higher for those who discount future
walking more.
This follows directly from inspection of equations 1.4 and 1.5. As the discount
factor decreases, the present discounted cost of walking to reach the Threshold de-
creases, increasing the probability of walking. In other words, individuals who are
less forward-looking over walking discount future walking heavily, and so the total
discounted cost of reaching the threshold is low.
Note that the prediction holds for both time consistent and time inconsistent
time preferences. Although this might seem like an artifact of our focus on a simple
2-period model in which there is no distinction between time consistent and time
inconsistent preferences, the finding also holds in multi-period models: the relative
efficacy of non-separability is increasing in general impatience regardless of its form.
Within time-inconsistent time preferences, the finding holds for both naives and
sophisticates; in fact, non-separability can in some cases work better even for naives,
34In models that incorporate uncertainty over walking costs, overall efficacy will also depend on
the degree of uncertainty and risk aversion.
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because their overoptimism about their future compliance makes them even more
likely to comply today (a longer-period model is needed to illustrate this point).
Threshold Results: Overall Effectiveness
Our primary prediction for the effect of the dynamic threshold contracts is that rela-
tive to linear contracts, they should improve performance for those who are impatient
over consumption; we do not have any predictions for the average effect. However,
it is still useful to analyze the average effect of thresholds for several reasons: first,
because our experiment represents (to our knowledge) the first randomized evidence
comparing a dynamically non-separable contract to one without; and second, be-
cause understanding its effects is useful from a policy perspective. We thus begin by
analyzing the average effect of threshold contracts relative to linear, before turning
to test for heterogeneity in the impact of the threshold by time preferences.
We find that adding a dynamic threshold decreases the total amount of incen-
tives delivered without sacrificing overall program effectiveness. Figure 1-10 and the
fourth and fifth rows of Table 1.2) show that individuals in the 4-day threshold and
5-day threshold treatment groups exceed the 10,000 daily step target roughly as fre-
quently as individuals in the base case incentive group (which has no threshold). For
both threshold treatments, compliance with the step target is within 2 percentage
points of compliance in the base case incentive (linear) treatment, with the difference
statistically insignificant. The number of steps are similar across treatments as well.
However, individuals in the two threshold groups only receive a reward for ex-
ceeding the step target if they do so on at least 4 or 5 days in a weeklong payment
cycle; when they walk on fewer than the threshold days, they are not rewarded.
Because individuals with threshold contracts do not reduce overall walking, but are
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paid for a lower fraction of days walked, the threshold contracts we offer are more
cost-effective than base case incentive contracts without a threshold.
Exceeded Step Target Daily Steps
COD
0
Monit CD
Dynamic Threshold Dynamic Threshold
(a) Probability Exceeded Step Target (b) Average Daily Steps
Figure 1-10: Adding a dynamic threshold does not significantly affect average walking
Notes: Figures compare the effects of the dynamic threshold treatments with the "base case" (linear)
incentive treatment. Panel A shows the average probability of exceeding the daily 10,000-step target
during the intervention period; Panel B shows average daily steps walked during the intervention
period. Confidence interval bars control for the phase-in value of the dependent variable, gender,
age, and weight.
Table 1.3 quantifies the cost-effectiveness of the base case incentive, 10-INR, and
threshold contracts in two ways. Column 5 shows the average incentive delivered
on a day the participant exceeded the daily 10,000 step target. For the base case
and 10-INR contracts, which pay out linearly according to the number of days the
target is reached, this is just the incentive amount. However, as Column 4 shows,
in the 4- and 5- day Threshold groups, participants are paid 91% and 86% of the
days the achieve the step target, respectively. Thus, the incentive paid per day the
target is reached is lower than in the base case (linear) group: 18 INR and 17 INR
per day of compliance as compared to 20 INR. These cost savings of 8% and 14%
are made while participants achieve nearly the same amount of walking. Column
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6 Shows the average incentive cost per additional day the step target was reached
above the monitoring group, which accounts for the possibility that the amount of
walking that is inframarginal to the incentives might differ between the compliers for
different contracts. According to this metric, the 4-day threshold and 5-day threshold
achieve cost savings of 6.1% and 11.0%, respectively. For comparison, the incentive
amount per day walked is mechanically lower in the 10-INR treatment group, but
this comes at the cost of reduced walking overall.
Table 1.3: Cost Effectiveness of Monitoring and Incentive Treatments
Cost-effectiveness of Incentive Contracts
Walking Rewards Cost-effectiveness
Compliance Treatment Incentive Proportion INR per INR per Day
with Effect Amount Compli- Day Complied
Target (INR) ance Complied above
Incentivized Monitoring
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Monitoring
Daily
Base Case
Monthly
4-Day Threshold
5-Day Threshold
10 INR
30.2%
50.99%
50.71%
50.1%
50.54%
51.7%
44.78%
0
20.8
20.52
19.9
20.34
21.5
14.58
0
20
20
20
20
20
10
0
1
1
1
.9
.85
1
0
20
20
20
18.08
17.07
10
N/A
49.04
49.44
50.34
44.92
41.04
30.71
One potential explanation for similar average walking in threshold and base case
groups is that individuals simply do not notice the thresholds. However, the thresh-
old contracts lead to markedly different walking patterns than the base case non-
threshold group, showing that individuals clearly understand and respond to the
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thresholds. Figure 1-11 shows that the threshold contracts have a large bimodal ef-
fect on walking: more individuals in the threshold contracts achieve their step target
7 days in a week or 0 days in a week. The bimodal treatment effect from thresholds
is not simply a feature of behavior across weeks, but also appears across individuals.
Figure 1-12 plots the density of each individual's probability of exceeding her step
target, and mean daily steps, over the entire intervention period. The results across
individuals mirror the results across weeks: the distribution of individual walking
habits has thicker tails under the threshold treatments, with more people walking
at the high and low ends. Appendix Table 1.C.3 substantiates these conclusions
using quantile regressions.3 5 In sum, although thresholds do not work well for every-
one, they work very well for some people, inducing them to walk with much more
consistency across days, and for more steps per day, than non-threshold contracts.
From a policy perspective, since threshold contracts create more extreme out-
comes, we might be concerned if there are diminishing returns to behavior. In this
setting, diminishing returns to exercise seem plausible, although the medical evidence
is not definitive. If so, instituting a dynamic threshold creates a tradeoff: it decreases
the cost per day of exercise induced, but perhaps also diminishes the health benefit
per day of exercise induced.3 ' The bimodal effects of thresholds also highlight the
importance of understanding for whom they work best. We next proceed to test our
3 5 Specifically, we report a series of regressions of dummies for six average daily step quantiles,
and six fraction-of-days-step-target-exceeded quantiles, on the different treatment groups. The fifth
row of each panel shows the additional effect of the Threshold incentives contracts (pooled together)
compared to the base case (linear) incentives. The coefficients are positive for the highest and lowest
quintiles, but negative for intermediate quintiles, showing that the threshold treatments push more
people to the extremes of walking behavior.
36 0n a similar note, one might think there would be greater value in inducing exercise among
those who have low levels of baseline exercise rather than those who already exercised a lot at
baseline. Appendix Table 1.C.5 and Figure 1.C.1 explore heterogeneity by baseline walking, showing
suggestive but weak evidence that thresholds increase exercise more for those who walk more at
baseline, providing one other potential downside of threshold contracts.
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Figure 1-11: Days walked per week in threshold and base case (linear) contracts.
Notes: This figures shows the distribution of the number of days walked each week in the 4-day
and 5-day threshold contracts and the base case (linear) contract during the intervention period.
Effects control for average daily steps during the phase-in period, gender, age, and weight.
Days Exceeded Step Target
0 .2 4 .6 .8
Fraction of Days
Base case - 4-day Threshold - 5-day Thresho
0
Mean Daily Steps
S 5Oi 10000 1500 2000
Steps
---- Base case - 4-day Threshold - 5-day Thresh
Figure 1-12: Fraction of days walked and
base case vs. threshold
average steps at the participant level, for
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of the fraction of days walked and average steps for each
participant over the entire intervention period in each of the threshold contracts compared with the
base case (linear) contract.
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theoretical prediction about one type of individual for whom the threshold contracts
will work better: those who are impatient over walking.
Threshold Results: Time Preference Heterogeneity
Our theory from Section 1.4.3 predicts that the threshold will be more effective for
those who discount future walking more heavily than current walking. To test this,
we regress an indicator for walking 10,000 steps (i.e., compliance with the incentivized
activity) on our structural measure of impatience in the step domain, an indicator
for being in a threshold treatment, and their interaction. We restrict the sample to
only the base case incentive group and the 4- and 5-day threshold groups so that the
only dimension that varies between groups is whether their contract has a dynamic
threshold. Following our ex ante analysis plan, we pool the threshold treatments for
power purposes (so Threshold is an indicator for being in either threshold group).
The key coefficient of interest is on the interaction between the Threshold treatment
and the measure of impatience over steps.
The evidence backs up our theory that impatience over steps play a role in the
success of thresholds. Column 1 of Table 1.4 shows that those with higher impatience
over exercise have higher compliance under the threshold treatment relative to the
linear. Because the impatience measure (labeled "delta" in the table) often falls
outside of the 0/1 range, to aid in interpretation of the magnitude, columns 2 and 3
show the results using indicators for whether impatience is above the 50th percentile
and the 75th percentile, respectively. We lose some precision, but the columns show
that the effect is large in magnitude: having above-median (above 75th percentile)
increases compliance with the threshold contract relative to the base case contract
by 4 percentage points (9 percentage points), which are large impacts relative to
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Table 1.4: Thresholds are more effective for those who are more impatient over
walking.
Dependent variable: Met step target (x 100)
Correlates
Above- Above- Standardized of
Impatience measure: Delta median 75th-perc. self-control self-control
delta delta index inex
index
Non- Non- Non-
Sample: missing missing missing Full Fall
delta delta delta
Impatience x Threshold 0.389*** 4.221 9.200** 5.292* 5.328***
10.134] 13.3681 13.804] 12.9991 11.9981
Impatience -0.266** 0.928 -1.926 -5.754*** -3.889***
10.108] 12.4761 [2.7831 12.0031 [1.469]
Threshold -1.518 -3.359 -3.690* -1.865 -1.137
[1.6841 12.4291 [1.967] [1.880] [1.388]
Domain of Impatience Steps Steps Steps General General
# Observations 110,932 110,932 110,932 85,246 156,351
Base Case mean 48.5 48.5 48.5 50.8 50.7
Notes: This table shows heterogeneity by time preferences in the effect
to linear contracts. The sample is restricted to the weekly groups - i.e.,
of threshold contracts relative
the base case incentive group,
which has a linear contract, and the 2 threshold groups, 4-day threshold and 5-day threshold, pooled
here together as "Threshold." The base case group is the omitted category. All columns control for
gender, age, weight, and the baseline value of the dependent variable. The unit of observation is a
respondent x day. Larger values of each impatience measure indicates more impatience. The first 3
columns all are based on the structural estimate of impatience in the step domain. Standard errors in
brackets clustered at the respondent level. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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the average effect of incentives (20 percentage points). (Note that only the second
coefficient is significant). Figure 1-13 shows the threshold effects visually by quartile
of impatience: the effectiveness of the threshold seems to be relatively flat until the
final quartile.
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- Non-separable coefficient 95% Cl's
Figure 1-13: Threshold effect, by quartile of time preference
Notes: The sample is restricted to the weekly groups - i.e., the base case incentive group, which
has a linear contract, and the 2 threshold groups, 4-day threshold and 5-day threshold, pooled
here together as "Threshold." The chart shows the coefficient on a dummy for being in a threshold
treatment from a regression of compliance on a dummy for being in a threshold treatment group,
estimated separately by quartiles of the distribution of impatience. The base case group is the
omitted category. All regressions estimated with control variables (gender, age, weight, and the
baseline value of the dependent variable).
One concern with the structural impatience measure is that it can only be es-
timated for individuals making interior choices in the CTB allocation, and thus is
missing for about 30% of the sample. We thus might be concerned that those who
make interior choices are different than those who do not. Several weeks into the
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data collection for the project, we realized the prevalence of non-interior choices, and
added to our baseline survey a set of questions on impatience and self-control from
the psychology literature that proxy for impatience and which we use to create a
standardized index of impatience/self-control issues. Although these data are only
available for participants who were enrolled after that point in the data collection
(and thus precision is low), unlike for our structural measure, the sample with data
available should be representative of the full sample. Reassuringly, we obtain a con-
sistent finding using this standardized index, with the estimated coefficient in column
4 suggesting that the threshold works 5 pp better for those who are one standard
deviation higher in the index. Finally, to get data from the full sample, we also
create an index of procrastination-style questions that were included in the baseline
survey from the beginning of data collection and that correlate with the index from
column 4, and again we see consistent results (see column 5).
Of course, impatience is not randomly assigned and could correlate with other
variables that influence the effectiveness of the threshold treatment. Luckily, Ap-
pendix Table 1.C.6 shows that the impatience measure is not correlated with most
other variables (e.g., risk aversion), somewhat assuaging this concern. We have two
other approaches to address this concern. First, Appendix Table 1.C.7 controls for
other baseline covariates and their interactions with the threshold treatments. Reas-
suringly, the tables shows that the threshold interactions are relatively robust. Note
that this test is in many senses too stringent ("over-controlling"), as some of these
other control variables could also be downstream outcomes affected by impatience.
Second, we calibrate a model using the empirical distribution of walking costs
to show that, in this setting, the performance of the threshold treatments should
indeed increase meaningfully with impatience over exercise. We first extend the
simple framework from Section 1.4.3 to cover a 7-day model with 4-day and 5-day
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thresholds. To calibrate the average compliance in the threshold and base case
(linear) contracts, we need to estimate the distribution of walking costs, F(.). We do
this by fitting a normal distribution to several moments from the data. In particular,
the average walking in the monitoring treatment, in the 10 INR treatment, and in
the 20 INR base case incentive group uncover F(0), F(10), and F(20), respectively.
We also use two additional moments: the probability of walking for the 4-day (5-day)
threshold group when one had already walked 3 days (4 days) and it is the last day
of the contract period to uncover F(80) (F(100)).
We can then use this normal distribution to estimate how relative compliance
in the base case (linear) and threshold contracts would vary with the discount rate
over walking, d,. The results are displayed visually in Figure 1-14, with the discount
factor over walking on the x-axis, the gap between performance in the threshold and
linear on the y-axis (shown separately for the 4-day and 5-day thresholds), and the
figure shown separately for different scenarios of the discount rate over payments
din. The figure confirms that, given the sample's distribution of walking costs, in-
crease in performance of the threshold contract as impatience increases should be
quantitatively important. Note that the calibration overestimates the average effect
of the threshold, likely at least in part because our simple model does not incorpo-
rate uncertainty over future walking costs and risk aversion, which would decrease
the average performance of the dynamic threshold. However, these other factors
should primarily affect the average effect of the dynamic threshold relative to the
base case contract, and should not we believe meaningfully affect the heterogeneity
by impatience, which is the main goal of this analysis.
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Predicted Gain in Walking Relative to Weekly
by Discount Factor
delta-m = .90 deta-m = .99 defta-m 1
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Figure 1-14: Calibration: Threshold compliance relative to the base case linear com-
pliance, by the discount factor over walking
1.5 Results: Program Evaluation
In this section, we begin by evaluating the effects of the incentives and monitoring
treatments on various health and behavioral outcomes. We then investigate whether
monitoring alone affects exercise.
1.5.1 Health and Lifestyle Effects
The impacts of an incentives program on health and healthy behaviors are of inde-
pendent policy interest, especially among a population at high risk for complications
from non-communicable disease such as ours. Regular exercise such as walking can
help prevent complications from diabetes, as well as hypertension. In addition,
exercise may have coincident benefits for physical fitness and mental health. Finally,
walking incentives programs such as ours may also impact other behaviors, either
encouraging them (e.g., by increasing the salience of good health), or discouraging
(e.g. if people substitute between healthy behaviors). In this section, we assess the
impacts of our programs on health and healthy behavior.
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For looking at health outcomes, our experiment was primarily powered to detect
the difference between incentives groups (pooled) and the pure control group. Tables
1.5 through 1.8 report results from regressions of the following form
y = a + 31 x incentivesi + /2 x monitoringi + /3 x SMS, + X'Y + Ei (1.6)
where y, is a health or lifestyle outcome at endline for individual i; incentivesi is an
indicator for being in the incentives group; monitoring is an indicator for being in
the monitoring group; SMS is an indicator for being cross-randomized into the SMS
reminders group; and Xi is a vector of controls. /31 is the ITT effect of incentives
relative to the pure control group, /2 is the ITT effect of the monitoring relative to
the pure control group, and, for benchmarking, 33 is the ITT effect of being in the
SMS reminders group.
This section reports ITT effects on outcomes in five categories: physical health,
anaerobic fitness, mental health, diet, and addictive substance use. In order to
maximize our power to detect overall effects on each category, we create a single
index of all variables in each category by taking the simple average of each variable,
standardized by the mean and standard deviation in the pure control group.3 7 While
we report regression estimates for each outcome individually, we focus on the category
indices for inferring effectiveness.
Physical health and anaerobic fitness
Table 1.5 shows that the incentives program improves health indicators in this pop-
ulation. Turning to the components of the index, we see average reductions in two
37We follow Kling et al. (2007), by imputing missings for each component using the sample mean.
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measures of blood sugar at endline: Hbalc, a three-month weighted average of blood
sugar levels; and random blood sugar (RBS), a measure of instantaneous blood sugar
levels, although only the latter is significant, and only at the 10% level. Of the other
3 components - blood pressure, BMI, and wast circum - only waist circumfernce is
individually significant (at the 10% level). Column 1 presents the treatment effect
on the "Health Risk Index", which averages these five health risk factors. We find a
moderately sized statistically significant reduction in health risk of 0.06 units. The
table also shows that monitoring alone did not seem to impact health.
We included the SMS treatment partly to benchmark the effect sizes of the incen-
tives group, as that treatment has been effective in other contexts. Surprisingly, the
SMS treatment effect here is, if anything, positive; recall that here positive coefficients
are associated with worse health. To probe further on why this might be the case,
in Appendix Table 1.C.8 we estimate a model including all of the interaction effects
between the SMS treatment, and the monitoring or incentives treatments. Although
these estimates should be interpreted as suggestive only since (a) we did not plan
to run this specification ex ante, and (b) the interaction effects are only marginally
significant, it appears that one reason for the SMS Treatment's marginally negative
average effect, is that the SMS treatment does not interact well with incentives,
especially for their effect on blood sugar.
To assess the size of our incentives treatment on health, we can also compare our
effect sizes to the effects of other interventions in the literature. Although the In-
centive treatment effects appear small, they are, in fact, relatively reasonable when
compared to other interventions in terms of scalability, intensity, and cost. Ap-
pendix Table 1.C.9 shows the effects sizes and intervention details of other SMS and
exercise interventions. Note that the majority of studies that find larger effects on
Hbalc utilize more intensive interventions that are both costly and are unlikely to
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be scalable.
Table 1.5: Impacts of incentives and monitoring on health risk factors.
Incentives
Monitoring
Control mean
P-value: M =
P-value: SMS
P-value: SMS
# Individuals
Health
Risk
Index
-0.060**
[0.026]
0.0038
[0.046]
I
I
M
0.00
0.12
0.00
0.28
3,103
Mean
HbAlc RBS Arterial
BP
-0.087 -6.12* 0.23
[0.071] [3.42] [0.43]
-0.15 1.86 1.28*
[0.12] [6.06] [0.75]
8.44 193.83 103.14
0.59 0.14 0.12
0.10 0.81 0.22
0.10 0.37 0.83
3,061 3,067 3,050
Waist
BMI Circum-
ference
-0.065 -0.39*
[0.049 [0.24]
0.034 -0.37
[0.087] [0.42]
26.52 94.50
0.21 0.96
0.02 0.03
0.41 0.11
3,065 2,951
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. For the Health Risk Index, controls include age, gender, and
second order polynomials of all health variables underlying the index at baseline. Controls for all
other outcomes include age, gender, SMS treatment, and a second order polynomial of dependent
variable at baseline. The Health Risk Index is an index created by the average of endline Hbalc,
RBS, MAP, BMI, and waist circumference standardized by their average and standard deviation
in the control group. Hbalc is the average plasma glucose concentration (%), RBS is the blood
glucose level (mg/dL), MAP is the mean arterial blood pressure (mm Hg), and BMI is the body
mass index. The omitted category in all columns is the pure control group.
We next examine the ITT impacts of incentives on physical fitness. Our survey
collected two measures of anaerobic fitness at baseline and endline: 4-meter timed
walk, and standing five times from a sitting position (e.g., from a chair). Thus, a
smaller value of either of these measures indicates greater anaerobic fitness. Table 1.6
shows that participants in the incentives groups are not meaningfully faster or slower
at either the times walk or sit-stands, nor on our index of the two measures. Although
is is surprising that walking does not have any detectable impacts on our measure of
fitness, while having large impacts on exercise, this may partly be explained by the
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fact that our intervention motivated a low-intensity form of exercise, while we were
only able to implement time trials of high-intensity, short-duration exercise activities
in our surveys.
Table 1.6: Impacts
Incentives
Monitoring
Control mean
P-value: M =
P-value: SMS
P-value: SMS
# Individuals
I
I
M
of incentives and monitoring on fitness.
Fitness
Time Trial
Index
0.0064
[0.0281
0.025
[0.049]
0.00
0.67
0.24
0.24
2,819
Seconds to
Walk 4m
0.015
[0.044]
0.040
[0.0771
3.88
0.71
0.34
0.33
2,598
Seconds
for 5
Sit-Stands
-0.091
[0.12]
-0.13
[0.21]
13.18
0.83
0.97
0.90
2,595
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. For the Fitness Time Trial Index, controls include age, gender,
and second order polynomials of both fitness variables underlying the index at baseline. Controls
for all other outcomes include age, gender, SMS treatment, and a second order polynomial of
dependent variable at baseline. A large value of Fitness Time Trial Index indicates low fitness: it is
an index created by the average two trials of endline seconds to walk four meters, and the seconds to
complete five sit-stands standardized by their average and standard deviation in the control group.
The omitted category in all columns is the pure control group.
Mental health
We next turn to the ITT impacts of incentives on mental health. We measure mental
health using seven questions adapted from the Rand 36-Item Short Form Survey (SF-
36). The SF-36 is a standard, publicly available quality-of-life survey, which has been
validated for measuring emotional wellbeing in India (Sinha et al., 2013; Rajeswari
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et al., 2005). We selected questions having to do with emotional health, including
emotional wellbeing, energy/fatigue, and social function. Each question asks for the
frequency of a feeling or event in the previous four weeks." Answers are then recoded
so that larger values indicate better mental health.
Table 1.7: Impacts of incentives and monitoring on mental health.
Mental Less
Health Felt Less Peaceful Energy Less Less harm to
Index Happy Nervous Blue Worn Social
Life
Incentives 0.073** 0.088** 0.026 0.055 0.061 0.015 0.090** 0.052*
10.0321 10.0451 [0.0441 10.047] 10.0481 10.0431 10.039] 10.0301
Monitoring 0.11* 0.072 0.12 0.092 0.035 0.13 0.17** 0.049
[0.057] 10.0791 10.0771 10.0831 10.0841 10.077] [0.0691 10.0531
Control mean 0.00 3.06 3.48 3.35 3.30 3.86 4.40 4.71
P-value: M = I 0.50 0.81 0.16 0.62 0.73 0.11 0.18 0.94
P-value: SMS = I 0.48 0.35 0.21 1.00 0.58 0.32 0.11 0.27
P-value: SMS = M 0.31 0.60 0.93 0.72 0.87 0.66 0.03 0.44
# Individuals 3,192 3,068 3,068 3,068 3,068 3,068 3,068 3,068
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. For the Mental Health Index, controls include age, gender,
and second order polynomials of all questions underlying the index at baseline. Controls for all
other outcomes include age, gender, SMS treatment, and a second order polynomial of dependent
variable at baseline (where available). The Mental Health Index is the average values of seven
questions adapted from the Rand 36-Item Short Form Survey (SF-36), standardized by their mean
and standard deviation in the pure control group. The omitted category in all columns is the pure
control group.
Table 1.7 shows that the incentives program significantly improve our index of
mental health. In addition, the monitoring program has an even larger positive
effect on mental health, although we cannot reject equality. Although many studies
have found a positive association between exercise and mental health (Biddle, 2016),
experimental evidence that exercise causes improvements in mental health is fairly
3 8 For example, the "Felt happy" question asks: "In the previous four weeks, how often have you
felt happy? All of the time, most of the time, a good bit of the time, some of the time, a little of
the time, or none of the time?"
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scarce and mixed. Our result is novel experimental evidence that exercise can improve
mental health among a general population.
Lifestyle
Finally, we examine the ITT impacts of incentives on two dimensions of a healthy
lifestyle: diet, and the consumption of addictive goods. We do not find evidence
that incentives lead to healthier diet choices or reduce consumption of addictive
substances, as seen in Tables 1.8 and 1.9, although most of the coefficients go in the
hypothesized direction.
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Table 1.8: Impacts of incentives and monitoring on Healthy Diet, relative to pure
control.
Meals
Wheat with
meals vegeta-
bles
Servings -(Rice (Junkfood(Spoons
Fruit meals) pieces) sugar in
coffee)
0.051 0.027 0.060* 0.040 0.029 -0.017 -0.022 -0.028 0.0036
10.045] [0.030] 10.0311 10.0381 10.0331 10.0621 10.0461 10.038] [0.0181
0.021 0.018 0.078 0.060 -0.0075 0.13 -0.029 -0.048 -0.041
10.0791 10.0531 10.055] 10.066] 10.0591 10.111 10.081] 10.0671 10.0311
Control mean
P-value: M = I
P-value: SMS =
P-value: SMS =
# Individuals
0.00
0.68
I 0.97
M 0.79
0.49
0.84
0.28
0.52
0.58
0.70
0.22
0.24
0.53
0.73
0.49
0.44
-2.34
0.49
0.31
0.81
3,192 3,068 3,068 3,068 3,068
-0.87
0.14
0.47
0.60
-1.08
0.93
0.25
0.36
3,192 3,192
-0.35 0.83
0.75 0.11
0.05 0.79
0.10 0.17
3,068 3,068
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. For the Healthy Diet Index, controls include age, gender, and
second order polynomials of all questions underlying the index at baseline. Controls for all other
outcomes include age, gender, SMS treatment, and a second order polynomial of dependent variable
at baseline. The Healthy Diet Index is an index created by the average values of eight diet questions,
standardized by their average and standard deviation in the control group. A larger value indicates
a healthier diet. The omitted category in all columns is the pure control group.
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Diet
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Incentives
Monitoring
(Sweets
yester-
day)
Avoid
un-
healthy
food
Table 1.9: Impacts of incentives and monitoring on Addictive Substance Consump-
tion, relative to pure control.
Incentives
Monitoring
Control mean
P-value: M =
P-value: SMS
P-value: SMS
# Individuals
Addictive Good
Consumption
Index
-0.010
[0.037]
-0.0058
[0.065]
I
I
M
0.00
0.94
0.50
0.65
3,192
Average Daily
Areca
0.035
[0.042]
0.013
[0.074]
0.13
0.75
0.89
0.73
3,068
Average Daily
Alcohol
-0.036*
[0.020]
-0.016
[0.0361
0.11
0.54
0.10
0.44
3,068
Average Daily
Cigarettes
-0.055
[0.111
-0.019
[0.19]
1.02
0.83
0.60
0.59
3,068
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. For the Addictive Good Consumption Index, controls include
age, gender, and second order polynomials of all questions underlying the index at baseline. Con-
trols for all other outcomes include age, gender, SMS treatment, and a second order polynomial
of dependent variable at baseline. The Addictive Good Consumption Index is an index created
by the average self-reported average daily consumption of areca, alcoholic drinks, and cigarettes,
standardized by their average and standard deviation in the control group. A larger value indicates
more consumption. The omitted category in all columns is the pure control group.
1.5.2 Monitoring and Exercise
The previous results suggest that the monitoring group had limited impact, although
the results are somewhat imprecise. One may wonder whether this is because the
monitoring treatment did not affect exercise, or whether these exercise impacts were
too small to translate into measurable health impacts. Existing evidence from other
settings suggests elements of the monitoring program can increase walking. 39 In this
39For example, in a meta-analysis of randomized evaluations in high-income countries, Bravata
et al. (2007) find that pedometer use increases walking, especially in combination with an explicit
step target, with treatment effects ranging from 1571-2796 steps per day.
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section, we evaluate the impact of monitoring on walking, which is useful not just as a
standalone exercise, but is also helpful for understanding the impact of incentives on
walking, since the earlier Section 1.4.1 analysis only evaluated the effect of incentives
relative to monitoring, which must be added to the effect of monitoring to get the
overall incentive impact.
We use two strategies to assess the effects of the monitoring treatment on exercise
outcomes. Our first strategy exploits experimental variation in treatment assignment
between the monitoring and pure control groups. However, although this strategy
is well-identified, it relies on self-reported exercise data at endline (the pure control
had no pedometers). These data are not only imprecise, but they are likely biased
since the monitoring treatment emphasized the importance of walking. Our second
strategy is to compare pedometer-measured walking behavior among participants in
the monitoring group before and after treatment assignment, exploiting the experi-
mental time-series variation in the introduction of the monitoring treatment. While
this strategy will be biased either in the presence of within-person time trends in
walking, or if the phase-in period directly effects walking behavior, it has the advan-
tage of using a more rigorous outcome measure. We present the details and results
from each of these strategies in turn.
First, we compare self-reported exercise at endline across treatment groups using
regressions of the following form:
yi = a + ,1 x incentivesi + fl2 x controli + X'y + Ei (1.7)
where yi is the outcome at endline for individual i, and controli is an indicator for
being in the pure control group. The coefficient 01 represents the ITT effect of
incentives relative to the monitoring group, while 02 is the ITT effect of the pure
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control relative to the monitoring group. The results of these regressions are shown
in Table 1.10.
Table 1.10: Impacts of incentives and monitoring on self-reported exercise.
Self-Reported Data (at Endline)
Incentives
Pure Control
Fraction Days
Exercised Last
Week
0.0627*
[0.03201
-0.124***
[0.03531
Minutes Walked
for Exercise
Yesterday
4.968**
[2.2571
-7.626***
[2.365]
Monitoring mean
Controls
Observations
0.497
Yes
3,063
22.333
Yes
3,063
Notes: We report pooled incentive effects. The columns show coefficient estimates from regressions
of the form specified in Equation 1.7, using a cross-section of self-reported exercise data at endline,
after the intervention period is over. The sample includes the Pure control, incentives, and mon-
itoring groups. Controls include age, gender, weight, SMS treatment, and the average daily steps
and fraction of days step target was exceeded during the phase-in period (before randomization).
The omitted category in all columns is the monitoring group. Standard errors, in brackets, are
clustered at the individual level. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
The results show that self-reported exercise was higher in the incentives group
than the monitoring group, and the monitoring group than the pure control group.
Monitoring participants report substantially higher levels of exercise than the control
group. However, the results give potential reason for doubt, as the estimated effect of
monitoring relative to control seems unreasonably large, and the effect of incentives
relative to monitoring unreasonably small, given the findings we have from pedome-
90
ter." This suggests that self-reported exercise during the intervention period may
be biased upwards relative to the other groups, and makes us question the reliability
of these analysis.41
Our second source of information on the impact of the monitoring treatment is
a comparison of steps walked in the phase-in and intervention periods. A pre-post
estimate of monitoring effects is valid under the assumption that walking during the
phase-in period is a valid counterfactual for walking during the intervention period
without the aspects of the monitoring program we are assessing: a daily 10,000 step
goal, a pedometer, and a step-reporting system. This is a strong assumption, and
may be invalid in a simple pre-post comparison for two reasons. First, on average, the
timing of the introduction of the intervention period may be correlated with aggregate
seasonal or time trends in walking behavior. In order to avoid this source of bias,
our primary specification isolates the variation between individuals in the phase-in
and intervention period in a given month, using year-month fixed effects. Second,
walking during the phase-in period may have been influenced by the program: during
4 01n the self-reported data, the estimated monitoring effect is 50-90% larger than the estimated
effect of incentives relative to monitoring. Given that, using pedometer data, the monitoring mean
for days exceeded target was 30% and the incentive effect relative to monitoring was 20%, these
would imply that the control group should have been exceeding their target on around 0% of days,
which seems implausible given that people exceeded their step target on 25% of days in the phase-in
period before the interventions were launched.
4 1The difference between the incentives and monitoring group in both the self-reported likelihood
of walking on a given day in the week before the endline, and the duration of walking the day
before endline, are much smaller than the 21% difference in compliance with the step target and
approximately 12 minutes of daily walking during the intervention period. The somewhat smaller
impacts on self-reported exercise outcomes at endline have three non-competing explanations: in-
centives may increase the intensity of exercise bouts (so that the incentives groups take more steps
per self-reported minute and day walked); the exercise outcomes of the monitoring and incentives
treatments converged between the end of the intervention and the endline survey (although the gap
was short); or the self-reported endline outcomes are biased upward in the monitoring group rela-
tive to the incentives group, for example because the monitoring group faces a stronger desirability
bias relative to their actual behavior. We unfortunately do not have a way of teasing apart these
explanations.
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the phase-in period all participants are given pedometers and asked to report their
steps to a step-reporting system, two of the program elements we wish to evaluate.
However, before the phase-in, we instruct all participants to do their best not to
change their walking behavior during the phase-in week. In addition, we do not
mention a 10,000 step goal until after the phase-in period. Nonetheless, it is likely
that walking during the phase-in period was higher than usual levels due to either
Hawthorne effects, or the direct effect of the pedometer and step-reporting system.
Thus, we consider a pre-post comparison of walking in the monitoring group to be a
lower bound of the monitoring program treatment effect.
We estimate the pre-post monitoring effect in the context of a differences-and-
differences regression of outcomes observed both in the intervention and phase-in
periods. We estimate a regression of the form:
yit = a + 31Intervention Periodit + / 2incentivesi + /3 (Intervention Periodit x incentives )
+ X'7 + Am + Eit, (1.8)
where yit are daily pedometer outcomes measured during both the phase-in and the
intervention period, Intervention Periodit is an indicator for whether individual i
has been randomized into their contract at time t, incentivesi is an indicator for
whether i is in an incentives treatment group, Xi is a vector of individual-specific
controls, and Mm is a vector of month fixed effects. Since pure control participants
are not included in these regression samples (they do not have pedometer data in
the intervention period), the coefficient #1 - the coefficient of interest - is the pre-
post difference in pedometer outcomes within the monitoring group (controlling for
aggregate time effects).
The variation used for our pre-post monitoring treatment effect estimate is illus-
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trated in an event study framework in Figure 1-6. Walking increases immediately
during the intervention period for the monitoring group, indicating that our interven-
tion, even without incentives, does change exercise behavior. However, the effects of
the monitoring program decay over time. The average treatment effect of monitoring
over the intervention period is shown in Table 1.11, as well as the incentive impacts
estimated using the differences-in-differences strategy outlined above. The second
row of the table shows that, on average, the monitoring group achieves the 10,000
step target on approximately 7% more days in the intervention period than in the
phase-in period (controlling for year-month and individual characteristics), an effect
nearly .4 times the estimated additional impact of incentives. Interestingly, monitor-
ing group individuals walk only about 140 more steps per day during the intervention
period than in the phase-in period (the effect is statistically indistinguishable from
zero), which is only .1 times the additional impact of incentives, indicating that the
monitoring treatment does more to make walking more consistent across days - which
is important for blood sugar control - than it does to increase total steps.
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Table 1.11: Impacts of monitoring (pre-post) and incentives (difference-in-
differences) on exercise outcomes.
Achieved 10K Steps Daily Steps
Incentives 0.013 0.014 0.0091 73.6 76.0 62.3
[0.024] [0.024] [0.011] [270.8] [270.2] [114.0]
Intervention Period 0.065*** 0.081*** 0.073*** -25.7 216.2 62.0
[0.020] [0.021] [0.020] [238.1] [241.4] [234.2]
Intervention Period X 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 1278.0*** 1263.1*** 1224.2***
Incentives [0.021] [0.021] [0.0211 [248.7] [249.4] [243.4]
Monitoring phase-in mean 0.24 0.24 0.24 6848.51 6848.51 6848.51
Year-month FEs No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes No No Yes
# Monitoring 203 203 203 203 203 203
# Incentives 2,404 2,404 2,401 2,404 2,404 2,402
# Individuals 2,607 2,607 2,604 2,607 2,607 2,605
Observations 218,812 218,812 218,573 220,169 220,169 220,040
Notes: This table shows coefficient estimates from regressions of the form specified in Equation 1.8.
The outcomes are from daily panel data from the pedometers. Standard errors, in brackets, are
clustered at the individual level. Individual controls include age, gender, weight, and the average of
the dependent variable during the phase-in period (before randomization). The omitted category
in all columns is the monitoring group in the phase-in period. The coefficient in the second row,
on Intervention Periodit, corresponds to the pre-post estimate of the monitoring effect.
Taken together, the evidence from our experiment suggests that the monitoring
treatment improved the likelihood of reaching the daily 10,000 step target by at
least 7.3% during the intervention period (accounting for 30% of the total impact of
incentives relative to control), and increased the self-reported likelihood of walking for
exercise at endline - after the intervention period - by 12% (65% of the total impact
of incentives). Thus, combining monitoring, goal-setting, and feedback - without
incentives - appears to be an effective intervention per se to encourage individuals to
exercise on a regular. However, the impacts of the monitoring treatment on average
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daily steps during the intervention period cannot be distinguished from 0, suggesting
that the monitoring treatment may have induced intertemporal substitution of steps
between days in order to regularly achieve the 10,000 step target.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper investigates incentive design for impatient agents. From a model of
agents with separate time preferences over consumption and financial rewards, we
identify a feature of incentive contracts that will interact with impatience in each
domain. In particular, our model predicts that the frequency of incentive delivery will
interact with impatience over financial rewards, and whether the payment function
is dynamically separable over time will interact with impatience over consumption.
In order to test our predictions, we implement an RCT to incentivize walking
among approximately 3000 individuals with diabetes and prediabetes in India. Over-
all, the incentives program leads to a large increase in walking among the study
population and leads to improvements in diabetes- and mental- health risk factors.
This is encouraging evidence that exercise-incentives programs can be successful in
a developing country setting.
We find evidence that individuals are impatient over consumption - that is, they
prefer to put off the effort of walking. Consistent with our model, the dynamically
non-separable contract works better for those who are more impatient over consump-
tion. However, we find limited evidence of impatience over payments in our sample.
Neither more frequent nor more immediate payment leads to increased walking be-
havior in our sample, and we cannot reject a null relationship between a survey-based
measure of impatience over rewards and the effectiveness of more frequent payment.
The finding that impatience is more prevalent in the consumption domain than the
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financial domain is consistent with previous experimental work (Augenblick et al.,
2015). However, our finding that dynamically non-separable contracts can be used to
motivate time-inconsistent individuals is a new and policy-relevant insight. The fact
that these contracts have heterogeneous treatment effects opens up a key question,
which we hope to address in future work: can we tailor incentive contracts to more
cost-effectively encourage exercise?
96
Appendix
97
L.A Baseline Time Preference Measurement
We follow earlier work and use a Convex Time Budget (CTB) methodology to es-
timate time preferences. In each CTB choice of the time-preference survey, the
participant is asked to allocate a fixed budget of either steps or mobile recharges
between a "sooner" and a "later" date using a slider bar. In particular, each choice
allows the respondent to choose an allocation of consumption on the sooner and later
dates, Ct, Ct+k that satisfies the budget constraint
Ct + -Ct+k = m (1.9)
r
where the sooner date t, the later date t + k, the interest rate r, and the budget
m change between each choice. A sample slider screen allowing for such choices is
shown in Figure 1.A.1.
We asked participants to make six allocations in the recharge domain, and eight
allocations in the step domain, as summarized in Table 1.A.1. We assume a time-
separable and good-separable CRRA utility function with quasi-hyperbolic discount-
ing. In the domain of recharges, individuals will then seek to maximize utility,
1 1
U (Ct, Ct+k) = - (Ct - w)" + 06k - (Ct+k - W)' (1.10)
and in the step domain, individuals will seek to minimize costs of effort
1 1
C (Ct, Ct+k) = (ct W )- 06k -(ctI k +w) (1.11)
a a
The variation between consumption choices choices given different parameters of
the budget constraint identify the daily discount factor 6, the present-bias parameter
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Appendix Figure 1.A.1: Sample decision screen for mobile recharges. In this example,
the interest rate, r, is 1.25; the total budget, m, is 140; the "sooner" date is Today
(0 days from today); and the "later" date decreases from 5 days from today in the
first choice to 1 day from today in the final choice. The sliders are shown positioned
at the choice (ct = 70, Ct+k = 82).
3, and the concavity or convexity of preferences a in each domain. We recover struc-
tural estimates of time preference and concavity parameters from the allocations,
(Ct, Ct+k), using a two-limit Tobit specification of the intertemporal Euler condition
following Augenblick et al. (2015).
We estimate two time-preference measures from our CTB allocations in each do-
main: a reduced-form measure following Gine et al. (2017), and a structural measure
following Augenblick et al. (2015). The reduced-form measure relies on allocation
pairs with the same interest rate r and lag k, but where the "sooner" date of only
one allocation is in the present (t = 0), whereas for the other allocation the "sooner"
date is in the future (t > 0). If the allocation to the "sooner" date is larger when the
"sooner" date is in the present, it is a present-biased preference reversal; if the allo-
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Appendix Table 1.A.1: This table summarizes the parameters of the six CTB allo-
cations made over recharges, and the eight CTB allocations made over steps.
Summary of
Question no.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Convex
t k
7 7
0 7
0 5
0 3
0 2
0 1
7 7
0 7
Time
r
1
1
1.25
1.25
1.25
1.25
1.25
1.25
Budget allocations
Recharge Domain
X
X
X
X
X
X
Step Domain
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
cation to the "sooner" date is smaller, it is a future-biased preference reversal. Our
measure is the fraction of question pairs with present-biased reversals less the frac-
tion with future-biased reversals in each domain. We call this measure net fraction
of static present-biased preference reversals; its average in each domain is reported
in Column 3 of Table 1.A.2.
We also estimate the daily discount rate using two-limit Tobit specifications of
the standard intertemporal Euler equation for an agent with an exponential daily
discount factor 6, and concavity over recharges, or convexity over steps, oz. 42
log )= 6 k + 1 log (r)
(Ct+1 a - I a -1
(1.12)
4 2Details on the estimation strategy can be found in the Online Appendix of Augenblick et al.
(2015).
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Appendix Table 1.A.2: Average fraction of present- and future-biased preference
reversals, and net fraction of present-biased preference reversals, in the recharge and
step domains.
Average Fraction of Preference Reversals
Recharges Steps Total
Fraction Present-Biased Reversals 0.185 0.313 0.249
Fraction Future-Biased Reversals 0.262 0.115 0.189
Net Fraction Present-Biased Reversals -0.077 0.198 0.060
Observations 6433
1.B Heterogeneity in frequency effects by impatience
over recharges
This appendix explores the possibility that immediate incentive delivery is a driver
of incentive effectiveness among the subset of more impatient participants. If so,
we expect a positive interaction between more immediate incentive delivery and our
measure of baseline impatience over mobile recharges. We test this interaction using
both between-treatment and within-treatment variation in immediacy of payment.
Our first test is whether daily incentives are relatively more effective, and monthly
relatively less effective than the base case of weekly payments, for those who display
more impatience for recharges in their baseline CTB allocations. For simplicity, we
restrict the sample to those who were in the daily, weekly, and monthly groups, and
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run the following regression:
yit =a + /0Impatiencei + #13dailyj + #2monthlyj
+ # 3 Impatiencej x dailyi + 34Impatiencej x monthlyi + X' + Eit, (1.13)
where yit is a daily walking outcome; Impatiencei is either the daily discount rate
estimated using CTB allocations over recharges at baseline or an indicator for having
above-median daily discount rate; and dailyi and monthly are indicators for being
assigned to the daily and monthly treatments, respectively. #31 and /2 represent the
effects of daily and monthly relative to the base case weekly payment (respectively).
The coefficients of interest are 03 and /4, showing whether the effects of daily or
monthly relative to Weekly are differentially large for those who are more impatient.
If impatience over recharges is a mechanism through which more immediate incen-
tive delivery increases effectiveness, then we expect the daily treatment to be more
effective (33 > 0) and the monthly treatment to be less effective (34 < 0) for more
impatient individuals.4 3 Our results are reported in Table 1.B.1. We see no evidence
that suggests that sooner payments work better for those with higher measured im-
patience, with the one marginally significant effect going the wrong direction.
Our second test is whether individuals who display more impatience for recharges
in their baseline CTB allocations are more likely to increase step-target compliance
on their payday. We perform this test among individuals in the base case incentive
and monthly incentives groups. Following Kaur et al. (2015), we define individual-
specific walking "payday effects" as the difference in the probability of exceeding
10,000 steps on paydays compared to all other days. The walking payday effect is a
43 Note that we do not have predictions for the interactions of the other incentive contracts with
impatience over recharges; nonetheless, for completeness, Appendix Table 1.C.4 shows regressions
where the Impatience variable is interacted with all separate incentive treatments.
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Appendix Table 1.B.1: High-frequency treatments are not more effective for those
who are impatient over recharges
Dependent variable: Met step target
Above-
Impatience measure: Delta median
delta
(1) (2)
. -0.275 -0.120*
Daily x Impatience [0.42] [0.07]
. -0.0379 0.0286
Monthly x Impatience [0.41] [0.07]
Daily -0.00396 0.0498
(0.04] [0.051
Monthly -0.0254 -0.0406
[0.03] [0.05]
Impatience -0.111 -0.00398
[0.17] [0.03]
Domain of Impatience Recharges Recharges
Methodology Discount DiscountRate Rate
Base Case: mean .507 .507
# Daily NTH 92 92
# Base Case 483 483
# Monthly NTH 90 90
# Individuals 665 665
Observations 53,066 53,066
Notes: This table shows heterogeneity in the effect of the frequency subtreatments by treatment
effects of each incentive non-threshold treatment, interacted with measures of impatience over
steps; the base case incentive group is omitted. Standard errors clustered at the individual level
in brackets. Controls include respondent's gender, age, and weight as well as the average phase-in
period value of the dependent variable and month-year fixed effects. "Discount Rate" indicates a
structural measure of the daily discount rate I- 1 estimated from a two-limit Tobit model of CTB
allocations with individual discount-rate fixed effects, restricting the present-bias parameter 3 to be
one. Larger values of each impatience measure indicates more impatience. The unit of observation
is a respondent x day. Standard errors in brackets clustered at the respondent level. Significance
levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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revealed-preference measure of impatience over rewards. We estimate the interaction
between individual payday effects and our structural measure of baseline impatience
over recharges using regressions of the following form:
yit = ce + /0 (Impatience Measure) + 01 (Payday)it
+ 02 (Payday)it x (Impatience Measure)i + X'y + eit, (1.14)
where y2, (Impatience Measure), and Xi are defined as in equation 1.13; and
(Payday)it is an indicator for whether day t is a payday for individual i. To test
whether more impatient individuals respond more to more immediate payment, we
test whether 02 > 0.
Our results are shown in Table 1.B.2. Both measures of impatience predict larger
payday effects, but the coefficients are not statistically different from zero. Thus,
we find no strong evidence that even those individuals who are most impatient over
rewards react to more immediate reward delivery over the payment cycle.
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Appendix Table 1.B.2: Payday effects are not bigger for those with higher measured
impatience over recharges
Dependent variable: Met step target
Impatience measure: Delta Above-median delta
(1) (2)
Impatience -0.144 -0.00355
[0.16] [0.02]
Payday -0.00559 -0.0110
[0.01] [0.01]
Impatience x Payday 0.0718 0.0127
[0.09] [0.02]
Controls X X
Domain of Impatience Recharges Recharges
Methodology Tobit FE Tobit FE
Dep. var. mean 0.51 0.51
# Base Case 484 484
# Monthly 90 90
# Individuals 574 574
Observations 45,979 45,979
Notes: This table shows heterogeneity in the "payday" effects for those in the base case incentive and
the monthly incentive groups, by impatience in the recharge domain. Payday effects are defined as
the difference in a daily exercise behavior on paydays compared to all other days. Standard errors
clustered by individual are in brackets.
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1.C Supplementary Tables and Figures
Step Target Compliance by Phase-in Walking
0 .1 .4 .6 .
Step Target Compliance Rate (Phase-in)
l* Monitoring 9 Base Case
10 4-day Threshold 0 5-day Threshold
Average Daily Steps by Phase-in Walking
S6 5000 10000
Average Daily Steps (Phase-in)
* Monitoring * Base Case
* 4-day Threshold * 5-day Threshold
Appendix Figure 1.C.1: Effects on Threshold by Quantiles of Phase-in Walking.
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Appendix Table 1.C.1: Endline attendance in full sample and by treatment group.
Full Sample Control Monitoring Incentives
A. Endline attendance by treatment status
Attended EL .97 .971 .97 .97
p-value: Control=Monitoring -Incentives 0.99
B. Endline attendance by baseline characteristics
Monitoring -0.0005 0.003
10.011 [0.021
Incentives -0.0009 -0.02
10.0081 10.011
Age (from BL) 0.0004 -0.002 0.0007 0.0005
10.00051 10.0011 10.0011 10.00061
Female (=1), assume male if not female (from BL) 0.02** 0.005 -0.02 0.03**
10.01] 10.021 10.021 10.011
Labor Force Participation 0.02* 0.03 0.01 0.02
10.01] 10.02] 10.031 10.021
Per capita income (1000 INR/month) -0.003** 0.006* -0.003 -0.004**
10.0011 10.003] 10.0031 10.0021
Current Mobile Balance (INR) 0.0002** 0.00008 -0.00002 0.0003**
10.000101 10.00021 10.00021 10.0)01
Previous Day's Mobile Usage (INR) -0.002*** 0.0002 -0.007*** -0.002***
10.00051 10.00091 10.00091 10.00071
Previously diagnosed diabetic lassume not if waiting for diagnosisi (-1) -0.008 0.009 0.03 -0.01
10.10)1)1 10.021 10.021 10.01]
BP: Hypertensive (-1) 0.01 0.002 0.004 0.02
10.0091 10.021 10.021 10.011
Health risk index -0.007 -0.0007 0.02 -0.01
10.0081 10.011 10.021 10.011
Share of days met step target in fitbit data during phase-in period 0.02 0.08 -0.02 0.01
10.031 10.061 10.061 10.031
Average daily fitbit steps (/1000) during phase-in period 0.000002 -0.005 0.006 0.0008
10.0021 10.0041 10.0051 10.0021
Discount rate (recharges) -0.02 0.0003 0.09 -0.007
10.051 10.11 10.11 10.071
Discount rate (steps) -0.002 0.01 0.005 -0.005
10.0071 10.021 10.011 10.008]
Constant 1.0*** 1.0*** 1.0*** 1.0*** 0.9***
10.0071 [0.031 10.06] 10.071 10.04]
Sample size
Number of individuals 3,192 3,192 585 203 2,404
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Appendix Table 1.C.2: Impacts of incentives and monitoring on exercise outcomes,
without baseline controls.
Pedometer Data (Intervention Period) Self-Reported Data (at Endline)
Fraction Days
Achieved 10K
Steps
Incentives 0.20***
10.0231
Daily Steps Fraction Days
Exercised
in Previous
Week
1351.6***
1260.71
Pure Control
B. Unpooled Incentives
10 INR
Daily
Weekly
Monthly
4-Day Threshold
5-Day Threshold
Pure Control
Monitoring mean
Controls
0.15***
[0.049]
0.21***
10.0351
0.21***
[0.0241
0.20***
10.0351
0.20***
10.0251
0.21***
10.0301
0.30
No
859.2*
[517.6]
1207.9***
1386.51
1367.4***
1276.11
1572.0***
1392. 81
1342.2***
1286.51
1390.4***
[335.01
6822.78
No
0.057*
10.0341
-0.13***
10.0371
-0.0043
[0.0651
0.027
10.0471
0.054
[0.0361
-0.029
10.0481
0.090**
[0.0361
0.053
10.0411
-0.13***
10.0371
0.50
No
Minutes Walked
for
Exercise Yesterday
4.72**
12.341
-7.94***
[2.451
2.91
[4.891
6.24
13.891
4.46*
12.521
4.48
[5.091
6.19**
12.571
1.37
12.89]
-7.94***
12.451
22.33
No
Notes: Stand
# Monitoring 199 200 195 195
#10INR 64 64 62 62
# Daily NTH 163 163 161 161
# Base Case 891 890 867 867
# Monthly NTH 163 163 160 160
# 4-Day TH 778 778 759 759
# 5-Day TH 305 305 293 293
# Control 0 0 568 568
# Individuals 2,563 2,563 3,065 3,065
Observations 203,235 2041561 3,065 3,065
ard errors in brackets. The first two columns use daily panel data from
and standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The second two columns use a cross-section
of self-reported data at endline. The omitted category in all columns is the monitoring group.
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A. Pooled Incentives
pedometers,
Appendix Table 1.C.3: Impacts of incentives contracts, compared to the base case
non-threshold contract, on the probability of being in 6 quantiles of average exercise
outcomes.
Differential Effects of Incentive Contracts on the Distribution of Exercise
Outcome Quantile 1
A. Average Step-Target Compliance
Incentives -0.077***
[0.0221
Incentives X
(10 INR,)
Incentives X
(Daily NTH)
Incentives X
(Monthly NTH)
Incentives X
(4- or 5-Day TH)
Monitoring mean
Controls
B. Average Daily Steps
Incentives
Incentives X
(10 INR)
Incentives X
(Daily NTH)
Incentives X
(Monthly NTH)
Incentives X
(4- or 5-Day TH)
Monitoring mean
Controls
0.024
0.037]
0.019
0.0241
0.025
0.0241
0.020
0.013]
0.17
Yes
0.049*
0.0261
0.037
0.0421
0.042
0.0281
0.022
0.0281
0.030**
[0.0151
0.17
Yes
2 3
-0.028
10.0231
0.013
10.0381
-0.016
10.0251
0.014
[0.025]
0.00036
10.0131
0.13
Yes
-0.061**
[0.025]
0.0063
10.0411
-0.023
10.0271
0.025
[0.0271
0.021
10.0141
0.17
Yes
-0.10***
[0.02 11
0.050
10.0341
0.0081
10.022]
0.034
10.0231
0.012
[0.0121
0.16
Yes
-0.087***
10.022]
0.064*
10.0371
0.028
[0.0241
0.029
10.024]
-0.0016
10.013]
0.17
Yes
4
-0.030
10.0281
0.042
10.0461
0.038
10.03 11
0.019
[0.03 11
-0.0025
[0.0161
0.18
Yes
-0.019
10.0271
-0.058
10.0441
-0.0095
[0.0291
-0.013
10.0291
-0.034**
10.0151
0.17
Yes
5 6
0.021
[0.0281
-0.042
[0.0471
-0.011
[0.031]
-0.076**
10.03 11
-0.042***
10.0161
0.16
Yes
0.13***
10.0341
-0.043
10.0561
-0.065*
[0.0371
-0.084**
10.037]
-0.041**
10.0201
0.17
Yes
0.23***
10.035]
-0.055
10.0571
-0.031
10.038]
0.0036
10.0381
0.012
10.0201
0.16
Yes
0.072**
[0.0301
-0.036
[0.0491
0.0091
[0.0321
0.038
10.032]
0.025
10.0171
0.17
Yes
# Monitoring 200 200 200 200 200 200
# Daily NTH 163 163 163 163 163 163
# Base Case 888 888 888 888 888 888
# Monthly NTH 163 163 163 163 163 163
# 4-Day TH 778 778 109 778 778 778 778
# 5-Day TH 305 305 305 305 305 305
# 10 INR. 64 64 64 64 64 64
Observations 2,561 2,561 2,561 2.561 2,561 2,561
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. Controls include age, gender, weight, and the average
daily steps taken during the phase-in period (before randomization). The omitted category in
all columns is the monitoring group, and the omitted interaction with incentives is the base case
incentive treatment group.
Appendix Table 1.C.4: Differential Incentive Effects according to Impatience over
Recharges and Steps
Dependent variable: Met step Average Met step Average
target daily steps target daily steps
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incentives 0.241*** 1779.1*** 0.219*** 1655.0***
10.031 1273.051 [0.021 [260.321
10 INR -0.0427 -478.2 -0.0759* -581.2
10.051 1466.861 10.051 1425.501
Daily -0.00526 -387.2 -0.0197 -424.6
10.04] 1380.151 10.031 1321.661
Monthly -0,0252 -90.06 -0.0530* -426.5
[0.031 1366.631 10.031 1294.341
4-Day TH -0.0212 -350.6* -0.0199 -212.3
10.021 1205.841 10.021 1189.421
5-Day TH 0.0140 -190.8 -0.0280 -398.5*
10.031 [267.711 10.031 1232.861
Impatience -0.0901 -367.6 -0.000600 -228.4
10.17] 11567.331 10.021 1194.811
10 INR x Impatience 0.374 -821.9 -0.0774 -438.110.661 15694.071 10.051 1498.411
Daily x Impatience -0.318 -8444.8** 0.0335 346.610.431 13721.211 10.061 1538.161
Monthly x Impatience -0.0701 608.1 -0.0232 442.310.401 14733.301 10.041 1618.171
4-Day TH x Impatience -0.184 -2180.7 0.0193 254.6
10.261 12370.021 [0.031 1256.541
5-Day TH x Impatience 0.144 1823.5 0.104** 1090.2**10.351 13453.621 10.041 1427.411
Controls X X X X
Domain of Impatience Recharges Recharges Steps Steps
Methodology Discount Discount Discount Discount
Rate Rate Rate Rate
Base Case: mean 0.51 8190.18 0.51 8190.18
# Monitoring 97 98 144 145
# 10-INR 36 36 47 47
# Daily NTH 92 92 119 119
# Base Case 483 483 623 624
# Monthly NTH 90 90 116 116
# 4-day TH 428 428 558 558
# 5-day TH 159 159 218 218
# Individuals 1,385 1.386 1,825 1,827
Observations 109,893 110,709 145,093 146,119
Notes: This table shows the treatment effects of each Incentive treatment, interacted with measures
of impatience over recharges; the base case incentive group is omitted. Standard errors clustered
at the individual level in brackets. Controls include respondent's gender, age, and weight as well as
the average phase-in period value of the dependlThvariable. "Discount Rate" indicates a structural
measure of the daily discount rate - - 1 estimate rom a two-limit Tobit model of CTB allocations
with individual discount-rate fixed effects, restricting the present-bias parameter / to be one. Larger
values of each impatience measure indicates more impatience.
Appendix Table 1.C.5: Heterogeneity in threshold impacts by baseline walking
Exceeded Daily Step Target Average Daily Steps
(1) (2) (3) (4)
4- or 5-day TH x Walking Measure 0.061 0.0000040 748.8* 0.042
10.041 10.001 1444.801 10.041
4- or 5-day TH -0.028 -0.041 -372.0** -472.0
10.021 10.031 1185.991 1309.29]
Walking Measure 0.45*** 0.000028*** 5462.4*** 0.47***
10.031 10.001 1337.581 10.041
Walking Measure Step Target Compliance Average Steps Step Target Compliance Average Steps
# Individuals 2,561 2.560 2,561 2.560
Notes: This table shows the treatment effects of the 4- and 5-day threshold treatments, interacted
with measures of walking at baseline; the base case incentive group is the omitted group. The sample
is limited to the base case, 4-day threshold, and 5-day threshold treatment groups. Standard errors
clustered at the individual level in brackets. Controls include respondent's gender, age, and weight
as well as the average phase-in period value of the dependent variable and its square.
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Appendix Table 1.C.6: The structural measure of impatience over exercise is not
significantly correlated with other variables
Dependent variable: Impatience measure: Delta
Specification:
Age
Female (=1)
Previously diagnosed diabetic (=1)
HbAlc
Mean blood pressure
Risk aversion (higher means more risk loving)
Discount rate (recharges)
Above-median baseline steps (=1)
112
Separate
regressions
0.009
[0.006]
0.066
[0.1611
0.158
[0.1231
-0.020
[0.028]
0.001
[0.006]
0.014
[0.0631
0.285
[0.331]
0.057
[0.158]
Pooled
regression
0.004
[0.006]
0.078
[0.168]
0.196
[0.1751
-0.036
[0.0401
0.001
[0.006]
0.018
[0.066]
0.364
[0.390]
0.076
[0.152]
Notes: The unit of observation is a respondent. Robust standard errors in brackets. Signifi-
cance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Appendix Table 1.C.7: Time preference heterogeneity robust to including other controls
Dependent variable:
Above-75th-perc. delta x Threshold
Above-75th-perc. delta
Threshold
Met step target (x1000)
(1)
86.36**
138.5 11
-19.10
128.0 11
-32.13
119.791
Threshold x Covariate
Covariate
Threshold x Covariate 2
Covariate 2
(2)
87.01**
138.251
-19.44
127.981
-170.3*
196.671
2.791
11.9391
1.772
11.3981
(3)
86.53**
138.591
-19.02
128.011
-28.91
123.911
-7.552
134.691
4.716
125.191
(4)
86.82**
138.511
-19.27
128.011
-40.91
132.521
12.68
136.761
-4.463
126.251
(5)
86.98**
138.561
-19.46
128.051
16.20
148.901
-5.528
15.1231
5.603
15.120]
(6) (7) (8)
88.78** 84.60** 87.74**
138.431 [38.581 138.781
-21.23 -17.86 -19.70
127.901 [28.181 128.341
-67.04*** 20.64 -23.55
122.381 [39.20] 123.231
0.340*** -16.12 0.0238
10.1221 [10.00] [0.03521
-0.423*** 7.725 -0.00441
10.06391 [7.2601 10.02581
Prev. di-
Age Female agnosed
diabetic
110,932 110,932 110.932 110,932
507.12 507.12 507.12 507.12
Mean
arterial
HbAlc blood
pressure
110,932 110,932
507.12 507.12
Risk Discount
rate
aversion (recharges)
110,932 110.932
507.12 507.12
Above-
median
baseline
steps
110,932
507.12
Baseline Baseline
steps steps
110,932 110,932
507.12 507.12
I,
(9)
72.77*
137.59]
-12.72
127.251
-54.76**
127.041
57.79*
133.071
152.7***
127.851
(10)
76.91**
[37.751
-18.63
127.261
-66.44
145.971
0.00653
10.006451
0.0391***
10.00567]
Covariate used
# Observations
Base case mnean
(11)
81.82**
137.02]
-24.56
126.181
-22.79
148.931
-0.000567
10.01071
0.0653***
10.004841
3.88e-08
10.0000005531
0.00000123***
[0.0000001251
Notes: The sample is restricted to the weekly groups - i.e., the base case (linear) group, and the 2 threshold groups, 4-day threshold and 5-day threshold,
pooled here together as "Threshold." All columns control for the baseline value of the dependent variable. The unit of observation is a respondent x day.
Standard errors in brackets clustered at the respondent level. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Appendix Table 1.C.8: Impacts of incentives, monitoring, SMS treatments, and their
interactions on health risk factors
Incentives
Monitoring
SMS Treatment
Incentives x SMS
Monitoring x SMS
Controls
Control mean
# Control
P-value: M =
P-value: SMS
P-value: SMS
# Individuals
=I
=M
Health
Risk
Index
-0.072***
10.027]
0.015
10.0481
-0.017
[0.0771
0.12
[0.086]
-0.11
10.151
X
0.00
566
0.04
0.46
0.70
3,103
Mean
HbAlc RBS Arterial
BP
-0.15**
10.0741
-0.17
10.131
-0.35*
10.211
0.59**
10.231
0.20
10.42]
X
8.44
560
0.85
0.30
0.42
3,061
-8.15**
13.61]
2.50
16.391
-19.1*
110.01
19.9*
111. 21
-7.35
120.21
X
193.83
563
0.06
0.25
0.05
3,067
0.18
10.451
1.20
10.801
0.65
11.251
0.51
[1.411
0.75
12.481
X
103.14
559
0.15
0.70
0.69
3,050
Waist
BMI Circum-
ference
-0.068 -0.31
[0.0521 [0.25]
0.068 -0.26
10.0921 10.441
0.12 1.15
10.14] 10.711
0.036 -0.81
10.161 10.791
-0.33 -1.10
10.291 11.401
X X
26.52
563
0.10
0.18
0.76
3,065
94.50
538
0.90
0.03
0.07
2,951
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
columns is the pure control group.
All definitions follow Table 1.5. The omitted category in all
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Appendix Table 1.C.9: Other studies of interventions to
among diabetics
Author (year) Intervention N Country
Arora, et al (2013 ) SMS encouragement 128 United States
and reminders
Yoon, et al (2008) Monitoring and SMS 51 South Korea
based recommendations
Bjorgaas, et al (2004) 12-week 29 Norway
Exercise Program
Balducci, et al (2004) Aerobic and Resistance 120 N/A
Training Program
Dunstant, et al (1997) Aerobic Exercise 55 N/A
Program
Sigal, et al (2007) Aerobic and Resistance 251 Canada
Training Program
Wing, et al (1988) Aerobic Exercise 25 N/A
Training Program
improve health outcomes
Hbalc
Effects
0
-1.32
-0.5
-1.21
0
-0.51
0
Intervention
Intensity
low
low
high
high
high
high
high
Implementation
Cost
low
high
high
high
high
high
high
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Scalable
yes
no
no
no
no
no
no
,,
,
Appendix Table 1.C.10: Impacts of incentives, monitoring, and SMS treatments on
health risk factors.
Incentives
Monitoring
SMS Treatment
Controls
Control mean
# Control
P-value:
P-value:
P-value:
M = I
SMS=
SMS=
Health
Risk
Index
-0.060**
[0.026]
0.0038
[0.046]
0.064*
10.0331
X
I
M
# Individuals
0.00
566
0.12
0.00
0.28
3,103
Mean
HbAlc RBS Arterial
BP
-0.087
[0.0711
-0.15
[0.12]
0.10
[0.091]
X
8.44
560
0.59
0.10
0.10
3,061
-6.12*
[3.42]
1.86
[6.06]
-4.77
[4.40]
X
0.23
[0.43]
1.28*
[0.751
1.08*
[0.55]
X
Waist
BMI Circum-
ference
-0.065
[0.049]
0.034
[0.087]
0.12*
[0.063]
X
193.83 103.14 26.52
563
0.14
0.81
0.37
3,067
559
0.12
0.22
0.83
3,050
563
0.21
0.02
0.41
3,065
-0.39*
[0.24]
-0.37
[0.42]
0.47
[0.31]
X
94.50
538
0.96
0.03
0.11
2,951
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. For the Health Risk Index, controls include age, gender, and
second order polynomials of all health variables underlying the index at baseline. Controls for
all other outcomes include age, gender, and a second order polynomial of dependent variable at
baseline. The Health Risk Index is an index created by the average of endline Hbalc, RBS, MAP,
BMI, and waist circumference standardized by their average and standard deviation in the control
group. Hbalc is the average plasma glucose concentration (%), RBS is the blood glucose level
(mg/dL), MAP is the mean arterial blood pressure (mm Hg), and BMI is the body mass index.
The omitted category in all columns is the pure control group.
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Appendix Table 1.C.11: Impacts of incentives, monitoring, and SMS treatments on
fitness.
Fitness
Time Trial
Index
Incentives
Monitoring
SMS Treatment
Controls
Control mean
# Control
P-value: M = I
P-value: SMS =
P-value: SMS =
# Individuals
0.0064
[0.028]
0.025
[0.049]
-0.047
[0.037]
X
0.00
505
0.67
0.24
M 0.24
2,819
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. For the Fitness Time Trial Index, controls include age, gender,
and second order polynomials of both fitness variables underlying the index at baseline. Controls
for all other outcomes include age, gender, and a second order polynomial of dependent variable
at baseline. A large value of Fitness Time Trial Index indicates low fitness: it is an index created
by the average two trials of endline seconds to walk four meters, and the seconds to complete five
sit-stands standardized by their average and standard deviation in the control group. The omitted
category in all columns is the pure control group.
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Seconds to
Walk 4m
0.015
[0.044]
0.040
[0.077]
-0.053
[0.058]
X
3.88
465
0.71
0.34
0.33
2,598
Seconds
for 5
Sit-Stands
-0.091
[0.12]
-0.13
[0.21]
-0.099
[0.15]
X
13.18
459
0.83
0.97
0.90
2,595
Appendix Table 1.C.12: Impacts of incentives, monitoring, and SMS treatments on
mental health.
Incentives
Monitoring
SMS Treatment
Controls
Control mean
# Control
P-value: M = I
P-value: SMS = I
P-value: SMS = M
# Individuals
Mental
Health
Index
0.073**
10.0321
0.11*
10.0571
0.035
10.042]
X
0.00
585
0.50
0.48
0.31
Felt
Happy
0.088**
10.0451
0.072
[0.0791
0.020
10.0581
X
3.06
563
0.81
0.35
0.60
Less
Nervous
0.026
10.0441
0.12
10.0771
0.11**
10.056]
X
3.48
563
0.16
0.21
0.93
Peaceful Energy
0.055
10.0471
0.092
10.0831
0.055
10.06 11
X
3.35
563
0.62
1.00
0.72
0.061
10.0481
0.035
10.0841
0.018
10.06 11
X
3.30
563
0.73
0.58
0.87
Less
Less Less harm to
Blue Worn Social
Life
0.015 0.090** 0.052*
10.0431 10.0391 10.0301
0.13 0.17** 0.049
10.0771 10.0691 10.0531
0.085 -0.011 -0.0018
10.0561 10.0501 10.0391
X X X
3.86
563
0.11
0.32
0.66
4.40
563
0.18
0.11
0.03
4.71
563
0.94
0.27
0.44
3,192 3,068 3,068 3,068 3,068 3,068 3,068 3,068
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. For the Mental Health Index, controls include age, gender, and
second order polynomials of all questions underlying the index at baseline. Controls for all other
outcomes include age, gender, and a second order polynomial of dependent variable at baseline
(where available). The Mental Health Index is the average values of seven questions adapted from
the Rand 36-Item Short Form Survey (SF-36), standardized by their mean and standard deviation
in the pure control group. The omitted category in all columns is the pure control group.
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Appendix Table 1.C.13: Impacts of incentives, monitoring, and SMS treatments on
Healthy Diet, relative to pure control.
Incentives
Monitoring
SMS Treatnent
Controls
Control mean
# Control
P-value: M = I
P-value: SMS =
P-value: SMS =
# Individuals
Healthy
Diet
Index
0.051
10.0451
0.021
10.0791
0.048
10.0581
X
0.00
585
0.68
I 0.97
M 0.79
3,192
Meals
Wheat with
meals vegeta-
bles
0.027 0.060*
10.030] 10.0311
0.018 0.078
10.0531 [0.0551
-0.025 -0.0018
10.0391 10.0401
X X
0.49
563
0.84
0.28
0.52
3,068
0.58
563
0.70
0.22
0.24
3,068
Servings -(Rice (Junkfood(Spoons
Fruit meals su1 ar in
0.040
10.0381
0.060
[0.0661
-0.0026
10.0481
X
0.53
563
0.73
0.49
0.44
3,068
0.029
10.0331
-0.0075
10.0591
-0.025
10.043]
X
-2.34
563
0.49
0.31
0.81
3,068
pieces)
-0.017
10.0621
0.13
10.111
0.056
10.0801
X
-0.87
585
0.14
0.47
0.60
3,192
g
coffee)
-0.022
10.0461
-0.029
10.081]
0.063
10.059]
X
- Avoid
(Sweets un-
yester- healthy
day)
-0.028
10.0381
-0.048
10.0671
0.091*
10.049]
X
food
0.0036
10.018]
-0.041
10.0311
0.011
10.0231
X
-1.08 -0.35 0.83
585
0.93
0.25
0.36
3,192
563
0.75
0.05
0.10
3,068
563
0.11
0.79
0.17
3,068
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. For the Healthy Diet Index, controls include age, gender, and
second order polynomials of all questions underlying the index at baseline. Controls for all other
outcomes include age, gender, and a second order polynomial of dependent variable at baseline. The
Healthy Diet Index is an index created by the average values of eight diet questions, standardized
by their average and standard deviation in the control group. A larger value indicates a healthier
diet. The omitted category in all columns is the pure control group.
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Appendix Table 1.C.14: Impacts of incentives, monitoring, and SMS treatments on
Addictive Substance Consumption, relative to pure control.
Incentives
Monitoring
SMS Treatment
Controls
Control mean
# Control
P-value: M = I
P-value: SMS = I
P-value: SMS = M
# Individuals
Addictive Good
Consumption
Index
-0.010
[0.037]
-0.0058
[0.065]
0.031
[0.047]
X
0.00
585
0.94
0.50
0.65
3,192
Average Daily
Areca
0.035
[0.042]
0.013
[0.074]
0.045
[0.054]
X
0.13
563
0.75
0.89
0.73
3,068
Average Daily
Alcohol
-0.036*
[0.020]
-0.016
[0.036]
0.018
[0.026]
X
0.11
563
0.54
0.10
0.44
3,068
Average Daily
Cigarettes
-0.055
[0.111
-0.019
[0.19]
-0.15
[0.14]
X
1.02
563
0.83
0.60
0.59
3,068
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. For the Addictive Good Consumption Index, controls include
age, gender, and second order polynomials of all questions underlying the index at baseline. Controls
for all other outcomes include age, gender, and a second order polynomial of dependent variable at
baseline. The Addictive Good Consumption Index is an index created by the average self-reported
average daily consumption of areca, alcoholic drinks, and cigarettes, standardized by their average
and standard deviation in the control group. A larger value indicates more consumption. The
omitted category in all columns is the pure control group.
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Appendix Table 1.C.15: Impacts of incentives, monitoring, and SMS treatments on
self-reported exercise.
Self-Reported Data (at Endline)
Fraction Days
Exercised Last
Week
Incentives
Pure Control
SMS treatment group
Monitoring mean
Controls
Observations
0.0627*
10.0320]
-0. 124***
[0.03531
0.0101
[0.0251]
0.497
Yes
3,063
Minutes Walked
for Exercise
Yesterday
4.968**
12.257]
-7.626***
[2.365]
3.412
[2.336]
22.333
Yes
3,063
Notes: We report pooled incentive effects. The columns show coefficient estimates from regressions
of the form specified in Equation 1.7, using a cross-section of self-reported exercise data at end-
line, after the intervention period is over. The sample includes the Pure control, incentives, and
monitoring groups. Controls include age, gender, weight, and the average daily steps and fraction
of days step target was exceeded during the phase-in period (before randomization). The omitted
category in all columns is the monitoring group. Standard errors, in brackets, are clustered at the
individual level.
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Chapter 2
Pay me Later: Billing Technology
and Price Elasticity
2.1 Introduction
The marginal price of retail electricity rarely reflects the social cost of consumption.
Prices neither reflect the wide fluctuations in the marginal cost of generation, nor do
they fully incorporate the cost of externalities such as climate change. Misalignment
between marginal prices and marginal costs likely contributes to inefficient patterns
of electricity use. Economic theory suggests a simple and effective policy tool for
achieving efficient electricity use: bring prices in line with costs. This is the impe-
tus behind policies ranging from dynamic energy pricing (Borenstein and Holland,
2005; Joskow and Wolfram, 2012; Wolak et al., 2009) to carbon taxes (Fowlie, 2010;
Lemoine, 2017). In order to be successful, such policies require individual consumers
to optimize with respect to marginal price. However, a growing body of evidence has
found that individual demand is frequently inelastic (Reiss and White, 2005; Allcott,
2011; Ito, 2014), suggesting that consumers may not be attentive to marginal prices
and that cost-reflective pricing policies may not bring efficiency.
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In this paper, I provide evidence that the standard electricity billing process con-
tributes to inelastic demand. In particular, most residential consumers use energy
and are subsequently billed for the amount utilized during each billing period. Many
features of this system may reduce attentiveness to the marginal price of energy-
consuming activities: electricity prices are buried in monthly bills; charges are ag-
gregated over a lengthy billing period, making it difficult to match energy-consuming
behaviors to kilowatt-hours used; and bills are delivered after consumption, poten-
tially making cost less salient at the time of consumption. I find that customers who
are charged under an alternate system, requiring customers to pay up-front for elec-
tricity prior to use, are approximately twice as price-elastic as those who are billed
later.
In Section 2, I describe the study setting and data. My analysis exploits variation
in both electricity price and metering technology among residential electricity cus-
tomers in Cape Town, South Africa. Rich variation in marginal prices comes from
three sources. First, the city of Cape Town offered up to three different tariff sched-
ules at a time, yielding cross-sectional variation in price schedule changes. Second,
some tariff schedules include "kink points" with increasing marginal prices, such that
prices on a single tariff schedule vary with consumption. Finally, not only do the
marginal prices and kink points on the different tariff schedules change over time,
but individuals are also switched from one tariff schedule to another. Variation in
metering technology comes from a peculiarity of the South African setting. Whereas
some consumers have "postpaid" meters, and receive monthly bills for previous use,
many consumers have "prepaid" meters, and are required to pay for electricity before
they use it.
In Section 3, I explore reduced-form evidence on whether consumers respond
differentially to marginal price according to metering technology. I examine con-
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sumption responses to examples of the three types of price variation in turn. First,
as an example of different price changes across tariff schedules, I show an event-study
from the consolidation of two tariff schedules into a single schedule. Customers who
were on the higher-marginal price schedule prior to consolidation (and thus see a
smaller price increase) reduce consumption by less than customers who were ini-
tially on the lower-marginal price schedule. Furthermore, the difference is larger for
prepaid customers. Second, as an example of different price changes within tariff
schedules over time, I show that the introduction of marginal price kink points onto
tariff schedules leads to customers bunching near the kinks. The effect is again more
dramatic for prepaid customers. Third, as an example of individuals being moved to
tariff schedules with different prices, I show that customers who are switched onto
a higher-priced tariff decrease consumption, while those who stay on a lower-priced
tariff increase consumption. This effect is similar for both postpaid and prepaid
customers.
In Section 4, I combine the three sources of price variation above to estimate a
model of demand, and show that customers with prepaid meters are more than twice
as price-elastic as customers with postpaid meters. This suggests not only that price
salience is an important determinant of price responsiveness, but also that payment
technology can increase price salience. In particular, I find that a 10% increase in
electricity prices leads to more than a 2% decrease in consumption among prepaid
customers, but less than a 1% decrease in consumption among postpaid customers.
This finding is all the more striking given that postpaid customers tend to be higher-
volume consumers, with more opportunities for conservation. I show that this result
is robust to time-specific controls for baseline consumption, and therefore is not
driven by shifts in the distribution of electricity consumption during the study period.
This analysis contributes to three literatures. First, the price-responsiveness of
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electricity consumption is of independent interest for tax and environmental policy.
A number of papers investigate the price elasticity of demand (Reiss and White,
2005; Ito, 2014; McRae, 2015; Deryugina et al., 2017), with estimates of medium-term
responses to marginal electricity prices (as opposed within-day price changes) ranging
from near zero (Ito, 2014) to -0.4 (Reiss and White, 2005). In order to estimate
elasticities of demand in the presence of nonlinear budget sets, this paper draws on an
instrumental variables methodology developed in the the elasticity of taxable income
literature (Rosen, 1976; Burtless and Hausman, 1978; Hausman, 1979b; Gruber and
Saez, 2002; Blomquist and Selin, 2010; Saez et al., 2012), which has previously been
applied to the electricity setting by Hausman (1979a); Maddock et al. (1992); and
Ito (2014). I contribute to this literature in two ways. First, relative to previous
studies (with the exception of Ito (2014)), the breadth of pricing variation in my
setting and the length of my panel allow me to estimate elasticities that control much
more thoroughly for underlying trends and cross-sectional patterns in consumption.
Second, I show that variance in the payment technology may partially explain the
wide divergence in previous elasticity estimates.
I also contribute to a growing literature examining the consequences of price
salience for price responsiveness (Hossain and Morgan, 2006; Chetty et al., 2009;
Finkelstein, 2009; Li et al., 2014). This literature demonstrates that in many real-
world settings, individuals under-respond to prices that are less salient. For example,
Chetty et al. (2009); Li et al. (2014); Hossain and Morgan (2006) show that indi-
viduals respond more to price changes of alcohol, gasoline, and e-bay electronics,
respectively, when the price change is more prominently advertised and therefore
more likely to be salient; and Chetty et al. (2009) show that an experimentally-
induced increase in tax salience (posting tax-inclusive prices in a grocery store) leads
to a large reduction in demand. Similar to the present study, Finkelstein (2009)
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shows that payment technology can change price salience: after the introduction of
electronic freeway toll collection, driving volume becomes less responsive to tolls.
This paper extends the evidence on the relationship between price salience and price
responses to a new setting - electricity consumption.
Finally, I contribute to a literature on how technology influences electricity con-
sumption (Sexton, 2015; Jack and Smith, 2017; Gillan, 2017; Bollinger and Hart-
mann, 2017). In particular, this paper builds on an experiment by Jack and Smith
(2017) showing that the introduction of the technology I examine, prepaid electric-
ity meters, leads to an overall reduction in consumption in Cape Town. In a re-
lated quasi-experimental analysis, Sexton (2015) shows that consumers in the North
Carolina use more electricity after enrolling in automatic bill payment technology.
Although both Jack and Smith (2017) and Sexton (2015) find that individuals con-
sume less overall under payment technologies that plausibly cloud price salience,
neither assess price responsiveness. This paper is the first to show that technologies
with less price salience reduce price sensitivity in particular. Related work by Gillan
(2017) and Bollinger and Hartmann (2017) shows that the introduction of automated
"smart technologies" that automatically reduce energy consumption when prices are
high (i.e., smart thermostats) increase short-run elasticities of demand. However,
it is not clear if smart technologies increase or decrease price salience. Relative to
these papers, I show that technology (in the form of prepaid meters) can encourage
individuals to make active, real-time choices in response to prices.
2.2 Data and Setting
I use two administrative datasets from the City of Cape Town to understand household-
level electricity prices, consumption, and electricity metering technology from July
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1, 2005 - June 30, 2012. An overview of electricity provision in Cape Town and the
details of these data are explained below.
2.2.1 Background
The City of Cape Town has served as the primary energy supplier within the Cape
Town metropolitan area for nearly two decades. In the 1990s, the municipality was
governed by a number of racially-based local authorities, each supplying public ser-
vices - including utilities - to their own residents. With the end of apartheid, these
local bodies amalgamated into the City of Cape Town. While the national utility,
ESKOM, was tasked with supplying energy to a few particularly underserved town-
ships, the City of Cape Town took over electricity provision for the majority of the
municipality. Following consolidation, the city initiated a series of infrastructure
investments and policies aimed at increasing energy access and equity without com-
promising municipal revenue. Overall, these efforts have been quite successful, with
electrification rates in excess of 95% - the highest of any South African municipality
(Statistics South Africa, 2012), a redistributive tariff policy, and a consistent budget
surplus in the electricity sector.
My research design exploits two features of electricity provision by the City of
Cape Town to its residents, which are explained in the sections below. Section
2.2.2 describes how the city has experimented with a variety of tariff designs over
time, leading to substantial price variation. Section 2.2.3 describes the two metering
technologies - with different amounts of price salience - used by the City of Cape
Town.
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2.2.2 Marginal Price Variation
In order to estimate the elasticity of electricity demand, I exploit three sources of price
variation. First, in each year the City of Cape Town charges households according
to different nonlinear tariff schedules. Second, customers on each tariff see different
changes in marginal price over time, as the facets of the tariff schedules are updated
each year. Third, customers are moved between tariff schedules, as the city targets
each schedule according to time-varying individual characteristics.
Overview of Tariff Schedules
In the eight bill years from 2005 to 2012, the City offered customers up to three
different tariff schedules at a time: the Lifeline, Domestic 1, and Domestic 2 tariffs.
The distinct shapes of these three tariff schedules is explained below. Some of the
tariff schedules have increasing marginal prices. This yields cross-sectional variation
in the schedule of marginal prices across tariffs, as well as cross-sectional variation
in marginal prices within tariff but across consumption quantities.
The first of the three tariffs, the Lifeline tariff, is offered in every year in the
study period. The Lifeline tariff includes 50 kWh per month of "free basic electricity",
below which customers are not charged. Lifeline customers are charged a positive
marginal price for electricity consumption over 50 kWh per month, but they are
never charged any fixed fees. The rationale for the shape of the Lifeline tariff is
twofold. First, the tariff is targeted at low-income users, and free electricity is an
in-kind transfer to these users. Second, the initial zero marginal price and lack of
fixed fees discourages substitution from legal grid connections to two behaviors with
large negative externalities: dangerous illegal connections, and burning cheap but
dirty fuel.
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Marginal Price Schedule for Three Tariffs: 2010
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Figure 2-1: An Example of Cross-Sectional Variation in Tariff Schedules
Notes: This figure shows an example of typical cross-sectional variation in (a) the marginal prices
and (b) budget sets for electricity purchases in Cape Town. Each line represents one of the three
available tariff schedules in billing year 2010 (i.e., July 2010 - June 2011). In 2010, one of the three
schedules - the Lifeline tariff - featured increasing block prices, leading to convex kink-points in the
budget set. A second tariff - the Domestic 1 tariff - included a monthly fixed service charge. As in
all years in the sample, the Lifeline Tariff strictly dominates both Domestic tariffs, with lower prices
for all feasible levels of consumption. Among Domestic tariffs, the Domestic 1 tariff is cheaper for
high-consumers, and the Domestic 2 tariff is cheaper for low-consumers.
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The other two tariffs, Domestic 1 and Domestic 2, are not always differentiated
during the study period. In particular, during the first year of the study period,
all non-Lifeline customers were charged according to a single Domestic tariff. The
Domestic tariff has no free basic electricity, and customers face positive marginal
prices for all consumption. In addition, the initial Domestic tariff includes a fixed fee
in the form of a monthly service charge. In 2006 (the second year for which I have
data), the City of Cape Town introduced a new tariff schedule called Domestic 2,
which eliminated the monthly service charge but had a higher marginal price. The
Domestic tariff with a fixed fee and low marginal cost was retained to limit cost
increases for large electricity users, and was renamed Domestic 1. The City offered
both Domestic 1 and Domestic 2 tariffs from the 2006-2011 bill years. In 2012, the
Domestic 1 tariff was eliminated, leaving only the Lifeline and Domestic 2 tariffs.
Figure 2-la shows the marginal prices for customers on representative Lifeline,
Domestic 1, and Domestic 2 tariff schedules from the 2010 billing year. While the
marginal price is constant for the Domestic 1 and Domestic 2 tariffs, it is an increasing
step function with two kink-points for the Lifeline tariff. The first kink-point occurs
at the exhaustion of the 50 kWh allocation of free basic electricity, and a second
kink-point occurs at 150 kWh. Figure 2-1b shows monthly expenditures on the three
tariffs in 2010. The Lifeline tariff has lower expenditures for all levels of consumption,
a fact that is true throughout the study period. In addition, the Lifeline is not the
only nonlinear tariff in this year: the fixed fee introduces a nonlinearity into the
Domestic 1 tariff. Because of the fixed fee, the Domestic 1 tariff is more expensive
than the Domestic 2 tariff for low levels of consumption, but is cheaper for high levels
of consumption. In 2010, the two Domestic tariffs intersect at monthly consumption
of 1200 kWh (the highest crossing point during the period that both tariffs were
offered).
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If the Lifeline tariff strictly dominates the other two tariffs during the sample
period, why does anyone remain on either Domestic tariff? The reason is that assign-
ment to the Lifeline tariff is strictly controlled by the City of Cape Town throughout
the study period. In an attempt to target low-income customers, access to the Life-
line tariff was officially limited to customers who used less than 450 kWh per month
on average in a 12 months period (the exact 12 month period used for this measure
was under the city's discretion). This was enforced periodically (typically at the
start of a new bill year in July), when the city would review previous consumption,
switching qualified customers onto the Lifeline, and removing high-consumption cus-
tomers onto one of the two Domestic tariffs. Furthermore, in the periods when both
Domestic tariffs were offered, the City attempted to target these tariffs at customers
in order to minimize their expenditure. Tariff assignment is discussed further in
Section 2.2.2.
Changes in Tariff Structures over Time
My first two sources of price variation stem from the fact that marginal prices on the
three tariffs change differently over time. All tariff schedules are revised each July.
Although prices steadily increase across the board, they increase differently across
the three tariff schedules, and also across consumption blocks within the schedules.
The yearly marginal prices on each block of each tariff schedule are shown in Figure
2-2.
The clearest examples of differential price changes across tariff schedules are
when one tariff diverges into two, or two converge back to one. For example, in
2005, all Domestic customers faced an identical price schedule (Figures 2-2b and 2-
2c). As discussed in Section 2.2.2, the Domestic tariff diverged in 2006: Domestic 1
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customers saw a 5% increase in marginal prices, and Domestic 2 customers saw a 39%
increase. Conversely, in 2011, the Domestic tariffs converged, and while Domestic 1
customers saw marginal price increases between 34% and 48%, Domestic 2 customers
saw increases of only 15% to 27% (depending on the consumption block).
Price increases also vary across tariff blocks within a given tariff. This is most
starkly illustrated by the Lifeline tariff in Figure 2-2a. Over the entire study period,
the price of the first 50 kWh of monthly consumption was constant at zero (Block
1), while the price of consumption beyond 50kWh steadily increased (Blocks 2-5).
Another clear source of variation across blocks over time stems from the fact that
Cape Town introduced progressively more tariff blocks into all three tariff schedules.
By 2012, the Lifeline tariff had five differently-priced tariff blocks, and the Domestic
tariff had three (Figures 2-2b and 2-2c). The introduction of each new block led to
differential price increases on each side of the block kink-point.
Changes in Tariff Placement over Time
Another important feature of the research setting is that individuals move between
tariffs. There are two reasons that individuals switch between tariff schedules. The
most common reason is because the city automatically switches customers to a differ-
ent tariff schedule based on their previous year's consumption. Not only do individual
characteristics change over time, but the city's placement rules, timing, and level of
enforcement also vary from year to year, leading to variation in what tariff schedule
a customer faces. The second reason is that individual customers may elect to switch
from one tariff schedule to another. In particular, from the 2007-2010 bill years, Do-
mestic customers were allowed to apply to switch between the two Domestic tariffs
once per year.
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Bill Year
(a) Lifeline Tariff
Marginal Prices Over Time: Domestic 1
Block 1
Block 2
......... Block 3
- - Block 4
-- Block5
2012
Block 1
Block 2
----- ~-- Block3
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2611 2012
Bill Year
(b) Domestic 1 Tariff
Marginal Prices Over Time: Domestic 2
2005 2006 2007 2008
Bill Y
Block 1
Block 2
-...... Block 3
2009 2010 2011 2012
(c) Domestic 2 Tariff
Figure 2-2: Prices Increase Differentially Across and Within Tariff Schedules over
Time
Notes: This figure shows the time series variation in marginal electricity prices stemming from
changes to the tariff schedules each July. For the years when the Domestic 1 and 2 tariffs are con-
solidated into a single tariff schedule (2005, 2011, and 2012), the marginal prices of the consolidated
tariff schedule are plotted on each graph. 134
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Figure 2-3 plots the daily histograms of switches across Tariff schedules. Each
bin shows the total number of switches of the type specified taking place on a single
day. The plots in the first column (Figures 2-3a, 2-3b, and 2-3c) show the frequency
of precise tariff switch dates among postpaid customers, whereas those in the second
column (Figures 2-3d, 2-3e, and 2-3f) show the frequency of the first prepaid electric-
ity purchase after a switch among prepaid customers. 1 The spikes in each histogram
indicate dates when the City of Cape Town switched large numbers of customers
between the tariff types.
Figures 2-3a and 2-3d show switches onto the Lifeline tariff, and Figures 2-3b
and 2-3e show switches off the Lifeline tariff. Nearly all these switches are done
automatically by the City on bulk switch dates according to average consumption in
the previous bill year (as the figure shows, there are very few switches not on spike
dates). I exploit the price variation generated by these bulk switches in my analysis of
price elasticities. However, some prepaid customers are switched mid-year, especially
in the 2006 and 2007 bill years. These mid-year switches are primarily from customers
who have newly-installed prepaid meters, and were initially defaulted onto the wrong
tariff. In the first few months after installation during these years, the tariff often
switched (sometimes multiple times) as the city checked that tariffs were properly
assigned. In addition to the switching of new customers, a small number come from
individuals who approached the utility to be switched onto the Lifeline tariff. The
city would then audit the previous 12 months of consumption, and switch customers
onto the Lifeline tariff. My analysis excludes price variation generated from these
switches.
Figures 2-3c and 2-3f in the third row show switches between the two Domestic
'Because the prepaid data only includes records for purchase dates, it is generally impossible to
ascertain the exact date of a switch.
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tariffs. In the 2006 bill year, assignment between these two tariffs was done by the
city alone: while the lowest consumers (using less than 450 kWh per month in the
previous year) were placed on the Lifeline tariff, high-consumers using more than
600 kWh per month were placed on Domestic 1, and middle-consumers were placed
on Domestic 2. However, from the 2007-2010 bill years, customers were allowed to
elect between the two tariffs once per year. Nonetheless, Figure 2-3 shows that there
are virtually no postpaid customers who switch on days other than the bulk switch
days, indicating that electory tariff switches between Domestic tariffs are even more
rare than off-cycle switches onto the Lifeline in this sample. However, to ensure that
the results are not confounded by endogenous tariff switches, I drop all individuals
who switched between the two domestic tariffs or onto the Lifeline tariff, and whose
switch date could not possibly coincide with a bulk switch date. Thus, my analysis
utilizes price variation due to switches between tariffs conducted on the bulk switch
dates.
2.2.3 Cape Town's Two Metering Technologies: Postpaid and
Prepaid
This section describes the two metering - and payment - technologies used by the
City of Cape Town.
Postpaid meters allow customers use electricity on credit. Once installed, cus-
tomers use electricity as they please, and cumulative consumption is recorded on
a meter. These meters are read approximately once per monthly billing cycle by
municipal staff. If the meter is not read during a billing cycle, e.g. because of ad-
ministrative delay or because it is behind a locked gate, then the utility initially
charges the customer based on an estimate of consumption, and will revise the bill
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Figure 2-3: Switches between Tariffs were Executed Differently across Years and
Metering Technology.
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of customers switching between tariffs over time. The first
column shows switch dates between particular tariff schedules for postpaid customers. Each bin
represents a single day. The beginning and end of each billing period on a given tariff is indicated
on the bill, so the exact date of tariff switches is observed. Nearly all postpaid switches occur on
July 1st - the beginning of the new billing year - in line with the City of Cape Town policy of placing
customers on tariffs based on overall consumption the previous billing year. Mid-year switches are
nearly non-existent for postpaid customers. The second column shows histograms of the date of
the first electricity purchase subsequent to a switch between particular tariff schedules for prepaid
customers. The prepaid customer data is simply a set of purchase records, so the precise switch
date is unknown. Nonetheless, the substantial bunching of the first purchase after a tariff switch,
typically around the new bill year, indicates that most switches were performed by the city in bulk.
The histograms of tariff switches for both post4Td and prepaid customers contain irregularities,
indicating that the City of Cape Town implemented switches inconsistently across years. For
example, Panel (d) shows that in the 2009 bill year, prepaid customers were switched off the
Lifeline tariff in bulk in January 2010 instead of July 2009. In addition, Panels (b) and (e) show
that very few customers on either metering system were switched onto the Lifeline tariff in the 2009
bill year.
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the next time the meter is read. The majority of postpaid customers receive a con-
solidated monthly municipal bill that includes not only electricity charges, but also
water, sanitation, refuse, property tax, and other municipal service charges.
Prepaid customers instead pay for electricity before they consume it. Electricity
can be purchased from a dense network of prepaid vendors, including nearly every
ATM, gas station, and supermarket in Cape Town, as well as kiosks and small shops.
During the majority of the study period, electricity can also be purchase online or
with a cell-phone. Depending on the vendor, the customer provides the value of
electricity they would like to purchase in units of either money or power (i.e., Rand
or kWh), and their meter number. In exchange for the quoted payment, they receive
a receipt with a meter-specific code. Once the customer enters this code into the
keypad of their meter display, their metering system updates the total kWh available.
If they expend all available kWh, they cannot use their electricity connection until
the purchase more electricity.
Initially, all customers in Cape Town used postpaid meters. Prepaid meters were
first introduced in South Africa in the 1980s in an effort to reduce the costs of me-
tering, billing, and non-payment, especially in rural areas. In 1993, the City of Cape
Town adopted a policy that all new residential connections would receive prepaid
meters as part of the effort to extend electrification into underserved areas. Later
policies to encourage the replacement of postpaid with prepaid meters have included
both compulsory replacements and free voluntary "upgrades" to select customers, as
well as making some redistributive municipal benefits conditional on having a pre-
paid meter. Prepaid meters are therefor more prevalent in both newly developed
and poor areas of the city. Figure 2-4 shows that the prevalence of prepaid metering
steadily increased over the study period.
Although the initial justification for prepaid meters was to lower operating costs
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Figure 2-4: The share of Cape Town electricity
increased steadily throughout the sample period.
2009 2010 2011 2012
customers using prepaid meters
Notes: This figure shows the fraction of electricity customers in the City of Cape Town metered
with prepaid meters during the study period. The coverage of prepaid meters steadily increased
due to policies of metering all new connections with prepaid meters, incentives for switching to
prepaid meters (especially after meter breakage), and involuntary meter replacements.
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to the utility, a second benefit was quickly noted: prepaid metering increases the
ability of customers to control their electricity budget in the face of rising electricity
prices. The introduction of prepaid metering may increase responsiveness to energy
prices for a number of reasons:
1. Quantity display. Prepaid meters feature a visible display of energy con-
sumption within the home. The display is typically in an accessible location to
facilitate entering purchase codes. In contrast, postpaid meter displays are out-
side the home (to facilitate meter reading by municipal staff), and are typically
covered by a barrier such as a cement plate.
2. Frequent feedback on the cost of consumptive behavior. Prepaid cus-
tomers tend to make more frequent - and less aggregated - purchases. Whereas
the median postpaid billing period is 30 days, the median prepaid electricity
purchase frequency is only 3 days. This translates into more precise feedback
from consumption behaviors (e.g., leaving the AC running one day) to expen-
diture consequences (e.g., running out of prepaid electricity one day early vs.
a slightly higher monthly bill).
3. Purchases are made at the marginal price. Prepaid customers who
make multiple purchases within a billing cycle purchase some electricity at
its marginal price, whereas customers receiving a monthly bill may be unable
to distinguish marginal and average prices. In particular, postpaid and prepaid
customers are charged for nonlinearities in quite different ways. Postpaid cus-
tomers pay the fixed and marginal costs of all consumption for the entire billing
period together, when they pay their full utility bill. Because billing periods
vary depending on when the meters are actually read, any fixed fee is pro-rated
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for the duration of the billing period. Prepaid customers, on the other hand,
face a billing period of exactly one calendar month. They are required to pay
the entire monthly fixed fee in the first purchase of the month. The customer
then only pays the marginal cost of subsequent purchases in the same calen-
dar month. If their total monthly purchases passes a kink point, subsequent
purchases in the month will be charged at the higher marginal cost.
4. Short lag between purchase and consumption. Prepaid metering short-
ens the time gap between energy purchase and consumption. Postpaid cus-
tomers receive bills after a processing delay of up to 30 days after meters are
read, and then have an additional 60 days to pay the bill, leading to a large lag
between when electricity is used and when it is purchased. Although prepaid
customers can save purchased electricity for later consumption, the high aver-
age frequency of purchases suggests that most customers purchase electricity
for nearly immediate use.
5. No non-payment. Last, prepaid meters eliminate the possibility of non-
payment. Postpaid customers facing high energy prices may choose to consume
energy and simply not pay their bill. Although non-payment is punishable
with disconnection, enforcement in Cape Town is far from perfect. Prepaid
customers, however, are automatically disconnected as soon as they consume
the electricity they have purchased.
2.2.4 Data
The City of Cape Town sells electricity to postpaid and prepaid customers using sep-
arate vending systems. I use administrative data on household electricity purchases
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from both vending systems obtained under a non-disclosure agreement with the City
of Cape Town.
Postpaid Data
The postpaid data contains residential electricity billing records for all customers on
postpaid meters. From this dataset, I extract bills for a random sample of approxi-
mately 40% of households receiving any electricity bill between July 2005 and June
2013. A record includes each customer's account ID, meter ID, billing period start
and end date, electricity consumption, electricity bill, tariff type, and whether or not
the bill is for actual consumption (from a meter reading), or an estimate. Whereas
meters are typically read every 25-35 days, occasionally there is a much larger gap
between readings, in which case customers are billed based on estimated consump-
tion. When the meter is eventually read, the estimated bills are reversed, and a new
bill for actual consumption over the entire period is calculated.
To clean the postpaid data for analysis, I first remove all estimated bills from the
billing data, leaving an unbalanced panel of actual consumption and billed amount,
where each billing period is a different length. I calculate the average daily consump-
tion within each observed billing period, and assign it to the date at the midpoint of
the billing period. I then trim the billing consumption data at the 99th percentile of
average daily consumption to remove recording errors (e.g., extra zeros). In order to
generate a monthly panel of consumption and marginal price, I then linearly interpo-
late households' average daily consumption in each calendar month from the billing
period midpoint values. Finally, the marginal price for each month is calculated as
the marginal price that the customer would be charged for their interpolated average
daily consumption value.
142
Prepaid Data
The prepaid data contains records of each purchase made by prepaid customers.
I extract records for a random sample of approximately 40% of households making
prepaid electricity purchases in the sample period. A record includes each customer's
account ID, meter ID, purchase date, purchase amount, bill, and tariff type. To
prepare the prepaid data for analysis, I aggregate all purchases that occur in a given
month, and calculate the average daily kWh purchased over the month. Like for the
postpaid data, I trim the prepaid consumption data at the 99th percentile of average
daily consumption across months. I calculate the marginal price for each month as
the marginal price of the last kWh purchased that month.
In both the prepaid and postpaid datasets, I use the marginal price that the
customer faces for an additional unit of electricity in the monthly billing cycle. In
using this price to estimate consumption responses over the whole billing period,
I implicitly assume that customers on non-linear tariffs know with certainty which
price they will face at the end of the billing cycle. If consumption on an increasing
block tariff is uncertain, customers may be responding to a higher expected price than
realized price at the beginning of low-consumption periods, and to a lower expected
price than realized price at the beginning of high-consumption periods, leading me
to underestimate price responses. This is one limitation of the empirical strategy I
employ.
Sample Construction
I define a "household" in my dataset as a unique meter-customer ID pair. This means
that if a customer switches from a postpaid to a prepaid meter, I will not consider it
the same household. In practice, there are two reasons that I cannot always follow
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households throughout their entire history of electricity service with the City of Cape
Town. First, when households move, they do not bring their meter with them, and
they often switch customer account IDs. Second, when a customer switches from
a postpaid meter to a prepaid meter, they again change both meter and customer
IDs. Moves and meter technology changes are also likely to be correlated to shifts in
demand, making it difficult to attribute demand shifts before and after these events
to price changes. Therefore, the definition of household above is likely to reduce
within-household variance in consumption, at the cost of reducing the time span of
data available for the set of households who switch meters.
I further limit the household-month level dataset constructed from the prepaid
and postpaid data in the following ways. First, I drop all customers who were ever
charged at a commercial tariff rate (to eliminate businesses). To be conservative
about the potential for endogenous switching onto tariff schedules, I next remove all
customers whose tariff switch dates onto the Lifeline or between the Domestic tariffs
could not be on a bulk switching date. Since I observe the precise switching date for
postpaid customers, this entails identifying the spikes in postpaid customer switch
dates for each tariff type, and removing customers who do not switch on these dates.
For prepaid customers, I observe only the last purchase date before a switch, and the
first purchase date after a switch, which bound the actual switch date. I identify the
bulk switch dates for each tariff type from spikes in the first prepaid purchase date
after a switch. I then drop customers for whom the bulk switch date falls outside the
bounds of their switching period. To limit measurement error, I drop all customers
who have a gap of three or more consecutive months without prepaid purchases or
without a meter reading. The final dataset contains 194,063 households, each of
whom are present in the data for an average of 65 months.
Table 2.1 summarizes the monthly consumption, expenditure, and tariff schedules
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of postpaid and prepaid customers in the eight bill years from 2005 to 2012. A key
takeaway is that, in general, postpaid customers are higher-volume consumers, and
therefore are more likely to be on one of the two Domestic tariffs in a given month.
While postpaid customers tend to pay a higher average price for electricity, fixed
monthly service fees make up a large portion of their electricity expenditures, and
on average they pay a lower marginal electricity price.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Electricity Consumption in Cape Town: 2005-2012 Bill Years
Unweighted Propensity-score weighted
All Postpaid Prepaid Postpaid Prepaid
Annual consumption (kWh/m) 678 891 457 783 555
(3864.1) (5398.1) (368.3) (5496) (421.6)
Average price per kWh 0.63 0.69 0.56 0.69 0.62
(26.5) (37.3) (1.63) (12.2) (2.05)
Marginal price per kWh 0.61 0.58 0.64 0.67 0.67
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.31) (0.28)
Annual expenditure (ZAR/m) 434 584 278 578 356
(3200.5) (4473.4) (298.2) (4774.6) (341.4)
Tariff Plan
Charged on Lifeline Tariff 0.43 0.30 0.56 0.37 0.43
(0.49) (0.46) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50)
Charged on Domestic Tariff 0.46 0.60 0.33 0.48 0.45
(0.50) (0.49) (0.47) (0.50) (0.50)
Observations 20,782,352 10,567,865 10,214,487 8,113,761 7,055,137
Total customers 371,895 208,846 163,049 168,321 128,668
Average months in sample 55.88 50.60 62.65 48.20 54.83
Notes: This table summarizes propensity-weighted monthly consumption and prices among post-
paid and prepaid customers of the City of Cape Town from July 2005 to June 2013 used for
estimation of price elasticities. Propensity-score weights are estimated inverse probability weights
for being a prepaid customer conditional on pre-period observables. The weights are calculated
in the full panel of prepaid and postpaid consumption data using a probit regression of whether
the observation is prepaid on the following pre-period variables: the billing year the customer first
appears in the data, the customer's initial tariff assignment, the interaction of the first billing year
and initial tariff, and the billing years elapsed since the customer's first observation.
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2.3 Descriptive Evidence on Price Responsiveness
This section presents descriptive evidence on the degree of price responsiveness to
the three types of plausibly exogenous marginal price variation that I will use to
identify price elasticities: differential price changes across tariffs, differential price
changes across consumption levels within tariffs, and switching between tariffs.
2.3.1 Price Changes across Tariffs: An Event Study of Tariff
Consolidation
The clearest example of differential marginal price changes across tariffs in my data
is the consolidation of the two Domestic tariffs into a single tariff in billing year
2011. This can be seen in Figure 2-2: whereas customers on the Domestic 2 tariff
faced marginal price increases of 15-27%, Domestic 1 customers faced marginal price
increases of 34-48%. Figure 2-1 shows an event study graph of consumption in the
months before and after the two tariffs converged for postpaid (Figure 2-la) and
prepaid (Figure 2-1b) customers. In each graph, the top line plots the average daily
consumption of customers who were on the Domestic 1 tariff in bill year 2010, just
before convergence. These customers start from a lower marginal price in 2010,
and so the see a larger price change in July 2011. The bottom line plots average
daily consumption among customers who were on the Domestic 2 tariff. After the
tariffs converge on July 1 (shown with a dashed red line), consumption among former
Domestic 1 customers decreases, whereas consumption among Domestic 2 customers
increases slightly (these customers see a smaller marginal price increase). With the
caveat that consumption by customers on Domestic 1 and Domestic 2 tariffs may not
have been on parallel trends, this suggests that individuals are responding to tariff
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increases over time. In addition, the difference in difference of consumption between
Domestic 1 and Domestic 2 customers before and after the tariff consolidation is
larger for prepaid customers, providing suggestive evidence that prepaid customers
may be more sensitive to price increases.
Postpaid Electricity Use Over Time
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Figure 2-1: Consumption before and after convergence of two Domestic tariffs.
Notes: This figure shows the average daily consumption of electricity each month for postpaid and
prepaid consumption before and after the two Domestic tariff schedules were consolidated in July
2011.
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2.3.2 Price Changes within Tariffs: Bunching at Marginal
Cost Kink-points
I next present evidence on whether individuals respond to differential marginal price
changes on a single tariff. Most tariffs feature a constant marginal price of electricity
in most years. However, there are some exceptions to this. For example, Lifeline
customers face a zero marginal price for the first 50 kWh/month, and a positive
marginal price thereafter. In 2010 an additional kink was introduced to the Lifeline
tariff at 150 kWh/month, and in 2011 two more kinks were introduced at 350 and
600 kWh/month (Figure 2-2a). Also in 2011, the two Domestic tariffs were consol-
idated into a single tariff with a single kink at 600 kWh, and a second kink at 150
kWh/month was added in 2012 (Figures 2-2b and 2-2c).
Figure 2-2 shows how postpaid and prepaid consumers respond to these new
kink points. Each plot shows the distribution of consumption before and after the
introduction of kink points. The dotted black lines show the marginal price faced
at each level of consumption. After the kink points are introduced (at the solid red
lines), prepaid customers appear to shift consumption toward the kink, resulting in
substantial bunching. For example, the bottom panel of Figure 2-2d shows prepaid
domestic customers bunching near both kink points introduced in 2011-2012, and
the top panel shows minimal bunching near these kink-point values before they were
introduced. Figure 2-2c shows a similar bunching response among prepaid customers
on the Lifeline tariff. The postpaid customers' response, shown in Figures 2-2a and
2-2b, appears more muted, however the introduction of the kink points does seem to
result in some bunching for these customers as well.
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Figure 2-2: Bunching increases with the introduction of kink-points.
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of consumption of Lifeline and Domestic customers,
before and after the introduction of kink-points. The black dotted lines show the marginal price
schedule or schedules faced by Lifeline or Domestic customers. Vertical red dashed lines indicate
kink-points that have yet to be introduced; vertical solid red lines indicate kink-points that have
been introduced.
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2.3.3 Switching between Tariffs
The final source of variation I exploit is that some individuals are switched from one
tariff to another by the City of Cape Town in bulk switches. The switches are based
on average consumption over a twelve month period. For example, Lifeline customers
were periodically audited by the city, and those found to be consuming more than 450
kWh per month on average over the twelve months prior to the audit were switched
onto one of the two Domestic tariffs. Figure 2-3 compares the consumption of audited
Lifeline customers who were switched to a Domestic tariff in the 2009 bill year (the
top line) to those who were not switched (the bottom line). For postpaid customers,
the City of Cape Town audited annual consumption, and switched customers off the
Lifeline and onto the higher-priced Domestic tariff on July 1, 2009. Figure 2-3a shows
that those postpaid customers who remained on Lifeline increased their consumption
after the 2009 audit, but those who were switched decreased consumption after the
audit. Figure 2-3b shows a very similar picture for prepaid customers, indicating that
customers using both metering technologies respond to the marginal price changes
induced by tariff switches. This may be because these tariff changes are particularly
salient.
2.4 Demand Estimation
In the following section, I jointly exploit the three types of price variation above
to separately estimate the elasticity of demand for postpaid and prepaid customers,
and test whether the two groups have the same elasticity conditional on pre-period
observables.
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Figure 2-3: Electricity consumption fell more for customers switched to higher-price
tariffs.
Notes: This figure compares average consumption for Lifeline customers who where switched onto
a Domestic tariff in billing year 2009 (top line), and for those who remained on the Lifeline tariff
(bottom line). This automatic switch occurred in July 2009 for postpaid customers, and in February
2010 for prepaid customers. Customers who were switched onto Domestic experiences a larger
increase in marginal price. Whereas consumption rose slightly over time for those who remained on
Lifeline, consumption fell for those who were switched onto a Domestic tariff among both postpaid
and prepaid customers.
151
2.4.1 Model and Empirical Specification
My model of demand is adapted from the elasticity of taxable income literature
(e.g., Gruber and Saez (2002); Saez et al. (2012)), and has been previously applied
to the energy setting (e.g., Ito (2014); Ito et al. (2016)) to show how optimizing
consumers respond to nonlinear budget sets. Suppose each individual i in month t
using metering technology j maximizes a quasi-linear utility function
1+1/Ej
uit(qjt, cit) = Ci 1" _ + cit,I + 1/Ei
where qi is average monthly consumption of electricity, cit is all other consumption,
and ait and Ej are an individual-time-specific demand shifter and technology-specific
constant elasticity parameter, respectively. The budget constraint on a linear portion
of the tariff schedule is pitqit + ci = Et, where Ei is individual-time specific virtual
income and pit is the marginal price of electricity at consumption level qit. The first
order condition with respect to consumption expressed in logs yields a linear equation
for optimal consumption,
ln q* = ait + E In pt (2.1)
This model embeds a number of simplifying assumptions. The first assumption is that
there are no income effects on energy consumption. This assumption is typical in the
energy context, as spending on energy is a small portion of total income, and existing
estimates of the income elasticity of electricity demand from other contexts are close
to 0 (Reiss and White, 2005; McRae, 2015). The second assumption is that price
responses are immediate. The third assumption is that individuals respond to their
realized marginal price, and not (for example) to an average of marginal prices across
the tariff schedule. If the latter two assumptions do not hold in my setting, then my
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elasticity estimates will not necessarily identify the structural elasticity parameter
in the model above. Instead, differences in empirical elasticities across metering
technology may be partly attributed to different response times across technologies,
or to different understanding of true marginal prices.
My aim is to identify and compare ej for the two metering technologies, j E
(postpaid, prepaid). In order to do so, I decompose the demand shifter ait into a
fixed time-technology component agj, a fixed individual component ac, and a random
person-by-time term vit. Taking the twelve-month difference of Equation 3.5 for
customers using metering technology j yields the estimating equations:
A In qit = yjt + Ej A In pit + r7t (2.2)
for j E (postpaid, prepaid), where A ln qit = In qit -In qit-12, A ln pit = In pit -ln Pit-12,
7jt = aj - Ce,t-12, and 7it = Vit - Vit-12. The year-month fixed effects for each tech-
nology, 75t, flexibly control for potentially spurious time-series correlation between
overall consumption patterns and price changes. 2 The fixed individual component of
consumption differences out of the equation, controlling for the fact that individuals
with high consumption levels tend to face lower marginal prices overall.3
Because prices are set centrally by the City of Cape Town on an annual basis,
annual changes to the set of tariff schedules are plausibly exogenous. That is, joint
determination of supply and demand is unlikely to be a source of endogeneity in this
setting. However, there is a challenge to identifying each elasticity parameter, Ej, in
2 E.g. overall prices increase and consumption decreases over the entire study period, but a third
factor such as lower prices for energy-efficient technologies may be introducing a spurious correlation
between the two.
3 Across the whole sample, high-consumption individuals tend to be on the Domestic 2 tariff,
which has a high fixed cost but low marginal cost. However, among individuals on a single increasing
block tariff such as the Lifeline tariff, high consumption individuals tend to face higher prices.
Taking first differences controls for both sources of spurious correlation.
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equation 2.2. The error term 77it may be correlated with A ln pit for three reasons:
nonlinearities in a the tariff schedules, differential consumption trends, and selective
switching between tariff schedules. I discuss these in turn below.
The nonlinear tariff schedules offered during the study period introduce endo-
geneity through increasing block pricing, whereby individuals who consume more
pay a higher marginal price for consumption. This results in a mechanical positive
correlation between shocks to annual consumption changes it = vit - /it-12 and
marginal price changes A ln pit, because shocks may push individuals between facets
of the budget set. Following the literature, I addresses the endogeneity problem by
constructing a synthetic instrument for price changes: the imputed change in price
that an individual would have experienced if her consumption were fixed at a single
level, 4. This instrument isolates price changes due a change in the tariff schedule an
individual faces, rather than changes to where they fall on the schedule. Blomquist
and Selin (2010) show that setting the imputing prices using mid-period consump-
tion will result in a valid instrument even in the presence of mean reversion and error
autocorrelation. I thus select 4 = qt-6. 4
A remaining potential source of endogeneity is that individuals who face larger
price changes may have had differential consumption changes even absent the price
change - analogous to a violation of the parallel trends assumption in a simple
difference-in-difference framework. Because the price changes in this study tend
to be larger for high-consumers (both due to the introduction of increasing block
tariffs and the attempt to keep Lifeline prices stable), a particular concern is that
price responses may be confounded by shifts in the overall distribution of consump-
tion over time. As an example, if consumption inequality were falling over time
(say, due to an increasing availability of cheap appliances), these changes would be
4 This is the same strategy followed by Saez et al. (2012) and Ito (2014).
154
confounded with the smaller price increases seen by low-volume users in the study
period, and price elasticities would be overestimated. Because I observe customers
consuming similar amounts across multiple tariffs in each period, I am able to control
for potential confounds stemming from shifts in the distribution of consumption. In
order to mitigate this concern, I include specifications with period-specific controls
for imputed log consumption. In particular, I use the instrumental variable strategy
described above to estimate equations of the following form:
A In qit = -jt + Ej A In pit + ft (ln 4it) + r/it (2.3)
where I instrument for A ln pit using the simulated price change that the individ-
ual would experience consuming at his mid-period consumption level 4, on his tariff
schedules at time t and t - 12. Without these additional controls, the identifica-
tion assumption is that, absent differential price changes, individuals would see the
same extent of year-to-year consumption changes. With these controls, my identi-
fication assumption somewhat weaker: absent differential price changes, individuals
who consume the same amount on different tariffs would experience the same ex-
tent of year-to-year consumption changes. However, adding controls for mid-period
consumption absorbs the pricing variation within tariffs.
A last potential endogeneity concern stems from the fact that individuals are not
randomly switched between tariff schedules. Rather, the City of Cape Town switched
individuals onto tariffs based on average consumption over a 12-month period. If
individual consumption shocks are not autocorrelated, then the bias introduced by
this type of selection is minimal: shocks to a single month of consumption will
only minimally effect prices through their impact on annual consumption. However,
some structures of autocorrelation will lead to endogeneity concerns. For example,
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if shocks persist for a few months, then positive shocks in month t - 12 are likely to
push Lifeline customers onto the higher-price Domestic 1 in month t, and Domestic
1 customers onto the lower-price Domestic 2 in month t, yet consumption will fall
between months t - 12 and t simply due to mean reversion. Because the relationship
between average consumption and marginal price is non-monotonic, it is impossible
to sign the direction of the bias, yet there is unfortunately no reason to believe that
it will be 0. There is therefor a trade-off in exploiting additional variation from
switches between tariffs, and the bias in elasticity estimates. As a robustness check I
therefore include specifications that limit price variation to that induced by changes
to the tariff structure alone, excluding all variation from tariff switching. I do this
by modifying the instrument for marginal price changes: I impute the price change
that each individual would experience conditional on remaining on a single tariff
throughout the study period.
The procedure outlined above allows me to assess price elasticity separately
among prepaid and postpaid customers, but it does not identify the causal effect
of prepaid metering on price elasticities. The meter type is not randomly assigned,
and so the two groups of customers may have underlying differences that leads to
differential price responses. In fact, Table 2.1 shows that postpaid and prepaid cus-
tomers look different during the sample period. These within-sample differences may
be explained both by differential price responses (which would lead the less respon-
sive group to consume more, be defaulted onto the domestic tariff, and face higher
prices, as the postpaid customers do) and by different underlying characteristics of
the two customer groups. Because these underlying differences may be correlated
with price elasticity, it is difficult to interpret the raw difference in elasticities.
To address the underlying differences between the two groups of customers, I em-
ploy a propensity-score-based matching estimator (Hirano and Imbens, 2001; Hirano
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et al., 2003). This estimator weights observations in each of the prepaid and postpaid
samples by the the inverse of nonparametric estimates of the propensity score (i.e.,
the probability of being metered with the observed metering technology). I estimate
the propensity score using a probit model for the probability of being metered with
a prepaid meter on dummy variables and a full set of interactions for three available
pre-treatment characteristics: the year the customer enters the sample, the number
of years they have been in the sample, and their initial tariff assignment. By assign-
ing larger weights to postpaid observations more similar to prepaid customers and
vice versa, the matching estimator compares elasticities among observably similar
samples using each technology.
The results from these specifications are presented in the next section.
2.4.2 Results and Discussion
Table 2.1 show elasticity estimates for postpaid customers (Columns 1-3), and pre-
paid customers (Columns 4-6). Columns 1 and 4 estimate the specification from
Equation 2.2, and do not include controls for imputed consumption. These estimates
exploit all three sources of pricing variation: differential marginal price changes across
tariffs, within tariffs, and due to customer switching. Although postpaid customers
have a statistically significant price elasticity, the estimated magnitude of -0.063 is
on the low end of the range of previous estimates.5 Prepaid customers are much more
price responsive to the full set of price variation, with a price elasticity of demand of
-0.242.
The remaining columns of Table 2.1 estimate the demand specification in Equa-
5Although small, the elasticity of demand among postpaid customers in Cape Town is approxi-
mately twice the elasticity among postpaid customers in southern California estimated by Ito (2014)
using a similar methodology.
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Table 2.1: Prepaid customers are more price-sensitive than postpaid customers
Postpaid Prepaid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A In(p) -0.063*** -0.081*** -0.084*** -0.242*** -0.215*** -0.221***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Year-Month FEs X X X X X X
Year-Month FEs x In X X X X
Year-Month FEs x (In 4)2 X X
No. customers 169795 169035 169035 141683 141683 141683
Avg. months per customer 48 48 48 55 55 55
Observations 8193856 8162756 8162756 7740684 7740670 7740670
F-stat 4107682 3742661 3626613 3222834 2652566 2620497
Notes: This table shows heterogeneity in the elasticity of demand by metering technology. More
negative values of elasticity indicate a larger price response. The unit of observation is a customer
x month. The dependent variable in all columns is A ln q, the 12-month change in log electricity
consumption, and the independent variable is A lnp, the 12-month change in marginal electricity
price. The independent variable is instrumented using the imputed 12-month change in marginal
electricity price that the customer would have experienced with consumption held constant at the
period mid-way between the 12-month change in quantity. The F-statistic tests the joint significance
of the first stage coefficients. Standard errors are clustered at the customer level. Significance levels:
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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tion 2.3 with two functional forms of ft(ln it). Columns 2 and 4 include period-
specific linear controls for (In dit), and Columns 3 and 5 control for period-specific
second-order polynomials of ln dit. Controlling for mid-period consumption absorbs
pricing variation from increasing block tariffs. These controls lead to larger postpaid
elasticity estimates and smaller prepaid elasticity estimates - although the elasticity
estimates are not sensitive to the specific functional form of the additional controls.6
There are two potential explanations for this. First, the estimates in Columns 1 and
3 may be biased due to underlying correlation between shifts in the distribution of
consumption and price changes across the distribution of consumption within the
tariffs. Second, it may be that prepaid customers are more sensitive to increasing
block prices (i.e., the additional variation included in Columns 1 and 3) than they
are to changes in prices across the whole tariff schedule, while postpaid customers are
relatively insensitive to increasing block pricing compared to overall price changes.
Given the stronger bunching at kink-points among prepaid relative to postpaid cus-
tomers shown in Figure 2-2, the second explanation seems likely.
In Table 2.2, I replicate the specifications above using an instrument for policy
changes that does not include switches between tariffs. These estimates eliminate
any potential bias from an underlying correlation between year-on-year changes in
consumption and switching between tariffs. At the same time, they eliminate price
variation due to switches between tariffs. Excluding variation from changes in tariffs
leads to larger elasticity estimates among both prepaid and postpaid customers. It
is again impossible to know with certainty if this change is due to the elimination
of bias, a differential response to different types of price variation, or some combina-
tion. Either way, the main result is robust: prepaid customers are more elastic than
6 Alternate functional forms, such as quartiles or deciles of demand times year-month fixed effects,
yield similar results.
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postpaid.
Table 2.2: The larger elasticity among prepaid customers is not the result of differ-
ential endogenous switching between tariffs by metering technology.
Postpaid Prepaid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A ln(p) -0.128*** -0.152*** -0.154*** -0.291*** -0.268*** -0.314***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012)
Year-Month FEs X X X X X X
Year-Month FEs x In 4 X X X X
Year-Month FEs x (In 4)2 X X
No. customers 169676 168916 168916 141634 141634 141634
Avg. months per customer 48 48 48 55 55 55
Observations 8180138 8149041 8149041 7736866 7736852 7736852
F-stat 118068.8 31162.1 30208.72 137721.5 44201.11 41723
Notes: This table shows heterogeneity in the elasticity of demand by metering technology. More
negative values of elasticity indicate a larger price response. The unit of observation is a customer
x month. The dependent variable in all columns is A ln q, the 12-month change in log electricity
consumption, and the independent variable is A lnp, the 12-month change in marginal electricity
price. The independent variable is instrumented using the imputed 12-month change in marginal
electricity price that the customer would have experienced with consumption held constant at the
period mid-way between the 12-month change in quantity, and with tariff schedules held constant at
their initial tariff placement. The F-statistic tests the joint significance of the first stage coefficients.
Standard errors are clustered at the customer level. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Overall, the elasticity of demand among prepaid customers is more than twice
that of postpaid customers. While not causal, these results suggest that moving
customers to prepaid metering may increase their responsiveness to prices, increasing
the ability of policymakers to use price as a policy instrument.
As described in Subsection 2.2.3, there are many reasons that prepaid customers
may be more responsive to prices. Some of these, such as a visible display, dis-
aggregated purchases, and quicker feedback from consumption to cost involve the
increased salience of the marginal price of energy-expending behaviors. However,
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other reasons - such as the inability to use electricity without payment - have little
to do with price salience. A key limitation of this analysis is that I cannot isolate any
particular reason that prepaid customers are more price responsive. Instead, these
results can be interpreted as the total effect of all these technological differences on
elasticities, combined with any differences in the underlying makeup of customers
using the two technologies.
Although I cannot identify the underlying cause for the different elasticities of
prepaid and postpaid customers, I can investigate whether postpaid customers are
simply slower to learn about price changes. In particular, it is possible that prepaid
customers adjust immediately to higher prices at the beginning of the bill year, while
postpaid customers only adjust after receiving their first bill. In order to test this
hypothesis, I drop the first month of the billing year (July) from the estimation
sample and test whether the elasticities among the two customer groups converge.
The results are shown in Table 2.3. The postpaid elasticity is not meaningfully
different after the first month of the new billing year. If anything, the prepaid
elasticity is slightly larger, indicating that while prepaid customers continue to learn
and adjust to higher prices, postpaid customers do not learn.
Lastly, I present evidence that the larger price-responsiveness of prepaid cus-
tomers is caused by the different metering technology, rather than the different char-
acteristics of the customers. As described in Section 2.4.1, I re-estimate price elas-
ticities using inverse propensity score weights. The last two columns of Table 2.1
show that the weights eliminate much, but not all, of the observable heterogeneity
between prepaid and postpaid customers in the sample period. This is to be ex-
pected: because the observable characteristics such as consumption, price, and tariff
are endogenous to the price response, customers who are initially similar will diverge
over the course of the sample period if they have different price responses. Table 2.4
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Table 2.3: The larger elasticity among prepaid customers is not due to faster learning
about price changes.
Postpaid Prepaid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A ln(p) -0.061*** -0.077*** -0.082*** -0.239*** -0.218*** -0.224***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Year-Month FEs X X X X X X
Year-Month FEs x In 4 X X X X
Year-Month FEs x (ln q)2 X X
No. customers 168561 167829 167829 140216 140216 140216
Avg. years per customer 44 44 44 51 51 51
Observations 7422982 7394469 7394469 7113550 7113537 7113537
F-stat 3948387 3626946 3498566 3082233 2519187 2498088
Notes: This table shows heterogeneity in the elasticity of demand by metering technology, excluding
the month of July - the first month after tariff schedules change. The dependent variable in all
columns is A In q, the 12-month change in log electricity consumption, and the unit of observation is
a customer x month. More negative values of elasticity indicate a larger price response. Standard
errors in brackets clustered at the customer level. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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shows the propensity-score matched elasticity estimates. The estimated elasticity of
prepaid customers remains nearly twice the magnitude of postpaid customers after
controlling for pre-period characteristics. Under the assumption that metering tech-
nology is independent of price-responsiveness conditional on these characteristics -
the unconfoundedness assumption of Rubin (1978) - the difference in elasticities from
the weighted postpaid and prepaid samples can be interpreted causally. Given the
limited set of observable pre-period characteristics in this setting, unconfoundedness
is likely too strong an assumption. Nonetheless, the fact that observably similar pre-
paid customers are still twice as price-responsive as postpaid customers lends some
evidence that prepaid meters make individuals more price-elastic.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper contributes to our understanding of how technology interacts with the
price elasticity of demand. Taking advantage of rich price variation in Cape Town,
South Africa, I show that customers using an electricity meter which requires pay-
ments up-front are much more price elastic than customers using traditional postpaid
meters. While the evidence presented here is not causal, it is highly suggestive that
prepaid metering can increase price and consumption salience. This is in contrast
to other advances in payment and monitoring technology (such as automatic bill
payments), which have improved automation at the cost of consumption and price
salience. These technologies may nevertheless be desirable, as they reduce transac-
tion costs and payment delinquency. Prepaid meters offer an alternative tradeoff:
they decrease payment delinquency while increasing salience, but increase transac-
tion costs to the consumer. While the welfare consequences of prepaid meters are
ambiguous, they offer promise not only as a means to reduce non-payment, but also
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Table 2.4: The larger elasticity among Prepaid customers is not due to differential
pre-period characteristics.
Postpaid Prepaid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A ln(p) -0.073*** -0.091*** -0.090*** -0.221*** -0.180*** -0.184***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Year-Month FEs X X X X X X
Year-Month FEs x In4 X X X X
Year-Month FEs x (ln q) 2  X X
No. customers 169091 168365 168365 116421 116421 116421
Avg. months per customer 48 48 48 55 55 55
Observations 8113761 8082939 8082939 6460931 6460917 6460917
F-stat 1860226 2403179 2387648 4334831 3656323 3646855
Notes: This table shows heterogeneity in
using inverse propensity-score weights.
tering technology are calculated using a
customer enters the sample, the number
assignment, and a full set of interaction
The dependent variable in all columns is
the elasticity of demand by metering technology estimated
Propensity scores for the likelihood of receiving each me-
probit model with independent variables for the year the
of years the customer has been in the sample, initial tariff
terms.
A In q, the 12-month change in log electricity consumption,
and the unit of observation is a customer x month. More negative values of elasticity indicate a
larger price response. Standard errors in brackets clustered at the customer level. Significance
levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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to increase the effectiveness of electricity pricing as a policy tool.
This raises the question: which features of prepaid metering increase price re-
sponsiveness? Although this paper does not offer direct evidence, there are some
lessons that we can draw from the literature. For example, Jessoe and Rapson (2014)
find that in-home displays of real-time electricity use both decrease overall energy
consumption and increase the response to time-of-use pricing events among urban
consumers in Connecticut. The very similar displays included in prepaid metering
systems likely contribute to the higher price elasticity among these consumers. The
evidence on the impact of billing frequency on demand responses is mixed. While
Gilbert and Graff Zivin (2014) find that households receiving intermittent bills re-
duce consumption immediately after bill receipt, Wichman (2017) shows that more
frequent water billing leads consumers to increase consumption - potentially due to
reduced uncertainty over nonlinear water prices. While neither study presents direct
evidence on whether bill frequency influences price elasticity, both suggest a role
for more frequent billing to improve price salience. To my knowledge, there are no
existing studies on either the lag between consumption and billing or the increased
threat of disconnection from non-payment. Whether these two features of prepaid
meters influence price elasticity remains an open question.
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Chapter 3
Measuring Demand for Groundwater
Irrigation: An Experimental Protocol
Using Conservation Payments
3.1 Introduction
Groundwater is a major source of irrigation and drinking water worldwide, especially
for farmers in developing countries (Ministry of Agriculture of the Government of
India, 2014). Unfortunately, falling groundwater levels are creating negative con-
sequences in many regions. Depletion reduces water availability, raises the cost of
further extraction, may harm water quality, and can increase poverty and conflict
(Sekhri, 2014). While groundwater pumping is currently unregulated in much of the
world, many regulatory tools are available, ranging from quantity restrictions and
tradeable quotas to simple price instruments. However, to implement these tools
efficiently, a regulator requires knowledge of the demand for groundwater - a key
input for which evidence is thin.
This chapter presents an experimental protocol to measure the price response of
demand for groundwater in irrigated agriculture. To measure demand, we introduce a
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mechanism that implements a price incentive without requiring the power of taxation:
payments for reduced groundwater pumping, or "conservation credits". We plan
to conduct this study as a randomized controlled trial among well-owning farmers
in the Indian state of Gujarat between 2018 and 2020. The basic research design
will be to (1) install meters on the groundwater pumps of all study participants,
(2) offer payments for reduced pumping, relative to a benchmark quantity, to a
randomly selected sub-sample of participants, and then (3) compare the quantity of
groundwater extracted by these farmers to that of the rest of the sample (i.e., the
control group).
Besides allowing us to measure demand, our intervention may be a promising
policy tool in itself. By offering payments for voluntary conservation, we may be
able to overcome constraints often faced in regulating common-pool resources in
developing countries. One such constraint is weak enforcement capacity: In many
areas, a natural regulator for groundwater would be the state-owned utility that
provides the electricity used for pumping - but consumer-level metering is rare, and
electricity theft is widespread (Antmann, 2009; Northeast Group LLC, 2014; Golden
and Min, 2012). Another constraint is political concerns: Both energy subsidies and
open access to groundwater are often entrenched means of redistribution; in India,
reform efforts are commonly met with forceful protests (Sovacool, 2017).
The conservation credits model may be able to relax these constraints in two ways.
First, our program may be easier to enforce than electricity sales; both technical
and institutional features of the program may make cheating both more difficult
to do and easier to detect. Second, we do not attempt to interfere with existing
de facto entitlements. Unlike (for example) a new Pigouvian tax on groundwater
consumption, which has large costs to large users of free groundwater, we instead
offer payments relative to existing usage patterns. While conservation credits require
168
large expenditures, a Pareto improvement may be possible: an electric utility may be
willing to implement conservation credits if the outlay per unit of energy conserved
is smaller than the marginal cost of electricity provision.
Our analysis will consist of three parts. First, evaluating our intervention as
a whole, we will measure how much water and energy is saved by the conservation
credits program. This will provide reduced-form evidence on the response of demand
for groundwater irrigation to price incentives, as well as evidence on the ability of the
conservation credits model to reduce resource consumption in our context. Our pri-
mary outcome is duration of pump operation, as measured directly using hours-of-use
meters. We will also estimate treatment effects in energy and water equivalents, and
assess mechanisms of water conservation and follow-on environmental and economic
impacts. To assess "leakage" in this program (negative spillovers to non-monitored
actions), we will also estimate intervention effects on the use of other, unmetered
water sources.
Second, we will use the design of our intervention to estimate the slope of ground-
water demand with respect to price, a parameter that is an important input to the
design of any type of groundwater regulation. We will estimate demand by instru-
mental variables, using treatment group assignment as instruments for price faced
at the margin. To obtain a quantitative estimate of demand parameters, we need
an instrumental variables approach; intent-to-treat estimates do not suffice because
of the structure of our intervention design. Specifically, it would be cost-prohibitive
to offer enough incentives to ensure everyone is marginal - in practice, some par-
ticipants find their benchmark too low to affect their decisions. Additional random
variation in both prices and benchmarks will help to increase statistical power and
first-stage instrument strength.
Third, we will assess the cost-effectiveness of the intervention as implemented in
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the study. Conservation credits could be implemented by even a budget-constrained
electric utility if the cost of the energy conserved is larger than the cost of the
program. To evaluate the viability of this potential Pareto improvement, we will
compare these costs and test whether an electric utility could be enlisted to reduce
groundwater consumption using conservation credits. If the answer is no, we will
calculate the minimum per-unit groundwater conservation subsidy that would be
required for conservation credits to yield net benefits.
Our study design is informed by a small pilot trial implemented among 90 farmers
in our study region during the winter of 2017-18. This pilot demonstrates logistical
feasibility of our intervention: farmers approached were overwhelmingly willing to
participate in the study and install meters, the meters functioned properly, and we
observed little evidence of tampering. The pilot also yielded several improvements
in intervention design, as well as preliminary data on pumping hours that informed
our sample size calculations. Results from the pilot are highly imprecise but point
estimates are consistent with a large reduction in pumping hours in the treatment
group. Our study also follows an earlier, non-randomized pilot of a similar program
in northern Gujarat (Fishman et al., 2016).
This study will make several contributions. First, this study will provide, to our
knowledge, the first experimental evidence on the price sensitivity of demand for
groundwater. Price variation is scarce for an open-access resource, so most previous
estimates have used proxies for the cost of pumping (Gonzalez-Alvarez et al., 2006;
Hendricks and Peterson, 2012), but these proxies may be correlated with other de-
terminants of groundwater demand. Bruno (2018) exploits panel variation in prices
across three regions of an irrigation district in California, but there is still a possibility
that these prices may have responded to groundwater consumption; an experiment
can rule out both concerns. We also focus on a developing country, where evidence on
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groundwater demand is particularly scarce. Meenakshi et al. (2013) use differences-
in-differences to study a phased-in switch to metering in West Bengal, India, but
they rely on self-reported pumping data and find imprecise results. Badiani and
Jessoe (2017) estimate an aggregate price elasticity using panel variation in the fixed
cost of an electricity connection, but marginal incentives may produce quite different
results.
Second, we will contribute to the literature on the cost-effectiveness of payments
for environmental services (PES) for resource conservation. Our conservation credits
intervention has the same basic structure as hundreds of programs designed to in-
centivized the provision of environmental services, ranging from increased forest or
wetland cover, to reduced input intensity in agriculture.1 Despite their prevalence,
rigorous evaluation of these types of programs has been limited (see Pattanayak
et al. (2010) and B6rner et al. (2017) for reviews). Most existing evaluations use
covariate matching and are unable to address selection bias, a particular concern
for a voluntary program. The two exceptions are Jayachandran et al. (2017), who
use a randomized controlled trial to find that conditional payments to forest-owning
households in Uganda reduce deforestation rates by 50 percent, and Jack and Car-
dona Santos (2017), who find that while contracts for tree planting in Malawi increase
trees planted, they also increase tree clearing on unenrolled plots. Our study will
provide evidence on the feasibility and effectiveness of PES in a novel context: pro-
moting irrigation efficiency in agriculture. We will also build on previous studies
by using detailed survey data to investigate the behavioral mechanisms underlying
the response to a PES program. Understanding the response to this program will
'For example, in the United States alone, payments are available to farmers for actions to
mitigate flood and wildfire risks, provide habitat for endangered species, salinity mitigation, and
water and energy conservation.
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inform our understanding of whether a PES model holds promise as a method for
governments and donors to reduce energy and water use.
Finally, we will contribute to literature connecting the price response of elec-
tricity consumption in developing countries to policy decisions about energy-sector
investment and reform. Experimental and quasi-experimental studies are still lim-
ited, but a few have been conducted recently on rural households in Columbia (?),
urban households in South Africa (Jack and Smith, 2016), and new grid connections
in Kenya (Lee et al., 2018).
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Optimal groundwater policy: A framework
Groundwater is a shared, common-pool resource. Extraction by one user (most often
irrigators) imposes an externality on other users in the form of lower water availability
and higher costs of extraction. Multiple regulatory tools - including both quantity
and price instruments - are available to reduce over-extraction and restore efficiency,
and demand for groundwater is an essential input to all of them. In this section
we show how the optimal Pigouvian price level is set, and how this calculation is
affected by the demand for groundwater. We focus on price regulation because our
study implements a type of price instrument, but the analysis would be similar for
the quantity instruments more frequently used for groundwater management.
Figure 3-1 illustrates consequences of price regulation in the presence of ground-
water externalities. Irrigators have aggregate inverse demand for groundwater as a
function of water quantity, D(q). Inverse demand equals private marginal benefits
net of private marginal costs of extraction; it first declines with quantity but even-
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tually slopes upward as marginal costs rise. Extraction generates social marginal
damages, SMD(q), which increases with quantity. Although this analysis represents
the situation at a single point in time, it can fully incorporate dynamics: the present
discounted value of future costs of today's extraction may be included in demand
(the internalized portion) and social marginal damages (the remainder).
When groundwater extraction has a price of zero, irrigators continue using water
until net private marginal benefits are zero - where the demand curve intersects the
x-axis, or q0 . This level of extraction is inefficient, since the social marginal damages
are greater than the net private marginal benefits. The efficient level of extraction,
instead, is found where these two curves intersect, or q*.
One way to achieve this allocation is through a price, or tax, per unit quantity
extracted. If the price p is set to equal p*, the value of social marginal damages
at q*, irrigators will fully internalize the externality of extraction, shifting down the
effective demand curve. Then, they will extract only up to the efficient quantity q*,
since net private marginal benefits including the tax are zero. To set this per-unit
price p*, a common heuristic is to set the price equal to the social marginal damages
as measured locally. If social marginal damages are constant, the slope of demand
does not matter, since the efficient quantity is simply whatever amount results from
this price.
However, there are two reasons a policymaker pursuing price regulation may
need to know the full shape of the groundwater demand curve. First, social marginal
damages may not be constant. In Figure 3-1, if the price were set at SMD(qo), the
resulting quantity extracted would be far too low. Constant social marginal damages
may be a reasonable approximation over the range of groundwater conserved in
small programs in large aquifers, but the slope of the demand curve is essential for
larger programs or smaller aquifers. Second, even if social marginal damages are
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constant, the process of enacting a new policy may incur costs (such as political or
administrative costs). Whether the policy is worthwhile depends on the quantity of
water conserved, which can only be predicted with knowledge of the demand curve.
3.2.2 Existing evidence: Costs, benefits, and damages of ground-
water extraction in irrigated agriculture
Existing evidence is relatively thin for both the social damages and demand functions
for groundwater extraction. Social damages are difficult to quantify overall, but the
components are well understood. Some components have known values, while others
are best estimated using scientific models. Demand for groundwater, which is the
difference between private marginal benefits and private marginal costs, is less well
understood. Private marginal costs can be modeled fairly easily, but private marginal
benefits are unknown. Our study fills the gap in knowledge by directly estimating
demand.
Social damages
Social damages from groundwater extraction come first through the depletion of the
resource. Groundwater extraction by one user generally leads directly to a decline
in water levels for other users. The precise relationship between extraction and
water levels depends on geology, topography, soil, rainfall, and climate. Deeper
groundwater levels raise the cost of extraction, which can lead to increases in poverty
and conflict (Sekhri (2014)). Depletion can also degrade water quality, either through
inherent local properties of soil and geology, or by drawing in seawater from the ocean
in coastal areas.
These externalities can be complex and difficult to estimate, since the spatial
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extent of the extraction externality varies greatly across locations. Depending on
geology, in some areas, the externality may fall almost entirely on a small group
of neighbors, in which case Coasian bargaining may sometimes be able to govern
the aquifer efficiently. However, in many areas, and especially over longer periods
of time, the externality is felt over a very large area, making local cooperation less
likely to be sustained.
Another major source of social damages, which is easier to measure, is the costs
associated with the energy required to pump groundwater to the surface. Typical
energy sources are electricity and diesel, both of which create greenhouse gases and air
pollution. In many developing countries, including almost all states of India, political
pressure constrains governments to provide electricity to agricultural customers at
a marginal price of zero. In this case, the social marginal damages of groundwater
extraction include the marginal cost of electricity provision by the electric utility.
Demand
Private marginal costs in the short run can be modeled reasonably easily: they de-
pend on the price of fuel (which may be zero), water levels, and pump characteristics.
In the long run - that is, over large changes in water levels - discontinuities in private
marginal costs may arise from deepening wells or purchasing new pump hardware.
Private marginal benefits of groundwater extraction are more difficult to esti-
mate since they depend on the agricultural production function and any non-profit-
maximizing behavior by farmers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, especially in
developing countries, water inputs often exceed yield- and profit-maximizing levels.
Instead of measuring inputs precisely, some farmers simply flood their fields - which
would suggest that private marginal benefits are low at the current equilibrium.
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Because these private benefits are difficult to model, we instead directly estimate
groundwater demand using a revealed-preference approach, in which we observe how
quantity extracted changes with price.
3.2.3 Conservation credits as a Pigouvian tax
Our objective is to estimate groundwater demand by varying the price of extraction.
As an external party lacking the power of the state, we cannot require irrigators to
pay a tax. Instead, we offer payments for reduced water extraction, relative to a
benchmark amount - an intervention called "conservation credits." This interven-
tion provides the same marginal incentives as a Pigouvian tax, at least for some
participants.
Figure 3-2 illustrates the budget set of the conservation credits contract. Two
thresholds are set: a benchmark, and a maximum payment. If the irrigator ex-
tracts a greater quantity than the benchmark, the payment is zero. If the irrigator
conserves water relative to the benchmark, the payment equals the price times the
difference between the quantity and the benchmark. If the irrigator conserves very
large amounts of water, the maximum payment may be reached, after which further
conservation does not increase the payment.
Under a Pigouvian tax, all irrigators are marginal to the incentive, in the sense
that any positive quantity extracted is subject to a per-unit price. Under conserva-
tion credits, many irrigators are marginal, but not all. To see this, Figure 3-2 plots
quasi-linear indifference curves over groundwater extraction (including both the pri-
vate benefits and costs) and payments of conservation credits. Without conservation
credits, the budget set is flat and coincides with the x-axis; with conservation credits,
the budget set is piecewise linear. Irrigator A is marginal: her indifference curves
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are tangent to the x-axis at q6 and tangent to the conservation credits budget set at
q1, indicating that she will reduce groundwater extraction when eligible for conser-
vation credits. Irrigator B is extra-marginal: his indifference curves are tangent to
both budget sets at qB, indicating that he will not reduce extraction in response to
conservation credits.
3.2.4 Equivalence between water, energy, and pumping time
Some of the costs and benefits discussed so far are in units of water quantity, while
others are in units of energy consumed. In data collection, our main outcome of
interest will be a third unit: pumping time. These three objects are closely related
and can be converted using mechanical formulas:
E x t q P7 X t (3.1)
E M kh
where E is energy consumed, q is quantity of water pumped, and t is duration of
pump operation. P is the power rating of the pump's motor ("brake horsepower").
r/m and Ti are the motor and pump efficiencies; they are unitless, between zero and
one. h is the total hydraulic head, approximately equal to the depth to water level
(plus friction and outlet pressure). k is a conversion constant, equal to 3960-1 when
q is in gallons, P is in horsepower, t is in minutes, and head is in feet.
Slopes of demand can be related similarly by differentiating both sides of the
formulas in Equation 3.1. The price elasticities of demand for water, energy, and
hours are equal.
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3.3 Study Setting and Experimental Design
To estimate groundwater demand, we will implement a randomized controlled trial
among groundwater-irrigating farmers in Gujarat, India. The trial will have two
overarching treatment arms: conservation credit farmers will be eligible to receive
payments for conserving groundwater below a benchmark, whereas control farmers
will receive no such incentives.
3.3.1 Setting
Our trial will be implemented in Saurashtra, a water-scarce region of Gujarat state,
India. The study villages are located in coastal areas of Talaja block in Bhavnagar
district, where falling groundwater levels lead not only to increased irrigation costs,
but also to increased risk of seawater intrusion into the freshwater aquifer. Salinity
levels in Talaja aquifers are already extremely high (Central Ground Water Board
(2013)), with 60% of villages either prone to increased salinity or already partially
or fully saline, 2 reducing the ability of farmers to grow high-value crops (Samadhan
E Cube Innovator Pvt. Ltd. (2016)).
The primary source of employment in Talaja block is in agriculture (Registrar
General and Census Commissioner of India (2001)). The literacy rate is low com-
pared to the rest of India, at approximately 44%. In addition, households are rela-
tively large, with an average household size of 5.7 individuals (compared to 4.7 across
India). Only 3% of individuals are from Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. Agri-
cultural land is primarily irrigated by groundwater (47%), although 28% is surface-
water irrigated, and the remaining 25% is rain-fed (Registrar General and Census
2 Prone-to-saline indicates average total dissolved salt (TDS) concentration >500mg/L, partially
saline from 1000 to 2000 mg/L, and fully saline > 2000 mg/L.
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Commissioner of India (2011)).
3.3.2 Enrollment
We will recruit our sample from 44 study villages. The study villages were selected
by our implementing partner, the Coastal Salinity Prevention Cell (CSPC). CSPC
is not yet working in these villages, but plans to roll out a number of programs
beginning in 2018, ranging from health to agricultural development interventions.
The sample in each village will be randomly selected from eligible households of
landowning villagers who are willing to participate, following the procedure developed
in our pilot study. The sample frame will be formed on the basis of official village
landowner lists, which can be obtained from the village talati (accountant). These
lists include all land-owning villagers as of the date of the list (and sometimes include
other information, such as landholding size and location). CSPC will augment the
village list with phone numbers 3 through its network of village extension volunteers
(local villagers who carry out simple organizational tasks for a small stipend).
Random sampling will be conducted as follows. First, each name on a village list
will be assigned a random number. Surveyors will call and/or visit individuals on
the list, in the order of the number assigned, to determine if the primary agricultural
decision-maker (PAD) in the household meets the study eligibility criteria, and is
willing to participate in the study. Surveyors will then visit the eligible and willing
PADs to obtain informed consent for enrollment in the study.
In order to be eligible for the study, the household's PAD must meet the following
criteria:
3A survey funded by CSPC in Talaja and neighboring Gogha block in 2016 revealed 78% of
farming households owned at least one phone.
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Inclusion Criteria
" Also be the primary agricultural decision maker for the land owned by the
household.
" In the previous Rabi (winter) season:
- Must have planted crops.
- Must have irrigated at least one farm using primarily groundwater.
- Must have solely used an electric-powered pump for this purpose.
" Must plan to farm and irrigate during the next Rabi season.
Exclusion Criteria
* May not have a diesel pump in use on the primary water source.
* May not have multiple pumps, or pump starters, in use on the primary irriga-
tion source (i.e. well).
Farmers who meet the eligibility criteria, complete a baseline survey, and consent
to the full study will be enrolled.
3.3.3 Sample size
We plan to draw a total sample of 2,200 well-owning farmers, equally divided between
treatment and control groups. These choices are based on power calculations using
meter reading data from a pilot of 90 farmers (the pilot is more fully described
in Section 3.6). Our primary object of interest is the intent-to-treat estimate: the
average treatment effect of eligibility for conservation credits on the duration of
180
pump operation. We measure this as the difference in group means of total pumping
hours after partialing out strata and month effects. This is likely conservative, since
individual-level time-varying covariates may be able to improve efficiency.
First, we divide the sample between treatment groups equally, since the primary
object of interest is a simple difference in means. Assuming equal variance in the
outcome variable across treatment groups (which our pilot data cannot reject), power
is maximized at a treatment proportion of 0.5.
Second, we calculate the sample size required for a minimum detectable effect of
10 percent of the sample mean pumping hours, at a power of 0.9. This is the sample
size required to reject a null hypothesis of no effect with 90 percent probability when
the true effect is 10 percent of the mean. We choose 10 percent because it is a salient
and quantitatively reasonable threshold. From pilot data, the conditional variance
of total pumping hours (i.e., after partialing out several baseline covariates) is 0.47.
The required sample size is then 1,990. Allowing for an approximately 10 percent
attrition rate,4 the total sample to be recruited is 2,200.
Figure 3-3 plots full power curves using the pilot data for a range of sample sizes
and minimum detectable effects.
3.3.4 Randomization
Randomization will be stratified by village and forecasted hours of irrigation. Specif-
ically, the final sample within each village will be divided into above- and below-
median forecasted hours of irrigation, creating two equally-sized cells in each village.
Farmers in each cell will then be randomly allocated to one of two treatment arms
4 This is larger than the 2 percent attrition in the pilot; we are conservative about attrition due
to the increased duration of the planned experiment compared to the pilot, to 18 months from 5
months.
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using a pseudo-random number generator (Stata software): 50% will be allocated to
the Conservation Credit arm, and 50% to the Control arm. Within the Conservation
Credit arm, we will cross-randomize both the benchmark below which individuals
are incentivized between a high and low option, and the size of the marginal con-
servation incentive between a high and low option, resulting in four equally-sized
sub-treatments (Figure 3-4). The intervention will run for approximately 18 months,
from randomization in late summer 2018, until the final meter readings are completed
in February, 2020.
3.3.5 Interventions
Conservation credits
Participants in the Conservation Credits arm will have an hours-of-use meter installed
on the electric pump starter of their primary irrigation source. The meter measures
the total hours of irrigation done by the farmer. Meters will be read monthly by
CSPC village extension volunteers.
Farmers will be incentivized for conserving water for five months of the Rabi
season, from September-January, across two consecutive years. This is the period of
peak irrigation; as there is typically no rainfall during Rabi, agriculture is entirely
dependent on irrigation. At each meter reading, farmers are informed of their bench-
mark for the following month, and the payment for the previous month is calculated.
Payments are awarded at a fixed rate for consuming fewer hours of irrigation than
the monthly benchmark, according the formula:
Paymentt = max (0, pricei x ((hours benchmark)it - (hours consumed)it)) (3.2)
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where pricei is the per-hour incentive rate, (hours benchmark)it is an individual-
month-specific benchmark, and (hours consumed)it is the monthly meter reading.
The payments are later disbursed as checks.
Conservation Credit Sub-treatments
The four Conservation Credits sub-treatments differ along two dimensions: the per-
hour incentive rate, and the benchmark. Individuals assigned a high price receive 40
INR (0.61 USD) per hour conserved, and those assigned a low price receive 20 INR
(0.31 USD) per hour conserved. The prices were chosen to be realistic estimates of
the groundwater price that a policymaker might wish to set. The prices are similar
to the cost of electricity provision for the median farmer, which is approximately 30
INR per hour of use (authors' calculation). 5
Individuals assigned the high and low benchmark receive 125% and 75%, respec-
tively, of their forecasted monthly hours of irrigation. The monthly hours of irrigation
forecast used to set benchmarks (and to stratify randomization) will be created from
baseline survey data collected before the program is introduced. The survey col-
lects the self-reported duration of irrigation in the previous year's Rabi season by
asking for the number of irrigations made during Rabi, the average duration of each
irrigation, and the first and last irrigation dates. This method of constructing bench-
marks is potentially liable to manipulation: if farmers know how survey answers will
be used, we might expect farmers to artificially inflate their reported irrigation to
increase their expected conservation credit payment. Because farmers will not yet
know the program details at baseline, we do not foresee manipulation in our set-
5A rate of 30 INR per hour is approximately equal to the unsubsidized average cost of electricity
supply in Gujarat for the power rating of a typical pumpset in the pilot region. That is: (5
INR/kWh average cost of electricity provision in Gujarat) * (6.2 HP average pump brake power) /
(74% typical motor efficiency) * (0.75 kW/HP conversion factor) ~ 31 INR/hr.
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ting. However, any scaled-up program would have to rely on a different method of
benchmark setting, such as collecting actual usage data.
Control
Participants in the Control arm will also have an hours-of-use meter installed and
read monthly for 18 months. However, these farmers will not be incentivized for
conservation.
3.4 Data
3.4.1 Data collection
In order to conduct our analysis, we will collect four datasets. First, we will con-
duct a baseline survey with both self-reported and field measurement components
prior to randomizing participants into treatments. Self-reported data will include
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, such as landholding size and house-
hold size; cropping, crop management, and irrigation decisions in the previous year;
the power of the primary pumpset, and water conservation strategies and attitudes.
Field measurements will include the precise geolocation, depth-to-water and salinity
levels (i.e., total dissolved solids) of each well on the participant's largest farm. All
data will be collected electronically through tablet surveys.
Second, we will directly measure groundwater pumping for all study participants,
using hours-of-use meters installed on the pump starter of each participant's primary
irrigation source.6 Village extension workers will record meter readings each month
using a digital tablet survey. Meter data quality will be assured through random au-
6Analog hours-of-use meters manufactured by Nishant Engineers (model: NE53/6S).
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dits, in which a research associate will compare the digitally recorded meter readings
with dated, geo-located photographs of the meter dial included on the tablet survey.
Our third and fourth datasets will be collected in two endline surveys, one after
each Rabi season. These two tablet-based surveys will collect the same field mea-
surements and retrospective self-reported information as the baseline survey, as well
as specific questions on changes to irrigation behavior and new technology adoption.
Finally, we will collect a supplementary dataset of water and energy consumption,
measured simultaneously with hours of use. We will use this dataset us to calibrate
pump and motor efficiencies under realistic conditions similar to our study sample,
which in turn will allow us to convert between our measured hours of irrigation and
the water and energy equivalents. For each major pump and motor type in our
sample, we will select small calibration sub-samples and compare hours of irrigation
with readings from both a portable electricity meter and an ultrasonic water flow
meter.
3.4.2 Data processing
To assess the response of groundwater irrigation to water prices, our primary outcome
will be monthly hours of groundwater irrigation. Hours of irrigation during each
meter-reading period will calculated as the difference between total hours consumed
at the end and beginning of the period. For individuals whose meters have been
disconnected following the drying of a well, hours will be recorded as usual (i.e.
according to the meter dial). For individuals whose meters are otherwise tampered
with (e.g. if the meter is disconnected or broken but the well is not dry), hours will
be recorded as missing. Because meter-reading periods may vary slightly over time
and across individuals, we will normalize the measured hours of irrigation in each
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period by the number of days in the period.
We will construct two secondary outcomes, water consumption and energy con-
sumption, from hours of irrigation using the conversion formulas in Equation 3.1.
Pump and motor efficiencies will be imputed based on pump and motor type from
the dataset of pump and motor efficiencies, pump power will be collected in sur-
veys, and monthly depth-to-water will be interpolated from baseline and endline
measurements.
Other secondary outcomes will be measured in each of the two endline surveys.
One group of outcomes measures the environmental and economic follow-on effects of
water conservation. We will assess environmental impacts through measured water
depth and salinity levels in the metered wells, and economic impacts through self-
reported crop yields for selected crops, crop revenue, and farm profits in the Rabi
season. Crop yields will be measured through questions asking the total kg of crops
harvested, crop revenue will be measured as self-reported price per kg times quantity
sold, and total profit will be measured both through a direct elicitation and by
subtracting total reported costs from total revenues.
Another group of outcomes sheds light on the mechanisms through which water
conservation may be affected: through adopting efficient irrigation technology, shift-
ing to less water-intensive cropping patterns, or simply through irrigating less. To
measure irrigation technology adoption, we will collect self-reported data on techno-
logical water conservation measures taken (such as micro-irrigation, alternate furrow
irrigation, or mulching). We then create two technological water conservation out-
comes: a dummy variable for whether any measure was taken, and an index of
z-scores following Kling et al. (2007) where we set less intensive measures to 1 if a
more intensive but mutually exclusive measure was taken (e.g. if alternate furrow
is used, we set furrow to 1, since alternate furrow is a more intensive conservation
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strategy than furrow alone and the two are mutually exclusive). To measure changes
in the water-intensity of planted crops, we both measure gross cropped area, and we
will create an index of crop water requirements using data on cropped area and crop
choice, parameterized by agronomic estimates of optimal water application rates. To
understand the margins over which individuals adjust irrigation, we will measure
irrigated area, irrigation frequency, and irrigation intensity.
A third group of outcomes investigates the possibility that conservation credits,
as implemented on only one well, could cause farmers to substitute to other wells
or water sources - a form of what is known as "leakage" in the PES literature. We
will assess these substitution patterns with five outcomes: an indicator for the use
of any other non-metered irrigation source, the area irrigated from other ground and
surface water sources, and an estimate of irrigation water volume drawn from other
ground and surface water sources (derived by multiplying together irrigated area,
irrigation frequency, and irrigation intensity).
3.5 Analysis Plan
After checking for balance between treatment groups and attrition status, our anal-
ysis will proceed in three steps. First, we will report evidence on how individuals
respond to groundwater prices through intent-to-treat (ITT) analysis of the conser-
vation credits intervention as a whole. Second, we will estimate a model of demand
for groundwater irrigation, using the price variation induced by our experiment in
an instrumental variables strategy. Third, we will analyze the cost-effectiveness of
the intervention from the perspective of a budget-constrained electric utility, by es-
timating the cost per unit of energy conserved.
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3.5.1 Balance checks
Treatment Groups We will report baseline characteristics of the experimental
sample in each treatment group including, but not necessarily limited to: household
size, age of primary agricultural decision-maker, farm size (hectares), primary Rabi
crop (including long-duration cotton planted before Rabi onset), irrigation technol-
ogy, irrigation intensity, the power of the metered pumpset, and the depth-to-water
and total dissolved solids in the metered well. We will test for balance using Wald
test for the hypothesis that there is no difference between any of these variables in
treatment and control groups.
Attrition. We will next test for potential differential attrition in treatment and
control in each of our hours-or-irrigation and endline datasets. First, we will assess
whether missing observations in each dataset are equally prevalent in treatment and
control groups. Second, we will check for balance in missing and non-missing data
using the same baseline characteristics as in our treatment balance checks. In the
case that we find evidence of differential attrition of either kind, we will report bounds
for all treatment effects following Lee (2009).
3.5.2 Program evaluation via intent-to-treat estimates
Primary statistical model. We will first report intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates of
the effects of the conservation credits intervention as a whole, regardless of the specific
sub-treatments. These estimates can be interpreted as a reduced-form measure of
whether individuals respond to water prices. Each outcome variable will be compared
between treatment (all farmers receiving any form of conservation credits) and control
(farmers not receiving conservation credits). We will use ordinary least squares to
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estimate a monthly panel regression of the following form:
Yt = a + (Conservation Credits)i + X>- + pt + Eit, (3.3)
where Y is an outcome variable for farmer i in month t, (Conservation Credits)i
is an indicator for being in one of the conservation treatment groups, pUt are month
fixed effects, and X2, is a vector of individual-specific covariates (with time subscripts
because some will be interacted with month indicators).
Covariates will include stratification variables (village indicators and an indicator
for being above or below median forecasted hours of irrigation) interacted with month
indicators. Covariates will also include baseline characteristics; to avoid overfitting
and cherry-picking, we will use the double-LASSO method (following Belloni et al.,
2013) to choose covariates from a high-dimensional set of variables derived from
the baseline survey and other pre-randomization data. As a secondary specification,
results will also be shown without these baseline characteristics. In all models, we will
use cluster-robust standard errors, clustering by individual, to correct for arbitrary
correlation in outcomes within individual across months. To increase power, we will
exclude any month in which less than 50% of the control group has nonzero, non-
missing observations - we try to schedule our program in months where pumping is
the norm, but an unusual rainfall pattern may lead to unexpectedly low pumping in
program months.
Primary outcome variable. The primary outcome variable will be hours of pump
operation in each month of meter reading. Because the true functional form of the
treatment effect is unknown, we will consider three specifications of this outcome
variable. The first two are the untransformed hours of operation and its inverse
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hyperbolic sine (Asinh) transformation. These transformations will estimate the
treatment effect more precisely if it is, respectively, constant (i.e., everyone reduces
by an equal number of hours) or proportional (i.e., everyone reduces by an equal
percentage of their hours absent the intervention). Regression coefficients from an
Asinh transformation can be interpreted similarly as a natural log transformation
(i.e., as proportional changes). We choose the Asinh over the natural log because the
Asinh admits zeroes, unlike the natural log, albeit in a particular functional form.
We will also consider a third specification in which the dependent variable is the
natural log of total hours of pump operation across all months of potential payments
within each year, and farmers who never pump at all (likely a small number) are
excluded. This specification models a proportional treatment effect but reduces the
influence of the functional form choice for handling individual monthly zeros, by
combining zero and nonzero observations into a single total. The downside is that
this specification may cost some power; the time period is interpreted as one year
instead of one month, so covariates cannot vary by month.
We are interested in both whether the program had an effect and the quantitative
magnitude of the effect. To answer the first question, we will conduct one-sided t-
tests (ce = 0.05), in which the alternative hypothesis (Ha) is that the program had
a negative effect on pumping duration, and the null hypothesis (Ho) is that the
program had a zero or positive effect. Because having three versions of the primary
outcome constitutes multiple hypothesis testing, we will adjust the p-values using the
free step-down approach of Westfall and Young (1993) following Kling et al. (2007).
To reduce the influence of outliers, final variables (after any transformations) will
be winsorized by replacing extreme outliers with the next most extreme value. We
define extreme outliers as values exceeding the third quartile plus three times the
interquartile range, of the nonzero values of the same variable.
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Secondary statistical models. In addition to the basic linear regression specifi-
cation, we will show results from three other models. First, to investigate seasonal
patterns in treatment effects, we will augment the primary regression to include time-
varying (i.e., month-specific) treatment effects. Second, to more explicitly distinguish
between the intensive and extensive margin of irrigation, we will apply a dynamic
unobserved effects Tobit Type II model for censored values. Third, to reduce reliance
on functional form, we will study the treatment effects across the full distribution us-
ing quantile regressions. We will simultaneously estimate quantile treatment effects
at the 19 quantiles {0.05, 0.10, ... , 0.95}, obtaining standard errors via bootstrap to
account for correlation across quantiles, using the following form:
Qy (T) = a + (Conservation Credits)i + X' + ,Ut + Eit (3.4)
Secondary outcome variables. In addition to the primary outcome variable, we
will use Equation 3.3 to examine the effects of the intervention on several other out-
comes. These will enable us to better understand (1) the impacts as measured in
units of energy and water, (2) whether the intervention has any measurable environ-
mental or economic impacts, (3) the particular mechanisms through which farmers
reduce water consumption, and (4) whether the intervention induced substitution
("leakage") to other water sources. The precise variables follow, with details of con-
struction in Section 3.4.2:
1. Unit conversions: Implied energy consumption; implied water consumption (for
each: monthly, monthly Asinh, and natural log of yearly totals).
2. Environmental impacts: Depth to water level; total dissolved solids.
3. Economic impacts: Crop revenue; farm profits (for each: level, Asinh, and both
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per hectare).
4. Mechanisms: Water conservation measures; gross cropped area; crop water
intensity; gross irrigated area; irrigation frequency; irrigation intensity.
5. Leakage: Use of other irrigation sources; gross area irrigated by other sources,
water volume used for irrigation from other sources.
Because secondary outcomes will be measured annually following each Rabi sea-
son, in these regressions, the time period in Equation 3.3 will be interpreted as one
year instead of one month. For the outcomes in the unit conversion and economic
impact categories, we will adjust p-values category-wise using the same method as for
the primary outcomes. For the outcomes in the environmental impact, mechanism,
and leakage categories, we plan not to adjust the p-values, because each outcome
answers a different question, and they are not measures by which we will judge the
overall success of the intervention. All variables will be winsorized in the same way
as the primary variables.
Heterogeneity. We also will analyze treatment effect heterogeneity according to
baseline characteristics in order to further assess mechanisms of conservation and the
feasibility of better targeting the program. These analyses will involve a variation of
the regression in Equation 3.3, in which the treatment indicator is interacted with
an exhaustive set of indicators in a particular category. Three of these categories
will be: (1) whether the farmer is a medium or large landowner (defined as owning
more than 2 hectares of land), (2) whether the farmer had previously invested in
micro-irrigation technology such as sprinkler or drip irrigation, and (3) whether the
farmer shares their primary irrigation source with others.
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Two additional heterogeneity analyses will serve as indirect tests of leakage. The
idea of these tests is to check whether the treatment effect is larger in areas where
there are more opportunities for leakage to other groundwater sources. Specifically,
we would expect to see more leakage in areas where more un-priced groundwater
is available. In these tests, we will interact the treatment indicator with (1) an
indicator for whether the farmer has unmetered groundwater sources (a proxy for
the availability of on-farm unpriced groundwater), and (2) the number of neighboring
farms that have a groundwater source but are not enrolled in the conservation credit
treatment (a proxy for the availability of off-farm unpriced groundwater). In both
cases, a positive interaction coefficient is evidence of leakage. Unlike the direct tests,
which compare water use from secondary groundwater sources among treated and
untreated farmers, the indirect tests have the advantage that they do not rely on
self-reported data.
3.5.3 Demand estimation via instrumental variables
Our second analysis will estimate a model of demand for groundwater irrigation. We
will use a linear regression to predict duration of pump operation:
Yit = a + pit + Xi7 + Pt + Eit (3.5)
where pit E {0, 20, 40} indicates the marginal cost of an hour of irrigation for
farmer i in month t, and pt are month fixed effects. Again, Xit is a vector of
individual-specific covariates including stratification variables interacted with month
indicators, plus baseline characteristics chosen by double-LASSO. Standard errors
will be clustered by individual.
We will estimate Equation 3.5 by two-stage least squares to correct for endogene-
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ity in price. Note that while Control farmers always face a price of 0, Conservation
Credits farmers in the low price sub-treatments face a price of either 0 or 20, and those
in high price sub-treatments face a price of either 0 or 40, depending on whether their
consumption is above or below their benchmark. This introduces endogeneity into
Equation 3.5: in the Conservation Credit treatment, positive consumption shocks Eit
are mechanically correlated with zero prices, biasing OLS estimates of ,B downward.
To boost precision in this estimate while avoiding overfitting and weak instru-
ments concerns, we will apply the instrumental variables LASSO method of Belloni
et al. (2012). Our set of candidate instruments will consist of indicators for each
of the four conservation credit sub-treatments, and their interactions with baseline
characteristics. The final set of instruments will be chosen from this candidate set
by the algorithm. As a secondary specification, we will also show results using only
the four sub-treatment indicators as instruments.
The IV estimate of 0 can be interpreted as a local average treatment effect of our
experimental price variation on those farmers whose marginal consumption is priced.
Our methodology is in the spirit of quasi-experimental estimates of the elasticity of
taxable income from non-linear budget sets (as summarized by Saez et al., 2012) and
of electricity demand (Ito, 2014).
The exclusion restriction for these instruments is that the Conservation Credit
sub-treatment does not affect consumption except through the actual price of irri-
gation. This assumption will be violated if the Conservation Credit sub-treatments
affect consumption even for farmers who do not face positive marginal incentives in
a given month - for example, if they attempt to conserve below the benchmark but
fail to reach their target. This is one limitation of our empirical strategy.
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Outcome variables. The primary outcome variable will be hours of pump opera-
tion as measured in meter readings. We will consider the same three specifications as
in the intent-to-treat analysis, adjusting p-values in the same way: (1) the untrans-
formed measure in each month, (2) an inverse hyperbolic sine (Asinh) transformation,
and (3) the natural log of the yearly total hours. Secondary outcome variables will be
the unit conversions: implied water consumption, and implied energy consumption.
Heterogeneity analysis. We will again explore the first three dimensions of het-
erogeneity for demand as for intent-to-treat effects: farm size, micro-irrigation tech-
nology, and well sharing.
3.5.4 Cost-effectiveness
Our third analysis will consider the cost-effectiveness of the conservation credits
intervention as implemented in the study. Because groundwater conservation yields
the side benefit of reduced electricity demand, a conservation credits program could
be implemented by a budget-constrained electric utility under one condition: that
the cost of the energy conserved is larger than the cost of the program. We explore
the viability of this idea through three questions. For each, we will report answers for
the program as a whole, as well as the low price treatment group alone (discarding
data from the high price treatment group).
Question 1. What is the minimum marginal cost of electricity for which the program
could be implemented by an electric utility with a budget-balance constraint?
For each unit of energy conserved through the program, an implementing electric
utility reduces its costs by the marginal cost of electricity. Therefore, the minimum
marginal cost (for which the program is viable) is equal to the average cost of the
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program per unit energy conserved. This will be calculated using the following
formula:
Cost per unit energy conserved = Total monthly expenditures (3.6)
Total monthly energy conserved
Total monthly expenditures will be tabulated from program data. To estimate total
monthly energy conserved, we will multiply the linear treatment effect of the pro-
gram on energy consumption (from the intent-to-treat analysis) by the number of
participants in the treatment group. To obtain a confidence interval that allows for
correlation between the numerator and denominator, we will bootstrap the treat-
ment effect and expenditures together, stratifying resampling draws on treatment
assignment. Note that a limitation of this confidence interval is that it will ignore
uncertainty in pump efficiencies.
Question 2. At the best estimate of actual marginal costs faced by electric utilities in
India, could the program be implemented by an electric utility with a budget-balance
constraint?
To answer this question, we will conduct a literature review on the marginal
costs of electricity provision in India and arrive at a best estimate of the typical
marginal cost prior to performing these calculations. Then, we will conduct a one-
tailed bootstrap test (a = 0.05), where the null hypothesis that the cost per unit
energy conserved is greater than or equal to this marginal cost, while the alternative
hypothesis is that the cost per unit energy conserved is less than this marginal cost
(revenue-positive). Ignoring uncertainty in the marginal cost estimate, we will draw
1,000 bootstrap samples and count the number in which the cost per unit energy
conserved exceeds the marginal cost of electricity. The null hypothesis is rejected if
this condition is met for fewer than 950 draws (95 percent).
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Question 3. What is the minimum subsidy per unit of energy that an electric utility
with a budget-balance constraint would require to implement the program?
We will consider this question only if the answer to Question 2 is no (i.e., we
fail to reject the null hypothesis). Even if a conservation credits program does not
pay for itself through electricity cost savings, a government placing social value on
groundwater conservation may be willing to subsidize the program. We will calculate
the minimum necessary subsidy by subtracting the estimated cost of the program
per unit energy conserved from the best estimate of the marginal cost of electricity.
Again ignoring uncertainty in the marginal cost estimate, the confidence interval will
be calculated in the same way as in Question 1.
3.6 Pilot Results
We conducted a small pilot of this experiment among 90 farmers in three villages in
a nearby district of the same state (Khambhalia, Gujarat). This pilot informed the
experimental design in four ways.
Demonstrates logistical feasibility. The pilot shows that the intervention can
be successfully implemented among a similar population as the experimental sample.
First, farmers were broadly willing to participate, voluntarily accept hours-of-use
meters and agree to monthly meter readings. Of 144 farmers randomly sampled
from village rosters, 100% agreed to allow us to install a meter on their pump. Of 90
farmers meeting eligibility criteria, meters were successfully installed for 100%. Of
the same group, one withdrew during the intervention, yielding a 99% completion
rate.
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Second, meter tampering is difficult and appeared to be minimal. The meter itself
is sealed, with no controls other than a reset button (which can be easily detected
after a first reading). Disconnection is not simple and leaves indications in the form
of uncoiled wires; only two farmers showed evidence of having disconnected and
reconnected in the same month. Third, farmers appear to understand the program;
during the initial intervention visit, farmers were asked questions designed to measure
comprehension and corrected if necessary; surveyors reported a subjective assessment
that most farmers understood the program very well.
Improvements in intervention design. The pilot yielded several ideas for im-
proving the effectiveness and power of the intervention that we will incorporate into
the experiment. First, 20 percent of farmers permanently disconnected their me-
ters following their last irrigation of the season. However, disconnecting the meter
disqualified treatment group farmers from receiving payments, so the disconnections
were highly concentrated in the control group (14 of 18). To ensure accurate data
from the control group, all farmers will be offered a small financial reward to keep
their meter connected through the end of the meter-reading period.
Second, the experiment will focus on months and geographical regions in which
the vast majority of farmers have access to groundwater (i.e., without deepening a
well). In the pilot, 29 percent of meter readings showed zero consumption, a pattern
that rose to 50 percent by the end of the pilot. Discussion with farmers revealed
that many had stopped pumping because their well had gone dry. These zeros
substantially reduced statistical power (by increasing the variance of the outcome
variable), and paying farmers whose well had gone dry was perceived to be unfair by
the implementing partner. For the experiment, the geographical region was chosen in
part because it has more reliable water availability. In addition, conservation credits
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will be paid during a more limited number of months (those in which a large majority
of farmers are known to irrigate crops).
Sample size calculations. Neither water consumption nor our proxy, hours of
pump operation, is often measured at the farm level in India, and so our pilot mea-
surements represent a contribution in themselves. Figure 3-5 plots the full distri-
bution of monthly measurements of pump operation time across all farmers in our
pilot. The variance is much larger than initially expected, which informed our power
calculations and led us to revise upward the sample size of the experiment.
Suggests conservation credits may yield the expected effects. While the
pilot has low statistical power and cannot yield precise results, analysis is not incon-
sistent with the intervention having the expected direction of response and a large
effect magnitude. Figure 3-6 plots the mean number of hours pumped per month
of the pilot. Before the price incentive was introduced, farmers in the treatment
group pumped for more mean hours than those in control; after conservation credits
began, the treatment group pumped for fewer mean hours than control each month
(although none of these differences are statistically significant).
To quantify these differences, Table 3.1 shows the results of linear regressions
following Equation 3.3, with each column including a different set of covariates.
Point estimates suggest that eligibility for conservation credits induces a practically
large reduction in pumping hours: a 32 percent decrease on a control-group mean
of 38 hours per month. Although these point estimates are imprecise (confidence
intervals include both zero and some positive values), they appear to be stable across
specifications.
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3.7 Conclusion
This chapter presents an experimental protocol to estimate the demand response to
groundwater pricing in irrigated agriculture in a region of Gujarat, India. To estimate
demand, the study will introduce random variation in prices through an intervention
that offers payments for groundwater conservation relative to a benchmark quantity.
We show how to use our demand estimate - given a marginal social damages function
- to calculate the optimal Pigouvian groundwater tax in our setting. The optimal
quantity of groundwater conservation could be achieved through a marginal incentive
on either agricultural electricity, groundwater, or duration of pump operation.
Our study will also evaluate the effectiveness of conservation credits, a second-
best policy solution similar to "payments for environmental services" programs. In
many settings, Pigouvian taxes may be politically infeasible. By exchanging correc-
tive subsidies for taxes, this program overcomes the political barriers to taxing the
agricultural sector, while still introducing marginal incentives for conservation. This
may be a promising policy approach for reducing inefficient groundwater extraction.
Conservation credits, however, are generally not efficient, unless benchmarks can
be perfectly targeted or revenue constraints do not bind. Some farmers are likely to
be extra-marginal: their extraction is so far beyond their benchmark that they do
not benefit from conservation. This raises another important question: what is the
optimal conservation credit program that a donor or government would be willing
to implement? Evaluating this question, given the goals and constraints of a funder,
depends not only on aggregate groundwater demand, but also on the distribution
of utilization across farmers. Future research may be able to use variation in the
program design parameters, like that introduced in this study, to make progress on
this question.
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3.8 Figures
Price
D(q) = PMB(q) - PMC(q)
D(q) - p* SMD(q)
p *- -- - -
qO Quantity
Extracted
Figure 3-1: Price regulation for groundwater management.
This figure shows how price regulation can be used to achieve the optimal groundwater quantity
extracted. Inverse demand for groundwater D(q) is the difference between private marginal benefits
PMB(q) and private marginal costs PMC(q); groundwater extraction also creates social marginal
damages SMD(q). Without regulation (i.e., at a price of zero), irrigators will consume the amount
where demand meets the x-axis, qo. When the price is set to p*, the value of social marginal
damages when it equals demand, irrigators will internalize the social damages, shifting effective
demand down such that they instead consume the optimal quantity q*.
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Payment
maximum IC1 A
payment Slope: p
/C'Ca/ /CB
Quantity q1 A qoA benchmark qB Quantity
Conserved Extracted
Figure 3-2: Budget set of conservation credits.
This figure shows the general form of the budget set created by a conservation credit program,
along with indifference curves of two representative participants. The payment equals the price p
times the quantity units conserved below the benchmark, up to a maximum payment. Irrigator
A is marginal and will respond to the program by reducing quantity extracted. Irrigator B is
extra-marginal, and does not change quantity extraction in response to the program.
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Power calculations: Conservation Credits
Model: Linear OLS.
0n=3000
0
N n=4000M ~n= tOOO
C -D
0
.0
0.05 .1 .15 .2 .25
Minimum detectable effect (proportion of sample mean)
Variance of meter reading totals from pilot of 90 farmers, after partialing out baseline controls.
Figure 3-3: Power curves for a range of sample sizes and minimum detectable effects.
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Listed in village talat lists (n=
Assessed for eligibility (n=
Excluded (n=
* Ineligible (n=
* Refused consent (n=
* Incomplete Baseline (n=)
* Other reasons (n=
Randomized (n=
Completed Endline (n= )
Discontinued intervention (n=
Lost to follow-up (n=)
Analysed (n=
* Attrition (n= )
* Never farmed in Rabi (n=)
AflQation Allocated to Conservation Credits (Pr=.5, n=
Subtreatments:
* Low Price, Low Benchmark (Probability = .25)
* Low Price, High Benchmark (Probability = .25)
+ High Price, Low Benchmark (Probability = .25)
* High Price, High Benchmark (Probability = .25)
Follow-Up
Ana"tyss
Figure 3-4: Experimental design
Notes: This figure displays the design of a randomized experiment to estimate the demand response
to agricultural groundwater prices.
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Allocated to Control (Pr=.5, n=
Completed Endline (n=
Discontinued intervention (n=
Lost to follow-up (n=)
Analysed (n=
* Attrition (n=)
* Never farmed in Rabi (n=)F
Distribution of hours pumped (in pilot data)
0
1
Figure 3-5:
months
0 100 200 300
Monthly hours pumped
400 500
Distribution of monthly hours of groundwater irrigation, pooled across
Notes: This figure plots the histogram of the monthly hours of groundwater irrigation measured
in the 2017-2018 Rabi season (October-February) in our pilot study of 90 farmers in Khambaliya,
Gujarat.
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Figure 3-6: Event study
Notes: This figure plots the average monthly hours of groundwater irrigation among farmers in our
pilot experiment over the winter 2017-2018 program. The bars denote the standard errors of the
mean.
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3.9 Tables
Table 3.1: Intent-to-treat effect of conservation credits program in pilot.
Monthly Pumping Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Conservation Credit treatment group -12.067 -12.126 -16.666 -12.032 -16.872
(12.071) (11.423) (13.305) (15.391) (15.672)
Strata FE X X X X
Month FE X X
Sub-village FE X X
Baseline controls X X
Observations 270 270 270 258 258
Clusters 90 90 90 86 86
Standard errors clustered by individual.
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